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A HAND-BOOK

OF

HINDU PANTHEISM.

THE PANCHADASI

OF

SREEMUT VIDYARANYA SWAMI.

TRANSLATED WITH COPIOUS ANNOTATIONS

BY

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Translator, "Vedantasara," &c.

SECOND EDITION.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

CALCUTTA:
HEERALAL DHOLE, MUSJID BARI STREET,
SOCIETY FOR THE RESUSCITATION OF INDIAN LITERATURE,
65/2, BEADON STREET.

1899.

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PRINTED BY H. C. DASS,

"Elysium Press," 68/2, Beadon Street, Calcutta.

Dhole's Vedanta Series.

THE PANCHADASI.

PREFACE.

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For one so deservedly reputed, as the author of the Panchadasi, which holds a high place in the realm of Vedantic Philosophy, it is but proper, that a short notice of his life and writings should go along with its English version. But in the matter of biography, there never was a time, nor is it even now the case,—when any attention was paid to it. India boasts of a literature which is unique; every department of learning bears the stamp of genius,—originality, deep research, and profound and sublime thoughts. Unfortunately the lives, that were spent in thus enriching the Sanskrit, and opening up a world of new ideas and new philosophies, were allowed to drop in time into the gulf of eternity, without leaving any trace of their struggles and sufferings, their joys and pleasures, beyond the simple fact that they lived and died. Suppression of self or egoism was a religious principle with them; and this may to a certain extent account for the lack of authentic records of the lives of our great men and good. And, if to this be added the certain fact, that they lived quite unostentatiously, with very slender means, barely enough to satisfy the simple wants of the flesh (already reduced to starvation limits); without that artificial halo, which encircles the mushroom authors of the day: it will be evident that the incident of such lives as theirs would neither be interesting nor profitable. We had no press that could puff in those days; the art of printing was yet in the womb of distant futurity; the renown of a scholar was confined in the narrow circle of his nativity,

where a solitary student would be found engaged in receiving, and he in imparting, instruction to them. His pupils, gradually spread his fame and worth ; for, after finishing their course, they turn into new pastures, and set themselves up as professors. In this way, the learned scholar draws pupils from remote places, who copy their teachers' manuscripts and writings, and, are taught in them. Under circumstances so repressive and trying it is a matter of congratulation that, what is yet left us, is a standing monument, imperishable like time itself, and undying like glory. With the paucity of materials for a suitable biography, so much of fiction has been transplanted on it that we had one time thought of giving up the idea ; but recollecting that a blind uncle is better than none, we begin our task.

Madhava, Madhavarya, Madhvacharya, and Madhavamatya were the names by which Vidyarana Swami used to pass prior to his turning into a recluse. He was born in the fourteenth century of the Christian era at Golconda. It appears that Vijayanagar was the capital of Bukkka I, whose family priest and minister our author was. Very little is known of his early life. His parents, as may naturally be expected from their connection with the reigning family, were in affluent circumstances and very highly respected. His father was, as he himself speaks of him in his commentary on Parasar's Law Book, "Narayan of good renown," and mother,—Sreemutty. He had two more brothers, called Sayan (the great Commentator of the Rig Veda)* and

* Unfortunately some Oriental scholars confound him with his brother, the subject of this memoir. Both the brothers, Sayan and Madhav, had their separate Commentaries on the Vedas.

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Somenath. They belonged to the Bharadwaj Gotra and *Bodhvayani Shakha* of the Black Yajur Veda. He wrote many works, all of which attest his learning and erudition. Next to Sankaracharya, he is everywhere recognised as an authority on the doctrine of Non-duality. He wrote on Medicine, Grammar, Astrology, besides writing Commentaries on the Four Vedas known by the name of *Madhavaprokash*; Commentaries on the *Brahma Mimansa* or *Adhikaran Mala*; Commentary on Parasar's Law Book; *Anumitiprakash Brahma Gita*, or a critical analysis of the doctrine of non-duality based on the *Sruti*, and a review of Madhava, Ramanuja and Sankar's views. Here also he has added his commentary for elucidating the text, and called *Prakashika*; *Jivanmuktiviveka*; *Drigdrishvaviveka* and the gloss of *Aparokshyanuvuti*. His *Sarvadarshan Sangraha* treats of fifteen systems as follow:—(1) Charvaka-darshna, (2) Buddha-darshana; (3) Arhata-darshna; (4) Ramanuja-darshana; (5) Puranprajna; (6) Nakulis-pasupat; (7) Shaiva; (8) Pratyabhijna; (9) Raseshavar; (10) Aulik; (11) Akshapada; (12) Jaimini; (13) Panini; (14) Sankhya; and (15) Patanjal. Among his minor works are *Jaiminya Naymala, Acharmadhava* and *Sankardigbijaya*.

It is neither profitable nor interesting to enter into details about the various anecdotes current about Madhava's snpernatural gifts. For instance, it is said, that with a view of propitiating the Gayatri Devi he had collected several learned Brahmins from various parts of the country, and on the auspicious occasion regularly commenced the Gayatripurashcharana, but he was unsuccessful in meeting her. This made him indifferent to worldly enjoyments, and ultimately turned him into a re-

cluse. Then Gayatri insisted upon him to ask for a boon, and Madhava requested her to cause a shower of gold in the Karnatic, so that every one may become rich. This was actually fulfilled. Later in life he settled himself in the Sringeri Math founded by Sankaracharya of which he became the reputed head. Here his last work *Panchadasi* was written, but as he did not live long to finish it, the work was left to his Guru Bharatitirtha Muni, who wrote the latter nine books and thus completed the fifteen books of which the Panchadasi is made.*

N. D.

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* And so it did happen that with this short Biographical Sketch of the author, the English translator of the *Panchadasi* paid his tribute of Nature. He died in his 47th year on the 14th of March, 1887 at 5-30 A. M., deeply regretted by all who knew him.

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THE PANCHADASI.

SECTION I.

SALUTATIONS be to my GURU SREE SHANKARANANDA who is non-different from the Supreme Self and who is the chief resort for the destruction of infatuity and its attendant evils derived from conceit and egoity, leading to ineffable misery every being acting under the influence of free will, like to those fearful animals—the dog, crocodile and others living in water.

2. Love and reverence to the said GURU will produce a pure heart, and enable the individual to distinguish the Real from the non-real objective world together with the elements of which it is made. This I proceed to consider.

3. To establish the identity or oneness of the Everlasting Intelligence and Bliss—PARABRAHMA—with the Individuated Self, it is necessary that the latter must also have the same everlasting intelligence and bliss. With this view, the non-difference of knowledge as helps the individual in the cognition of several objects is being cited here. We distinguish a

thing by its name, for instance a golden earring and a golden bangle are equally derived from gold, the difference in their shape determines their individuality.

4. And if this be omitted, the remaining gold is one in both, yet each has its name. In the same way, the Individual Spirit is one with the Universal:—the difference consists in their associates, which if left out, there remains only one consciousness. Hence the individual state being one of everlasting intelligence, it is one with the Absolute. But this requires proof and for such a purpose it is necessary, in the first instance, to establish consciousness as one and if that can be done, then it is eternal and true, for what is always one, is eternal.

5. There are three states of consciousness (*a*) waking, (*b*) dreaming, and (*c*) dreamless slumber. The first is defined as that condition when consciousness takes hold of a subject by the instrumentality of the senses. In the conciousness of the wakeful state are floating sound, touch, make, taste and smell—ether, air, fire, water and earth—(*i.e.*,) multiform subjects. What floats, is an object of cognition, subject, etc., and that in which it floats is consciousness. The respective consciousnesses which enable us to cognise an object by touch, sound, etc., may appear different and multiform, but such difference and diversity exist only in the subject or object which consciousness covers—while consciousness is one and alone; and that difference in the subject or object is easily recognisable by the individual characteristics or features presentin it.

6. For instance, a cow and horse are different from one another, a pitcher is also a separate object from a cloth; hence for variety, all objects are different from similar other objects and for oneness consciousness whether as regards sound touch, sight or in any other condition is non-different. In short, the condition which enables an individual to form an idea of an object by touch or sight, or by its sound, has reference to one

and the same consciousness, and what appears to us different *viz.*, sound quite distinct from touch, is due to the diversity of the objects. Therefore the consciousness present in the waking condition is one, but the subject or object of such consciousness is several, and for this multiformness we are apt to mistake the one and impartite consciousness as several, but if we can shake off such difference-creating-a-mistake then consciousness appears as one.

7. This intelligence is the Atma (Self) and for his being the receptacle of supreme felicity, he is full of bliss. If from extreme misery one is disgusted with his self, yet it cannot be said that self is not an object of love, for no one desires that he may be miserable, or that he may die; on the contrary every one desires that he may live long, and that he may enjoy happiness. This proves the self to be the centre of affection.

8. The affection for a son, or towards a friend is all for self, if it were otherwise, then we would have felt equally for an ascetic. But love for self is not actuated by any consideration in the way as it influences our connection in regard to a friend—for it is quite possible, and it happens so, for a rupture to take place with a son; but this is neither possible nor does it ever occur in the case of an individual's love for self. Hence the principle of individuality or self is blissfulness.

9. The individual spirit or self, having thus been shewn by the foregoing demonstrations to be eternal, intelligence, and full of bliss is expressed by the word *Twam* (Thou); the Parabrahma, Universal Spirit or Supreme Brahma as expressed by the word *Tat* (That) is eternal intelligence and bliss (this is self-evident.) Hence their non-difference is the object which is explained in the *Vedanta*. This will subsequently be pointed out.

10. Having thus established the Atma to be full of bliss it remains to be seen whether or not, happiness is manifested always. If it is not manifested, then Self cannot be the seat of

supreme felicity; for unless an ojbect appear beautiful, it cannot excite our love; moreover, even if it is manifested, Self cannot be styled to be the seat of happiness, for naturally after having derived happiness, there is no inclination for finding out its cause, hence where is the possibility of attaching felicity to him? And as after having tasted such supreme and ineffable happiness, there is no more hankering left for the gratification of worldly desires, therefore love for self owes its origin to no other second principle for which it is said, the semblance of bliss attached to the Atma is both manifested and its reverse.

12. As in an assembly of boys recanting the *Vedas* the voice of no one boy can be singled out plainly, though it is audible, hence it can be said to be audible and inaudible at the same time, similarly for an impediment the manifestibility of Self being full of bliss and its opposite condition are present at the same time.

13. The nature of the impediment which prevents the manifestibility of the supreme happiness of the Atma, though always present, is now being declared. That which is eternally present, but which appears to be non-eternal is called an impediment, or obstacle. In this way, the supreme felicity of the Atma is ever present but from being blinded by the poison of worldly desires, such felicity appears to be impermanent and ill defined, a result of what is called an obstacle, which prevents its manifestibility, though it is ever present.

14. What is the cause of obstacle? As in the foregoing example of an assemblage of boys, the cause of the obstacle which prevents the voice of a single boy being heard is the combining of several voices loudly recanting, so in the present instance the cause of the obstacle which prevents the manifestibility of the supreme felicity of the Atma is *Avidya* which has neither a beginning nor end and is indescribable.

15. This *Avidya* owes its origin to *Prakriti*. *Prakriti* is the shadow of the Supreme Brahma with the three attributes

of *Satwa*, *Raja*, and *Tamas*, it is subtle. It is of two kinds, *Máya* (Illusion) and *Avidya* (Ignorance.)

16. Though equally derived from *Prakriti* their constitution differs; for *Máya* is made of the pure *Satwa*. The reflection of intelligence in *Máya* after having subdued it, is called the omniscient, Iswara (the Lord).

17. The reflection of intelligence in *Avidya* and entirely subservient to it is called the *Jiva* (Life soul); purity or insentiency of Ignorance and its varying shades determine the constitution of a Deva, man, cow, horse, etc. It is likewise called the cause-body; and one having a conceit for this cause-body is called *Prâjna*.

18. Now to ascertain the Astral body (*linga sharira*) the five elements require to be considered. From the aforesaid *Prakriti* (Matter) abounding in (*Tamas*) darkness, by the command of Iswara (Lord) were derived first ether, next air, fire, water and earth for the enjoyment of *Prâjna* and others.

19. [*Prakriti*] Matter has been shown to possess the three properties, *Satwa*, *Raja*, *Tamas*, hence the elements which are derived from it, must also have them in common—for [the qualities of a cause-body are transmitted to its products.] From the satwavic particle of each of the five elements are derived in a consecutive order the several senses *viz.*, from the good particles of ether,—the ear, from air,—the skin, from fire,—eye, from water,—tongue, and from earth,—nose.

20. From the collective totality of goodness of the five elements is derived the internal organ (*antakarana*) which for a difference of its formation is divided into *Manas* (Mind) and *Booddhi* (Intellect) the first is characterised by doubts and the second by certitude.

21. From the intermediate meddlesome or active (*Raja*) quality present in each of the five elements, are derived in a serial order, speech and the five organs of action. That is to say ether is the cause of the organ of speech, air—the hands, fire—the feet, water—the anus, and earth—the genitals.

22. The collective totality of the same *Raja* as present in all the five elements is the progenitor of *Prâna* (vital air) which for a variety of function is divided into

(*a*) '*Prana*' the air situated at the tip of the nose.

(*b*) '*Apana*' the air residing in the anus.

(*c*) '*Samana*' which helps the digestion of food.

(*d*) '*Udana*' situated in the throat.

(*e*) '*Vyana*' which resides in all parts of the body.

23. The five senses, five organs of action, five vital airs, the mind and intellect constitute the seventeen characteristicts of the subtle body otherwise called Linga sharira. Hence to determine it, the foregoing explanation concerning the origin of ether, etc., was necessary.

24. *Prajna* associated with the impure goodness abounding in ignorance, for the conceit that he is the subtle Astral body is called *Taijas*; and *Iswara* associated with the pure goodness abounding in illusion for a similar conceit is called *Hiranyagarbha*. Here the conceit in the subtle body being identical in both, their actual difference consists in this:—that *Taijas* is the distribute segregate, and *Iswara* collective totality of all Astral bodies. That is to say Iswara or Lord has conceit that he is the collective totality of all Astral bodies while Taijas has a conceit for his individual subtle body only.

25. This *Hiranyagarbha* knows that he is non-different and inseparable from all collective subtle bodies with which he is associated. Hence he is called a collective totality. In the same way from want of knowledge *Taijas* is a distributive segregate.

26. Having thus dealt with the subtle Astral body and its associates *Taijas*, *Prajna* and *Hiranyagarbha* and *Iswara*, the origin of the gross physical body is now being considered. With this object quintuplication is to be explained. *Iswara* with a view of providing adequate food and drink for *Prajna* and other beings and their place of enjoyment, and for the production of the four varieties of gross bodies, viviparous,

cf. Tait-up. I. 7, I. Vol. 15 S.B.E. P. 50

oviparous, earthy and germinating, divided each of the five elements, ether and the rest, in the following wise :—

27. He divided each element into two equal parts, took the first half of each, divided it into four parts, and added to it, (one eighth), each first portion of the other elements.

28. From this quintuplication of the elements has been produced the Brahmâ's egg, and the fourteen abodes from Bhur to Patal etc., together with all the enjoyable things and the necessary bodies capable of enjoying them.* *Hiranya-garbha* for the conceit that he is present universally in the collective totality of all gross physical bodies is called *Vaiswanara*, or *Virat* [for he manifests in divers forms] *Taijas* for its presence in the distributive segregate of individual gross physical body and for the conceit that he is a *Deva*, man, cow, horse, etc., is designated *Viswa*.

29. Now the unspiritual and (ignorant) of these Devas and men for enjoying happiness and suffering woe, in this state of existence have recourse to actions which again lead to future re-births for similar enjoyment and suffering in proportion to their merits and de-merits. Thus being hurled into continual re-births, they are debarred from ever enjoying true felicity.

30. As in the instance of an insect falling into a whirlpool, pass from one whirlpool to another in an attempt to extricate itself, failing which it is prevented from attaining to happiness.

31. As the same insect for previous good actions from the kind hearted interference of an individual is rescued from

* "From the said fractional combinations of the elements have likewise been evolved, one above the other, the several abodes designated as Bhur, Bhuvar, Swar, Mahar, Janas, Tapas and Satya ; and one below the other, the nether spheres, severally called Atala, Vitala, Sutala, Rasatala, Talatala, Mahatala, and Patala, together with Brahma's egg, the four physical (gross) bodies with their adequate food-grains and drink."—*Vide* DHOLE'S *Vedanta-sara*, p. 25.

the whirlpool and deposited under the shade of a tree on the river bank to enjoy happiness.

32. So these ignorant and unspiritually inclined *Devas* and men for previous good actions of a prior existence, having received instruction from a teacher, devoted to *Brahma*, come to differentiate the Atma from the five sheaths *Annamaya*, etc., and attain to supreme felicity (*i.e.*,) emancipation.

33. What are the five sheaths? They are the *Annamaya*, *Pranamaya*, *Manomaya* and *Anandamaya*. They cover the *Atma* like a sheath, hence they are designated *kosha* (sheaths). As the silk-worm after having woven its sac becomes confined and is subjected to much inconvenience, so these five-sheaths cover the *Atma*, render him forgetful of his real nature and hurl him into a relationship with the external world.

34. Now for an examination of these sheaths. The resulting product of quintuplication of the elements is the physical body. This is designated the *Annamayakosh* or the foodful covering. The subtle Astral body having within it the five organs of action developed from the active *Raja*, together with five vital airs constitute what is called the Life-sheath (*Pranamayakosh*).

35. The five organs of sense (eye, hearing, etc.,) the resulting product of the satwavic quality with the Mind (*Manas*) which is full of doubts represent the mental sheath. But in connection with the Spiritual Intelligence—the faculty of certitude—(*Booddhi*) the five senses form the cognitional sheath.

36. Ignorance (*Avidya*) which has been described as the cause-body has a particle of satwavic or good quality, which is impure; this with its inherent tendency for delights, pleasures, love and affection, etc., is termed the (*Anandamayakosh*) 'Blissful sheath'; in other words the *Atma* for his conceit in each of these five sheaths receives a separate appellation, that is to say in connection with food, foodful; life sheath, vital; with knowledge, cognitional; and bliss, blissful.

37. The Supreme *Atma* is to be differentiated from the five sheaths for which He has a predilection or conceit by the methods of *Anvaya* and *Vyatireka*. If by the discriminating powers of intelligence, one's own *Atma* be disintegrated or separated and rendered distinct from the five sheaths, then is discovered his condition of everlasting intelligence and bliss, consequently the condition of the finite as represented by the *Jiva* is annihilated and he merges into the indication of Brahma, with which he is one.

38. In the dreaming state, consciousness belonging to the gross physical body—the receptacle of food—(hence foodful) is absent, but the *Atma* is not wanting in manifestibility. He is present as a witness even here and such a condition is termed 'Anvaya' or connection as cause and effect. [The oft quoted example of "I knew nothing then" is a trite example. Here the phrase signifies that all consciousness is at an end, but then the knowledge of such a condition is itself an experience of a certain amount of consciousness, otherwise for one to say on waking that he knew nothing while asleep will be impossible. Now this signifies that the mind in its ordinary state is a double combination of *Atma plus* mind, we are so much in the enjoyment of this twin medley, that its least disturbance as in fits, or trance where the mind sleeps, or in the dreaming condition when the mind ceases to receive the reflection of the *Atma*,—full of intelligence,—we say we know nothing, here the literal condition of the *Atma* continues as active as ever, it is only the mind that is cut off from the influence of receiving the reflected intelligence which is its habitual wont. The *Atma* is a witness of what the mind fails to perceive and such a condition is what is meant by the term just used,] while that other condition in which the active manifestibility of the *Atma* continues in the absence of consciousness in the gross physical body [*i. e.*, the consciousness of the gross body disappears in spite of the presence of Self] is called 'Vyatireka' or dissimilitude. By these two methods

the *Atma* is clearly discernible to be quite a separate thing from the gross physical body,—the foodful sheath.

39. Carrying the same argument to the next stage, *viz.*, that of dreamless slumber the duality of Self and the subtle Astral body will be clearly established. To be more explicit, we have seen that the *Atma* is full of manifestibility and is ever so, now in the dreamless slumbering condition, the subtle Astral body is wanting in consciousness, such would not happen if it were the Atma, for the consciousness of Self never ceases so long as life lasts, hence they are twain. Therefore the two methods are simply a process of analysis. The first refers to the *Atma*, the second to the body. As in the first case, so here too, when with the absence of consciousness in the subtle Astral body, the consciousness [of Self] is not in any way affected it is his 'Anvaya'; and when with the illuminating powers of Self, the subtle Astral body loses all consciousness concerning itself, it is its 'Vyatireka.'

40. Thus therefore while the discussion of the five sheaths clearly establishes their difference from the principle Self, the introduction of the consideration of the subtle Astral body is done on purpose, for if the Atma is a distinct entity from the same Astral body, then it follows that the *Pranamaya*, *Manomaya* and the *Vijnanmaya* sheaths are also quite distinct and separate. For these sheaths are non-different from the Astral body, from which they differ only in composition and quality, —in the constituent elements of the *Satwa*, *Raja* and *Tama* qualities inherent in them, for which they have each a separate name.

41. Now are to be explained for the purpose of ascertaining the non-identity of the cause-body with the Spirit, its *Anvaya* and *Vyatrieka* in the state of the profound meditation (*Samadhi*); for such a consideration the blissful sheath or the cause-body, though it shakes of its coil of ignorance, yet the tangibility of the Spirit as a witness is of the first, while the

continuance of ignorance, notwithstanding the presence of the Spirit, is an instance of the second.

42. By the aforesaid two methods of analysis the differentiation of the Spirit from the five sheaths and its attainment of the PARABRAHMA is thus established, as in the plant *saccharum munja* the tender and new fibres covered by the firmer covering of older fibres can plainly be separated mentally by argument and reasoning, so by analysis and synthesis if the Spirit be disintegrated from its five sheaths or coverings, it attains the everlasting blissfulness and truth of the Supreme Brahma, from which it has not even the semblance of dissimilarity.

43. Now this non-duality of the individual Spirit and the Supreme Brahma is indicated by the transcendental phrase (*Tat Twam Asi*) 'That art thou.' Here if the associates be left out according to the canons of Rhetoric, of abandoning a part, 'That' refers to Parabrahma—consciousness associated with illusion (*Maya*)—while 'Thou' refers to the individual consciousness associated with ignorance, if the associates, *viz.*, illusion and ignorance, be abandoned, there remains only consciousness. This is indicated.

44. As a phrase cannot be comprehended unless the several words composing it are rightly interpreted, therefore the words 'That' and 'Thou' are being separately explained. The proximate cause of the universe,—*Maya*, abounding in darkness (*Tama Guna*) and its instrnmental cause or material agent [(*Maya*) Illusion abounding in pure goodness, with the associate Parabrahma is indicated by the word 'That.'

45. The same associate of Illusion (*Maya*) abounding in impure goodness, full of desires, is indicated by the word 'Thou.'

46. Now if the conflicting portion be left out of the signification after the canons of Rhetoric of abandoning a part*

* " This term is defined in the *Vachaspatya* as " Indication abiding in one part of the expressed meaning, whilst another

of the indication, for the contradiction it implies, inasmuch as the same Illusion is characterised by the three different properties of pain, pure goodness, and impure goodness, the Impartite (remaining non-conflicting) consciousness is one in the two conditions of *Jiva* and Brahma, therefore this non-duality is indicated by the phrase.

47. [This is illustrated] :—As in the phrase, 'That' Devadatta is this, 'that' and 'this' refer to the same Devadatta with this difference in time that the first adjective pronoun refers to Devadatta seen in past time and 'this' refers to the present time, but if the contending element in the indication with reference to time past and present conveyed by 'that' and 'this' respectively, be left out, there remains only Devadatta, and that is meant by the phrase.

48. So in 'That art Thou' 'That' indicates consciousness associated with Illusion—Parabrahma, and 'Thou' consciousness associated with Ignorance—*Jiva*, if the associates Illusion and Ignorance be left out there remains only the Impartite everlasting Intelligence and Bliss—the Parabrahma.

49. So far then, having established the Parabrahma as the indication of 'That' and 'Thou' it remains to be seen whether such indication refers to the associated or unassociated condition. For if such indication refers to the associated condition then it reduces it to 'non-being' (*asat*) and therefore cannot mean the Supreme Brahma which is 'being' (*sat*). As for the unassociated condition being indicated, it is an impossibility, for neither the eye has seen nor the ear heard it, besides the attribution of signs in the indication will reduce it to the condition of an associate.

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part of it is abandoned. As for example, in the sentence 'That is this Devadatta,' whilst the meanings expressive of past and present time are abandoned, another portion of the expressed meaning remains and conveys the idea of the one Devadatta."—*Jacob's Vedantasara*, p. 87.

50. To such an objection it may be asked whether an associate is present in an unassociated, or described as a separate entity in an associated body. For what is unassociated cannot be said to have any associate, as such a condition will reduce it to the very reverse of its actuality, then again as an associated body means a body with an associate, therefore when it becomes associated it takes up the associate, similarly the body may be associate and its associate, the body. Hence it leads to a fallacy in the premises and yields no satisfactory solution. It is called 'unactual defect.' Therefore such erroneous disquisitions are untenable on both sides.

51. Now, such a fallacy is not confined to the points at issue in the foregoing instance only, but must be admitted in all bodies which have quality, action, caste, and relation, otherwise such bodies cannot be ascertained. In other words whether a quality resides in a body with qualities, or without them. In the latter case no quality can be present and in the former the 'same unactual defect' is noticeable. Hence it is only necessary to find out the simple presence of a quality in a body and not to analyse it after the above fashion as to whether it is with or without quality, with or without an associate.

52. Therefore to attribute to the Supreme Self any associate, attribute, indication or relationship is simply the product of Ignorance, for Self is simply eternal intelligence and bliss, and without any thing else.

53. Thus to ascertain the drift of the real signification of the transcendental phrase after the method of the *Vedanta* is designated 'hearing' about the PARABRAHMA. After having ascertained it, continually to consider and reflect on it with the help of the supporting arguments is called 'consideration' (*manana*).

54. By the two methods of hearing and consideration when the mind free from all doubts and uncertainties comes

to be *en rapport* with the Supreme Self, it is called (*Nididhya-sana,*) profound contemplation.

55. When such 'profound contemplation' has been ripened it is called 'meditation' (*samadhi*). In such a state when there is no recognition of subject and object, (*e. g.*, the person contemplating is the subject, and the PARABRAHMA, the object of contemplation) but the mind merges into the object of contemplation, the Supreme Self, and the function of the internal organ is unmoved like the unflickering light of a lamp it is called (*Nirvikalpa Samadhi*) 'contemplation without recognition of subject and object.'

56. In such a condition though the individual has no actual knowledge, yet on rising from his meditation he remembers that he was dwelling on the Brahma. Hence it is quite natural to suppose, that then, the mind assumed the shape of the Supreme Self, and unknowingly rested on Him.

57. If it be alleged that during such meditation the will-force is suspended, hence it is quite impossible for the mind to assume the shape of the Brahma and become one with it. For to awaken the function of an organ, exercise of individual effort is needed, without which effort no function is roused. To such a query the answer is, that at the beginning of profound contemplation there was present intense effort, which by continual exercise formed into a deep conviction, and this resulted in a continuous flow of the function moulded into the shape of the Brahma.

58. Bhagavan Sree Krishna compares the fixed condition of the mind in meditation to the light issuing from an unflickering lamp, in his discourse with Arjuna (*Vide Bhagabut Gita, Chapter* 6, *Verse* 19).

59. Such meditation enables an individual to escape the *karmaic* law which hurls a man to repeated birth and death in this transitory sphere, to reap the fruits of his deeds, good and bad, committed in a previous state of subjective existence; it destroys both good and bad actions and leads to the growth

of that pure religion which helps the individual to the knowledge of (Brahma) Supreme Self.

60. Since it rains an unceasing torrent of nectar such meditation has been termed by men learned in Yoga the 'Religion cloud.'

61. After the destruction of good and evil wishes in an infinite variety of ways and the cumulated products of good and bad actions of previous existence have been uprooted *en masse* through the instrumentality of such Religion-cloud-meditation, the transcendental phrase becomes clear and free from obstacles, at first, to help the cognition of the Brahma which was hitherto present dimly and subsequently as plainly as a thing is discovered in one's own hand.

62. The imperfect and obscure discovery of Self which follows, after hearing the discourse of an adept teacher, versed in Brahmaic lore, on such phrases as, That art Thou, etc., helps the destruction of all sins committed knowingly, like a blazing fire. In other words when one has come to know the Brahma, his wishes and actions cease.

63. The precepts of an adept teacher on the aforesaid phrase so helps the knowledge of Self as to render Him visible, then as the sun disperses darkness, so such knowledge destroys Ignorance which is the cause of this material world [and cuts of the chain of consecutive re-births.]

64. If one attached to the world will follow step by step the means of knowledge herein indicated and by close reasoning and analysis fix them in his mind, he shall then be able to cut of the chain of consecutive re-births,—soon to attain to the state of ineffable bliss.

SECTION II.

From the *Sruti* we gather that before the evolution of the objective world, there was present only 'existence' (*Sat*)—the secondless Reality Brahma—from which all things have been derived, hence an analysis of the several elements is necessary for the cognition of Brahma. For such a purpose, these are now being considered.

2. There are five elements:—ether, air, heat, water, and earth, distinguished by their specific properties of sound, touch, form, taste and smell. Ether and the rest are marked by the properties one, two, three, four and five in a consecutive serial order, ether has only one, the next one *plus* one, that is two, and so on till we find the last having four properties derived from the bases, together with its specific property.

3. To be more explicit, ether has only one property, sound; air, sound and touch; heat,—sound, touch and form; water,—sound, touch, form and taste; earth,—sound, touch, form, taste and smell. Hence, ether has only the property of communicating sound as evidenced in echoing, air besides emitting a peculiar sound in its passage, also communicates a sensation of heat and cold which is touch. In the same way, heat manifests itself by its crackling noise, sensation of warmth and visibility; water by its peculiar rippling or rushing sound, cold feel, white form, and mild taste; and the earth by its sound, hard feel, divers shape, variety of taste, and good or bad smell. This is evident enough.

4. [For the recognition of the said five properties, we have five especial organs of sense, to wit, the ears, skin, eyes, tongue and smell.] These organs from their separate seats becomes gradually accustomed to carry on their individual functions, and as they are very subtle,—hence cannot be seen

their presence is manifested by their functions,* by which alone they are conceivable, and they generally take hold of, or cover external objects.

5. Notwithstanding the general tendency of the several organs of sense, to cover external objects, they do at times take an inward course. For instance, if the external meatus be stopped with a piece of cotton wool, the passage of sound will find no obstruction, but will be distinctly audible, through the medium of the air situated within. In the act of drinking and eating the stomach feels a sensation of cold and warmth in the same way as the skin does; closing the eyes brings on darkness, and eructations convey taste and smell.

6. Speech, prehension, progression, excretion, and emission are the functions of the five organs of action. (Here again we find, that there are as many actions as there are organs,—an absence of the sixth function is due to the want of an organ to perform it.) Agriculture and trade &c, are carried on by means of the very same active organs, hence naturally they come within the aforesaid category of speech and the rest.

7. Mouth, hands, feet, anus, and the genitals are the five organs of action.

8. The five external organs of sensation, and five organs of action are controlled by the mind which has its seat in the lotus of the heart. It is likewise called the 'internal organ,' (Anthakarana) for its inward action is independent of them. Not so with the external, for which it has to depend entirely upon the senses.

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* The Aryan Rishis never mistook the external organs, eyes &c., for the organs themselves, they are the external appendages merely. The seats of the sensory organs, or centres, are the several ganglia with which each especial nerve is connected and which carry the impressions to the sensorium, these are looked upon as the 'internal organ.'

9. The mind ascertains the quality or defect of an object, after it has been covered (taken possession of) by the senses. It has three qualities, the good or pleasant, the active or meddlesome, and the dark or plainful. They induce changes on it.

10. The changes induced by the good quality are indifference to earthly pursuits, forgiveness and large mindedness. Passion, anger, temptation and struggle for worldly benefits, &c., are the products of the active quality. Idleness, error, sleep (lassitude) &c., are due to darkness.

11. From the good quality of the mind arises virtue, from the active are produced the passions, anger &c., which in their turn lead to sin and other bad actions; from the third or bad are derived sloth, lassitude and sleep, hence an individual under its influence spends his time in doing nothing and keeps himself aloof from virtue and vice. What attaches personality to the individual functions of the several organs in connection with the mind is the agent or instrument. As in common parlance one who does a thing is known as the doer or subject (?) agent, or instrument, so the internal organ or mind is the agent, for it is resort of individuality.

12. The objective world can easily be determined to have derived its origin from the elements, for their specific properties sound and the rest are the attributes of ether and the other elements, thus incontestibly establishing their elementary composition, hence further consideration is not needed. Not so with the organs. Here an analysis based on reason, and the teachings of the Shastras are required to show that they are derived from the same elements.

13. Now there are five organs of sense, five organs of action, both controlled by the mind (which also must be reckoned as an organ, as it helps cognition). Whatever is known by the aid of these organs, reason, and Shastras is indicated by the word 'Edam' (all this) in the phrase "*Sadeva sonya edam*," and it means the universe.

14. Before the evolution of 'all this' (universe) there was present one, secondless, existence (Sat) without a name or form. Such is laid down in the *Chandogoya Upanishad* by Udalika.

15. The three expletives 'one,' 'secondless,' and 'Existence' are used to differentiate It, from bodies similar and dissimilar. That is to say, as a tree has its branches, leaves, flowers and fruits differing from each other,—a leaf resembles not a flower, nor does a flower its fruit, nor either, a branch—thus constituting its distinguishing individuality or segregate units, for though the tree is one, yet it has its composite units different; and as such a tree is recognised from another of a different class by its family characteristics—a difference in its leaf, flower, fruit, growth, bark and stone, (its family characteristics)—and as it is easily known from other things as stone &c., it has therefore a third characteristic which serves to distinguish it from bodies dissimilar. (This may be termed contrast).

16. So in the case of the secondless Reality, no such apprehension needs be entertained as to the presence of the three aforesaid characterising traits. For such a purpose the three expletives ("Edam, Ebam, Aditiam") one, sure, and secondless are prefixed. Thus is non-duality established.

17. Moreover, it must be remembered that, as the Parabrahma is without form, and has no distinguishing individuality as noticed in the instance of the tree and its fruit &c., you cannot assign any form or name to It, for It existed prior to them.

18. Name and form are indications of creation, hence what existed prior to it cannot have a name; consequently the Supreme Self which is eternal and formless has no differentiating individual trait like the ether.

19. If there were two or more existences (Sat) then to individualise or identify them as separate entities there must exist family distinctions, but as it is secondless and one, It has

only *one* indication and not *many*, consequently there does not exist another body of Its kind. Virtually then, without the difference of Its associates in name and form, it has no distinguishing trait in Itself, therefore to describe the difference of associates and to admit them as belonging to It, is only conducive of error.

20 Nor can contrast be instituted here. For It is existence, hence contrast or dissimilarity will fix on non-existence (Asat) as dissimilar or different from It. But what is non-existent has no shape, hence the Parabrahma cannot be cleared by contrast.

21. Thus is established the oneness of Parabrahma which is eternal, Intelligence, and bliss without a second; but to establish it more firmly a consideration of the arguments adduced by the opponents of this doctrine, is now being given. Some amongst them erroneously assert that before the evolution of this universe there existed (Asat,) ' non-being' and therefore imply the non-existence of the secondless Reality which is (Sat) ' being' and essentially existent.

22. As a drowned man is bereft of his senses and loses the capacity of expressing himself, but is subject to extreme fear and hence is powerless, so these dissenters lose their senses and become bewildered when hearing the precepts and doctrines of non-duality and are overtaken by fear.

23. In the state of meditation without recognition of subject and object (worshipped) a certain dread is felt, by those persons who are given to the worship of a personal God, such is asserted by the religious teachers of Gour [Bengal] who have laid it down in their works.

24. Another name for the above variety of meditation is ' untouchable Yoga.' Because the followers of personal worship can never acquire it, in spite of the hardships enjoined for its practice, hence it is untouchable and though there is no cause for fear yet like little children evincing dread when left alone, without any substantial ground for it, these

devotees are unreasonably affected by imaginary dread, when actually there is none whatever in it, from the 'untouchable Yoga.'

25. The venerable Sankaracharya looks upon such followers of personal worship, (Madhyamic Buddhists,)—a set of controversialists who discard reason and anology from their arguments—as totally ignorant of meditation without subject and object, for the cognition of the unthinkable, essentially existent Supreme Self. [They are unacquainted with such a meditation in which the person meditating loses his personality and is unconscious of the object of his meditation, the two are blended into one—a non-dual condition]

26. They [such Buddhists] discard the *Sruti* either from Ignorance, or from want of comprehension, and drawing their inferences from possible cause and effect, they promulgate atheism and deny the existence of Self.

27. (Now the atheistic doctrine of 'non-being' is being critically examined in the way of queries and and answers.) Oh! ye Buddhists! you assert there was 'non-being' before the objective world was ushered into existence. What do ye mean by it? How can the meaning of the two words 'was' and 'none-being' be reconciled. 'Was' indicates existence, and 'non-being' non-existence, therefore two opposite conditions. Hence such an expression is full of contradiction.

28. You cannot ascribe darkness to the sun or say he is dark; to say so will be illogical and untenable, because the sun is the very opposite of darkness—light—this you know surely, and as light and darkness cannot by any means be looked upon as one or same substance, how can you possibly look upon as one and the same substance what is implied by the contradictory epithets 'was' and 'non-being' in your expression "there was non-being in the beginning"?

29. The *Vedanta* teaches the doctrine that the elements ether and the rest, potentially existed in the Parabrahma, and their separate designation and form are simply the result of

Illusion, if you attach a similar signification to your 'non-being' and fancy its existing potentially in the essentially existent Self, through the same Maya, then your 'non-being' is transformed into Self and may you live long for it.

30. If you say, that like your 'non-being' our attribution of name and form to the essentially existent Parabrahma is imaginary, for in It, we do not admit name and form and if such attribution is due to Illusion, then that Illusion must rest on something (real), for an Illusion means a mistake for something real, [as in the familiar example of a snake in a rope] and without some reality resting in the back-ground no error can arise. Hence, how can it be possible for your 'non-being' to convey a similar attribution to that of name and form.

31. If you contend that our Vedantic expression in the beginning 'there was existence' is alike faulty, inasmuch as existence is twice implied by the two words 'was' and 'existence' when they are considered separate, and tautological when otherwise, and therefore though "There was nothing" is alike faulty, it is passable. No, ye Buddhists! do not say so, for repetition of a word is sanctioned by usage :—

32. As doing right, telling a word, holding the ascertained, &c. These words have familiarised repetition to all pupils. The *Sruti* has likewise adopted the same practice in its mode of instruction when it says, 'Before the evolution of the universe there was existence.'

33. The past tense in the above passage is used to instruct a pupil, accustomed to connect a thing with notions of time. That is to say, in considering the secondless Reality, though time as a separate entity is absent, yet as the pupils are habituated to time, the past tense is purposely introduced to help their comprehension. Hence the expression cannot lead to the inference of a second thing, in any way militating against the secondless Reality—the Parabrahma.

34. In common practice, with the objective world before you, whatever questions or inferences you gather are possible,

not so with what relates to non-dual spirituality. That is to say, when there are many objects, and the knowledge relating to them many, then only questions will arise for solution in a variety of ways, but when the object of knowledge is reduced to number one as happens in the conception of non-duality, no such question or inference will cause an interruption of the subject, for then, that knowledge has assumed the impartite shape or in other words, become so modified and blended with the object, that it is one impartite whole. In such a condition (non-dual) questions, and answers, argument and analysis are out of the question, for the knowledge which enables the individual to cover an object for the purpose of framing a question, or deciding an answer for it, has become reduced to one and cannot master any thing else, besides it has become already one with the impartite Parabrahma.

35. To exclude duality from the spiritual Monad or Essence, the *Smriti* text is cited as authority wherein is mentioned, "Before the world had come into existence there was one, quite,—because inert, vast—so as not to be grasped by word or by the mind—unspeakable and unthinkable, nameless, —for it is impossible to portray an accurate description,— indescribable because the eyes and the other organs cannot take hold of It,—something—the antitype of nothing,— essentially existent. It is not fire, for it does not discover material objects, nor are they discovered by it. Neither is it darkness, as it enshrouds, nothing, for it is naturally uncovered, all-pervading, and equally present everywhere." [Now the controversy between a Buddhist and Non-dualist in reference to the inferences of their sacred writings is being given; 'you, refer to a Buddhist and 'we,' non-dualist].

36. If you ask, since the earth and its contents have all come into existence, it is very natural to conclude there was a time when they did not exist, yes not even the atoms, for all created objects are equally subject to destruction. But how do we comprehend ether also was then want-

ing, to avoid falling into the dilemma of admitting twain existences?

37. Oh ye Buddhists! If your conception of 'nothing' in that period of the history of the universe when it existed not, implies neither contradiction nor any difficulty, then why do you misapprehend us, when we say, that in that very same prior condition, there was only present the ONE EXISTENCE. The inference is very natural, for that prior condition is equally present in both the premises, in your 'nothing' and our 'existence.' They simply indicate the extreme—negative and positive poles. In the same way as your negative was present, our positive pre-existed every condition.

38. If you say ether is visible as a separate entity outside the globe in the shape of its atmosphere, so that as regards visibility it is not an inconclusive argument, we may then enquire of you, when and how do you see it without light or darkness? In the absence of that light or darkness ether is never visible, and both of them cannot exist *out* of the universe, consequently you never see the ether without it, this you are forced to admit. Besides,—according to your view, ether is not a really visible body.

39. If you say that according to the *Vedanta*, the essentially existent Parabrahma is also invisible, so here again the same difficulty crops up, which is pointed out in the preceding paragraph with regard to the visibility of ether, and the conditions are therefore equal, to such a query we reply that in the state of unconscious meditation without recognition of subject and object, we do conceive the Brahma as a (positive) existence and have no knowledge of non-existence, which by argument and analysis we do away with.

40. If you say, during such meditation, existence is not conceivable, for the separate function of the internal organ is at abeyance, and it cannot cover the Brahma. Our reply is, for discovering the Brahma the presence of *Boodhi* is not

needed. For, It is self-illuminated and requires no other extraneous aid for being discovered. Though not a subject of *Boodhi* (spiritual intelligence) yet it is duly reflected in the consciousness, as a witness, a presence not to be put by, a real existence, and not an unreal ' nothing.'

41. Therefore after the mind has been freed from its subjective modifications of determination and [error, mistake, or] indecision and has attained tranquility, as its associated consciousness is manifested in the form of a simple presence, or witness, doing nothing, but in a condition of passivity, so that prior condition when it existed before the objective world had sprung into existence through Matter (Maya) is easily conceivable and implies neither any difficulty nor contradiction.

42. The inherent force residing in the Parabrahma which is essentially existent, and which cannot be differentiated is called Maya. As the consuming flame of fire imparts an idea of its force, so the potentiality of the universal force resident in the Supreme Self is plainly seen in the (creative works) objective material world.

43. (Now this Maya cannot be said to be one with Parabrahma or as something distinct). As the consuming force of fire cannot be said to be fire, so the inherent force of the Supreme Brahma (Maya) is not the same with It, to say so is unreasonable, for, you cannot say "I am my own force," hence the inherent universal force is not the substance itself. Then again if you admit it as a separate entity, Can you describe its separate existence? [It will thus be evident that Maya and Force with which a Madhyamika Buddhist seeks to identify matter and Parabrahma, are two inseparably blended; we all know force cannot exist without matter as a separate entity, yet to say that it is the same as matter is absurd, hence the contention in the paragraph just asks an opponent of the Vedantic School to describe force as a separate entity.

But it may be urged that Parabrahma is force, and,—therefore to introduce the same force either in a separate or analogous form is no less absurd. For what is force, is always so, hence force *plus* force is equally force; under such circumstances the mind fails to comprehend the drift of the text. But no such ambiguity will remain, if we introduce matter in its undifferentiated condition,—a condition in which the difference between matter and its inherent force is nil, the boundary line so to speak, in which matter losing its grossness, assumes the subtlety of superetherial finis, when no matter is distinguishable as such, but all is spirit or force; and such an inference is derived from nature, for the boundary line between the mineral and vegetable, and between the latter and the animal creation is so gradually bevelled at the edges, that each passeses into the other by way of transition. For a long time, Science was undecided whether a certain vegetable was the last link in the scale of the animal series or a vegetable, so much do they resemble each other. If such a view be accepted, and it is the one advocated by Kapila—in his Mula Prakriti—then the difference between Prakriti and Purush on which many have stumbled from ignorance, no longer subsists for all practical purposes, but for syllogistic ends we may go on dabbling *ad-infinitum*. The Vedantist here presents to his antagonist, (a Buddhist) the sharp point of a sword which cuts both ways, inasmuch as it takes the ground from under his feet and makes the position of the assailant really invincible. Now, Maya is described as a force and it is elsewhere described as the chief factor of the universe, consequently it cannot be anything less than matter. So that we come to the same point whence we started, *e. g.*, matter and force. Otherwise the meaning is absurd. And this Maya or matter existed potentially in the Parabrahma and by an act of volition was created the objective world with the self-made Maya residing within It. Now such a doctrine is not open to the crticism that God made the world out of nothing, for nothing can create

nothing. On the other hand He* created it out of matter which resided within him. If it be asked, since the Parabrahma is a pure spirit how can It have any connection with matter which is antagonistic to It? We reply, that spirit and force are convertible terms, and we have seen that force cannot exist without matter, hence wherever there is force, there must matter be. It is emphatically laid down that Maya existed in the Parabrahma, and it is this Maya which evolved or created the universe in a natural order of sequence, by undergoing change impressed upon it, through its force or Parabrahma. Without such changes being wrought upon it through the agency of its spirit or force, the universe and its stellar system could never have sprung up; change is the law of the universe, change every where and in every moment is the grand centre around which are deposited the nidus of future planets, their sattelites etc., and the gradual, slow but sure dissolution of the present existing ones. In this way there never was a time when the world was non-existent, nor will there ever be a time when such will be the case; though in truth it may be laid down that this world is not the first of the series; nor is our human race the first that has been called upon to fill or inhabit it. From close reasoning this must naturally establish itself as an axiomatic truth, for if the Parabrahma is eternal and essentially existent, and if such Parabrahma cannot exist as a separate entity without its Maya, (or out of matter) then matter and its force must by natural laws induce changes in each other which must end in works. Such then the *role*. We use purposely each other, because we find Parabrahma is one force, and we are told by Science that there are several forces attraction, repulsion, gravitation;—centrifugal, centripetal and gravitation—synonymous with Satwa, Raja and Tama of Aryan writers.]

* Parabrahma is always neuter, we have purposely made use of the masculine gender to indicate the creative act, prominently.

44. If you say the nomenclature of Maya is similar to your 'nothing' then you contradict yourself, inasmuch as it was said (in the 27th para.) to be a product of Maya, thus then you are to regard Maya as something else then (*Sat*) 'existence,' and distinct from (*Asat*) 'non-existence' or 'nothing,' a condition that cannot be described, hence—indescribable: (virtually reminding the reader of Ignorance which is the same as Prakriti or matter, therefore Maya is matter.)

45. Now for the proofs of such an assertion the *Sruti* is quoted. "Prior to the world's springing into existence, there was neither present (Asat,) 'nothing' nor 'being' as a separate entity, but only Maya (an indication of darkness) the inherent force of the Supreme Self, having no independent existence but deriving its tangibility from the Parabrahma.

46. But such a consideration does not necessarily reduce the Parabrahma to the condition of a second. For the separate existence of a force outside of a substance is nowhere recognised.

47. If it be alleged, since with the decrease of strength, vitality is reduced and with its increase life is prolonged, we have an instance of the separate existence of force, it is laid down that strength or force is no cause for the prolongation of life. It is the cause of inducing cultivation, war, and other acts in which labour is concerned. Hence it has no separate existence from the body. Now, following a similar train of argument if it be asserted that since strength is the cause of cultivation, war, and the rest, we may as well attribute to the Supreme Brahma a second attribute or existence. But this cannot be done with any show of reason, for in that prior condition when the objective world was not in existence, neither war, nor cultivation was possible, therefore, to admit them is absurd, (and a duality of existence is not less so).

48. The aforesaid force (Maya) is not diffused in Parabrahma, but, pervades only a part, in the same way as every

sort of earth cannot be profitably turned into a jar or other earthen thing, but can moist earth only.

49. To this purpose the *Sruti* says, "One portion of the Parmatma is engrossed in the whole elements, the remaining three-fourth is eternal, pure, free, and self-manifested." In this way, the function of Maya is attributed to the Parabrahma in the *Sruti*.

50. Referring to this subject, Krishna in his discourse with Arjuna says, "With a small portion of the body, I pervade the universe and occupy it (*vide Gita, Chapter X.* last stanza.)

51. There are other *Sruti* texts and *Shariraka Sutras* equally corroborative of the above. "The Parabrahma by a small portion of its body pervades the whole universe, the remaining portion is eternal, pure and free."—*Sruti*. "The Parabrahma is not wholly enshrouded in change, but rests in an uncovered, unchanged and unaffected condition.—*Shariraka Sutra, Book IV. Chapter IV. Sutra 19*.

52. But it is formless, hence to say that a portion of Its body is covered, and subject to change, while the other is not, implies a contradiction. This is cleared in the following wise:—The *Sruti* attributes form, for the purpose of explanation to a pupil.

53. That inherent force Maya, abiding in the Parabrahma induces a change which finally ends in works usually called creative, but strictly speaking,—evolutional, in the same way as by a blending of the primitive colors a beautiful effect is produced.

54. Now the first product of the change induced by Maya is ether, which is void. And as this ether is a derivative product of Maya, which again is a force of the Parabrahma, its manifestibility is a manifestibility of its cause—the Self.

55. Hence though Self is essentially existent, its product ether has two attributes, *viz.*, existence and void.

56. In other words, ether has the attribute of sound which

is absent in the Parabrahma, therefore the latter has only one attribute, whereas Its derivative product ether has two, *viz.*, sound and existence.

57. That Maya which produces ether, after establishing the identity of ether with Self seeks further to draw opposite inferences, by attributing the property of the cause to the product and transmitting that property to the product, that is to say, Self is essentially existent, therefore to conclude ether is also similarly endowed, is a product of (Maya) Illusion.

58. The fact is, ether owes its existence to Self, and it is non-eternal, for it is a created product; hence the assumption of the Tarkikas or other ordinary men who hold ether to be eternal, is due to Illusion. For Maya naturally leads to error.

59. It is universally admitted that proofs establish the real nature of thing, while error has a contrary effect.

60. Now this ether and the rest are looked upon in a different light, till cleared by the analysis of the *Sruti*, therefore pause and reflect whether it is eternal or not.

61. Ether and the Supreme Sat (Being) are distinct from each other, for—etymologically their signification is different, moreover the consequence of the action of ether on air is the presence of sound which determines or establishes that air and not ether.

62. For He is all pervading, hence Self is the receptacle of ether which is an action or attribute, thus considered nothing remains of ether to claim a separate identity.

63. If you regard ether as naturally void, then it is quite different from (Sat) 'being,' in other words you admit it as 'non-being' (Asat). If you say though ether is different from 'being', yet it is not 'non-being,' then you contradict yourself, for what is not 'being' must be 'non-being' and you cannot maintain the one and discard the other with any show of reason.

64. If you argue, since the ether is plainly discernible, it cannot be non-existent, for in that case it would have been

invisible, we reply that it is the very nature of Illusion (Maya) to make 'nothing' appear as something like an object seen in a dream, which is non-existent, yet plainly discernible. This we call unreal.

65. In two co-existing objects no difference can be perceived. Therefore the difference between the words ether and existence is thus established. Caste and person, being and body, quality and object are each different from the other, and the method by which they can be distinguished will enable a differentiation of ether and existence.

66. (If you are not convinced about the mutual difference of the two even after understanding it, the subject is further explained by the following questions and their replies.) If you say that you understand the difference between ether and 'being,' but you cannot firmly believe it, then state your reasons for disbelief.

67. If carelessness be its cause, fix your attention and be earnest, if doubt, have recourse to proofs adduced in the *Shastras*, and weigh the arguments based on analogy and reason.

68. After the existing difference of ether and 'being' has been firmly established in the mind by fixed attention, *Shastra* proofs and analogy, ether is no longer mistaken for Reality, nor is Reality connected with the perquistes of ether and mistaken with unreality.

69. The Prajna always looks upon ether as non-eternal; and (Sat) 'being,'—devoid of the attributes of ether; (e. g.,) He is eternal, pure and free.

70. The 'liberated in life' with the aforesaid conception of ether and 'being' is astonished to find ignorant persons holding opposite beliefs; bent in worldly pursuits and full of desire, they are devoid of self-knowledge, hence believe the reality of ether.

71. Thus after establishing the unreality of ether and Reality of the Parabrahma, if the same line of argument be

carried in reference to the four other elements, It will be found different from them.

72. Though with 'being' and air—the resulting product of ether,—there is no relation of cause and effect, yet from their mutual connection, their identity can possible be established, hence to consider Sat from air their mutual relationship is being established. The essentially existent Parabrahma is closely situated to Maya, which again is similarly placed to ether, and ether to air, that is to say, each preceding one stands more or less in the relation of cause to its effect, which comes immediately after, and for such relation (of cause and effect) it is possible to look upon air and 'being' as identical.

73. In this way, after ascertaining the relation of identity between them, their existing difference can only be made out by a consideration of the properties of air. Now air has naturally four properties:—attraction of moisture, touch, motion, and velocity. And the respective properties of Sat, Maya and ether are also discernible in air (in the following wise) :—

74. The existence of air is due to Sat, and if such existence be separated from it, then it is reduced to impermanence which is a product of Maya; and its sound is the result of ether.

75. In the 62nd verse it has been asserted that Sat is naturally present in air and the other elements, and not ether, but it is now said that sound, an effect of ether, is easily distinguished in air, this implies a contradiction.

76. [It is thus cleared]. In the 62nd verse it was said, the void of ether cannot be established in air; and now,—sound, the property of ether is discernible in air, hence they do not contradict each other.

77. If from its difference from Sat you admit air as impermanent and a product of Illusion, What prevents you to think it distinct from Maya since the indescribable Maya is a force and there is existing difference between force and air?

78. Because, that undefinable force or its expressed action is not due to Maya which is only an unreality or Illusion. Can you say both in the inexpressed and expressed forms—force and action—the same unreality is equally present?

79. In the consideration of the Real and unreal it is necessary to establish their difference, but there is no need of entering into the individual difference, existing in all things ncluded in the unreal.

80. If from air the reality of existence due to the Supreme Brahma be separated, the remaining portion which is material will be found to be unreal and impermanent. Hence you must cease to regard it as eternal and knowing.

81. A similar consideration will reduce fire, which is a product of air but less pervasive than it, to impermanence the five elements are said to cover the universe (Brahma's egg) more or less, one over the other.

82. In air, one-tenth of it is fire; a similar tenth portion in the other elements is spoken of in the *Purans*.

83. Now the nature and impermanence of fire is being determined. The individual property of fire is manifestibility, while existence, impermanence, sound and warmth proceed from its cause.

84. Sat and Maya, ether, and air, have the aforesaid four properties, if fire with its individual property of manifestibility be separated from Sat, it is reduced to impermanence.

85. The same consideration will reduce water to impermanence, which forms less than a tenth part of fire.

86. The five properties of water derived from its cause are:—existence, impermanence, sound, touch and form while its individual property is taste. Now by discriminating them from Sat, water is also reduced to impermanence.

87. And in water, less than one-tenth of its proportion is earth, which being subjected to a similar analysis will establish its difference from Sat, (*i. e.*,) impermanence.

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88. In earth, impermaennce, sound, touch, form, and taste are derived from its cause, while its individual property is smell, hence differentiating them from Sat will reduce it to impermanence.

89. If the essentially existent Reality be differentiated from earth, it is reduced to impermanence, and less than a tenth part, with its included Brahmanda, is contrived to be present in earth.

90. In the Brahma's egg are included the fourteen abodes Vur and the rest with their adequate inhabitants.

91. The several species of being inhabiting the different abodes included in Brahma's egg possessed of five sorts of bodies (viviparous, oviparous, parasitic, and earthy) elementary in composition, when differentiated from Sat, are reduced to impermanence, in spite of their tangibility, which cannot in any way affect the secondless Reality.

92. After having ascertained the unreal nature of elements, elementary bodies and Maya, nothing will create any disturbance as to the non-dual conception of Sat.

93. Even after the elements and elementary bodies have been ascertained to be unreal, the wise do not discontinue using them, though unreal, because by their tangibility they are capable of being used.

94. Let Sankhya, Kanad, the Buddhists and other controversialists use their specific arguments to support the reality of the objective world, we do not strive to disappoint them, for we are one with them so far as calling into requisition the service of all useful objects, what we want is to determine the reality of spiritual existence.

95. We suffer no injury from them if they fearlessly shew no respect to the *Sruti* proofs explanatory of the secondless Reality, we in the same way, having framed our conception from *Sruti*, experience and analogy, as to the unreal nature of every thing else the besides *Atma*, disregard their duality.

96. To show such disregard of duality is not unnecessary

for us, because the more it becomes firm, the more will it lead to a just appreciation of non-duality. He is 'liberated in life' who by an utter disregard of duality has confirmed his knowledge of non-duality.

97. Such a disregard of duality and firm conception of non-duality does not lead to deliverance in life only, but helps the individual to attain emancipation (from consecutive re-incarnation or re-birth). As in the Gita (Chap. 2, V. 27.) Krishna says to Arjuna, " Such a wise individual delivered in life is never re-born. In the end he attains to that ineffable bliss in the Brahma known as *Nirvana*."

98. "In the end" is thus explained:—In ordinary practice the scondless Reality and unreality are equally regarded. [That is to say though all material objects are non-real because impermanent, yet they are required for use, and are capable of being used, for they are tangible and taken cognition of by our senses; hence in daily use they are not thrown away for their unreality, therefore their use brings them to a condition of reality, for what is false cannot be handled, or seen, etc., hence independent of reality or unreality, both are alike dealt with]. But when with discriminating eyes the unreal are separated from the real, that is meant by the phrase " In the end."

99. Or, it means the separation of the vital air from the body, and this is its common acceptance. Even then, a theosophist no more confounds non-duality with duality.

100. No matter whatever may be his condition in his dying moments, whether with or without any disease, retaining consciousness and suffering the agonies of death, or perfectly unconscious, nothing can disturb the firm conception of non-duality which an individual liberated in life has.

101. Even if unconscious when dying, his knowledge of non-duality does not forsake him, and as in the case of an ordinary individual when dreaming or dreamlessly slumbering, his acquired learning may appear to him as if forgotten,

but no sooner he awakes he finds it all right, so in the aforesaid instance, a theosophist's knowledge of non-duality does not leave him when he parts with the body.

102. Contradicting proofs must be stronger than supporting proofs, before an established fact, can be proved to be false, hence non-duality based on Vedantic proofs, is never disturbed "in the end," because stronger proofs than them do not exist, therefore contradiction is impossible.

103. Thus the self-evident truths which the *Vedanta* expounds to differentiate the elements must inevitably lead a man to ineffable bliss in the Brahma.* [For ignorance being destroyed there is no more materiality left to subject him to re-birth and he merges in the Brahma to be in a condition of joy].

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* According to the *Vedanta-paribhasa*, "The joy which admits of no increase is Brahma; as the Veda says, "He knew Brahma to be joy." The acquisition of Brahma whose essence is joy is *moksha*, and it is also the cessation of sorrow.

SECTION III.

On the five sacs or sheaths.

In the *Taitirya Upanishad* it is said, the wise enjoy all happiness by knowing that the secondless Reality—the Supreme Brahma—is situated in a cell. Here the word 'cell' has reference to the five sacs or sheaths, and as their consideration enables an individual to a right appreciation of the *Atma*, the five sacs are now being declared.

2. With a view to arrive at a correct signification of the word 'cell' in the aforesaid paragraph it is now being defined:—The physical body is the foodful sac, inside of it is the vital, within which is the mental, enclosing the cognitional within, and internal to it is the blissful sac, that is meant by it.

3. [Now the foodful sac and its non-identity with the Atma is being declared.] The gross physical body is called the foodful sac, because it is formed from semen and blood which are an altered condition of, and derived from food, and because it depends entirely upon food, for its growth. But the body cannot be called eternal, or indestructible, as prior to its birth and after death it is wanting, hence it does not resemble Self.

4. If you say that a derivative product is subject to death, and though non-eternal there is no harm in considering the gross body same with Self. (The reply is.)—Prior to birth the body was non-existent, and therefore simply from the law of *Karma* it is fulfilling its present phase of existence, the future birth will also be a product of accumulated actions*

* There are three kinds of works (*sanchita*) accumulated, (*prarabdha*) fructescent, and (*kriyamana*) current. 'Accumulated' are the works of previous re-births which have not yet commenced to bear fruit; 'fructescent' have began to bear fruit, and 'current' are those which will bear fruit in a future life. The *Vedanta*

in the present life, which it is not enjoying now but will have to wait for a future re-incarnation,—this life being simply a scene for the fruition of past actions.

5. The five vital airs which strengthen the gross body, and induce the several organs to perform their functions is designated the life-sac. It is not-self, for it is insentient.

6. The mistaken attribution of 'I' and 'mine' to the physical body and to worldly goods, is due to the influence of mind. This one is called the mental sac. It is not-self, because it is worked upon by the several passions which induce change.

7. The shadow or reflection of intelligence (*Boodhi*) which in the waking condition occupies every part of the body and merges in ignorance in the condition of dreamless slumber, is called the cognitional sac. But as it is subject to the laws of birth and death, hence non-eternal, it is not-self.

8. *Manas* and *Boodhi* (The animal and human souls) though for ordinary purposes are looked upon as the internal organ and non-different, yet they are differentiated into the mental and cognitional sacs, because *Boodhi*, as the internal instrument or agent, is the indication of cognitional, and *manas*, as the external agent, is the indication of the mental sheaths respectively.

9. When during the fruition of meritorious and virtuous deeds the internal function of *Boodhi* is full of reflected intelligence and bliss, and after such enjoyment is over, that function blends in *Prakriti* (un-differentiated cosmic condition of matter) it is denominated the blissful sac.

10. Because it is liable to immediate destruction, it is not-self. Besides Self is not a reflected shadow but is light, eternal, infinite, intelligence and bliss.

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believes in the destruction of the first and last through knowledge of Brahma and one's identity with It. The fructescent can be only exhausted by actual enjoyment of their fruits during the present life.

11. If it be said, that from the gross body, to the 'blissful sac' every one of them is not-self, can be admitted, but it is impossible to regard any thing else as Self, for nothing can be conceived in that way.

12. It is indeed true that the physical body and the rest are easily conceivable and nothing beyond them can be determined as self. But what prevents you from identifying self with that eternal Intelligence through which you conceive the body etc.? That is Self.

13. If therefore Self is present as eternal Intelligence, Why is he then not cognizable? Because, he is Intelligence and not the object of cognition. [The introduction of subject will be incompatible with truth and infinity, besides it will create dualism; for that which cannot be demarcated in any way is infinite, and if it were a knowing subject (a knower) its knowledge would be limited by its object and cognition, hence not infinite. As regards dualism: if Brahma were conscious there would be objects of consciousness, thus there would be a relation,* and wherever there is relation there is dualism. Therefore Brahma or Self is knowledge, as an abstract.] From the absence of the cognitive subject and objects of cogtion it is not known, not because it does not exist.

14. As sugar imparts sweetness to a substance when mixed with it, but does not depend upon any thing else for its sweetness, because such sweet-imparting-substance there is none.

15. And as from want of such another substance imparting its sweetness to sugar, its own sweetness is self-evident, so from an absence of a subject and object of cognition, the Atma though unperceivable, is yet evidently Intelligence and eternal.

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* Says the *Mundukya Upanishad*, "Brahma is neither internally nor externally cognitive, neither conscious nor unconscious." Verse 7.

16. [And we have *Sruti* testimony also confirming it] :— Self is self-illumined ; before the evolution of all the worlds, He alone was existing, they follow the train of his illumination, and by him every thing is illumined or discovered.

17. That Intelligence which cognises the phenomenal world cannot be cognised by any other object. The several organs are powerless to cognise it, because they are prone to cover objects of cognition, and are incapable of holding the cogniser himself.

18. The proofs are :—" All objects of cognition are known to the Supreme Self, but no one can know Him. He is different from all known objects and is yet separate from unknown. He is the Supreme God, eternal and Intelligence."

19. He who fails to conceive of the Supreme Brahma after understanding Its difference from known and unknown, as knowledge itself, is merely a lump of clay in human shape, that is to say, it is impossible to make so dull-headed a person, understand the proofs cited in the *Shastras*.

20. To say " I have no knowledge of the eternal Self" is as unreasonable, as it is shameful to say " I know not whether I have a tongue," and yet a tongueless individual cannot speak, similarly He is knowledge and not to know him will amount to a perfect want of knowledge, a clear impossibility.

21. Whatever objects you come to know of, in ordinary use, leaving the the things aside, fix upon that knowledge as Brahma, and it can be termed knowledge of Brahma, for there is not another thing resembling It.

22. Though such knowledge, without the objects (as in the aforesaid paragraph) as Parabrahma, is really entitled to be called knowledge of the Supreme Self, yet a consideration of the 'five sacs' is not unnecessary, because when they are left out by close thinking, the residue of knowledge as a witness represents the Supreme Self, that is never absent. This is is explained as follows :—

23. Intelligence as indicated by the word Self can create no misapprehension with regard to one's Self, that is to say no one can be so misguided as to contend that he is not in existence, this is impossible. And who will be his antagonist in such a contention ?

24. Such a misapprehension with regard to his personality or existence never arises unless one is subject to a wild phantasy, hence the *Sruti* says "There is not one person who disbelieves his own existence."

25. He, who contends that the Supreme Self is non-existent, is himself so, for his individual intelligence is identical with self, and as that has already been pointed out to be imperceptible, then he is forced to admit his existence and with it,—Self.

26. The illumination of Self is now determined by the following queries and answers. What is the *Atma* like? That which cannot be determined as resembling this or that, hence what is neither this nor that, is Self.

27. 'This' refers to objects visible to the eyes, and 'that'—invisible objects. But Self is not a subject of cognition by sight, nor is he invisible, for He is eternal, self-illuminated, knowledge.

Thus though unknowable, Self is determined to be eternal, and visible.

28. Therefore we find, though self is imperceptible, yet he is visible, and the same arguments will establish his self-illumination; moreover the *Sruti* indications of truth, knowledge, and infinity to Parabrahma are also applicable to Self.

29. What is not liable to destruction is called truth, hence after the dissolution of the objective world, who alone remains as a witness, is the Intelligence known as the eternal, indestructible, Supreme Self.

30. As after the dissolution of visible objects, ether (space) alone remains, so what remains after the destruction of

ether [and the rest] is knowledge, and that knowledge is called Self.

31. If it be said, nothing remains after the destruction of visible objects, and therefore we cannot call Self to be residue of destruction. [The answer is] Self is that unindicated something which you say remains *not* after destruction. Hence our difference is merely in words, the unindicated, and unascertainable residuum, left after the destruction of the world is alike admitted by both of us, (you say it to be nought, and I say it to be Self.)

32. With this object the *Sruti* seeks to differentiate the Witnessing Intelligence from all visible objects, "For even after their destruction he is indestructible, and is therefore called a residuum of destruction and eternal knowledge."

33. The *Sruti* has in the aforesaid manner established a twain condition in all impermanent objects, one of which is determinable as liable to destruction, the other undeterminable portion is the residue left after it. Now this residuary portion of destruction represents the undeterminable, eternal, infinite Supreme Self, who is imperishable.

34. In this manner is established his truth,* while that of knowledge has already been determined (*Vide Ver. 13 ante.*)

35. "He is infinite" because Self cannot be demarcated by place, time or object. He is present every where, hence it is impossible to fix a boundary line as to his locality ; as He is eternal, time cannot affect him, and as he pervades every object, it is impossible to confine him in one thing. Thus then, as He is unrestricted by place, time or object, He is infinite.

36. The *Sruti* is not alone in saying Self to be infinite, analogy alike establishes it,—for our conceptions of place,

* Truth is indestructible, and it is one, therefore it is Brahma, for Brahma is secondless.

time and object are illusion,* they cannot limit him, hence He is infinite.

37. It has already been shewn that the attribution of insentient material objects to Self cannot be true, inasmuch as in that case the infinite and eternal Self,—unassociated consciousness—will be reduced to the condition of the finite. Neither can he be limited by Iswara and *Jiva* for their associates are illusory, then again consciousness present in both of them is non-different from the consciousness of Brahma, hence they are powerless to distinguish it.

38. [Now the associates of Iswara and the individual are being set forth.] The force of the Supreme Brahma is centred in every object, from the 'blissful sac' to the rest, and as it controls them all, it is the associate of the Lord (Iswara.)

39. If that force were not to control the laws which govern the universe, they will act against one another and reduce every thing into chaos and disorder.

40. This force of the Supreme Brahma (which is eternal consciousness,) is intelligent, hence it is not impossible for it to exercise that sway which keeps the universe in order; combined as an associate with the Intelligence of Brahma it is called Iswara; that is to say when Intelligence is unassociated it is called the Supreme Brahma, and when associated with the force Maya, it is Iswara.

41. And Intelligence associated with the 'five sacs' (already mentioned), is designated *Jiva.* As in every-day life, we find the same man standing in the relation of a father to

* "Because the sense illusion is common and necessary law with all the senses,—external light and colors and sounds are all illusions, the cold in the hand, or in the ice, heat in the fire, pain in the foot, taste in the tongue, scent in the nose, is all illusory throughout and yet essential to existence."—H. G. Atkinson, in *The Phil. Inq.* Vol. VII. p. 63.

his son and grandfather fo his grandson, [so the one Intelligence for a difference of associates is designated Iswara and *Jiva*.

42. As in the absence of a son and grandson, the same man is neither a father nor grandsire, so the one Intelligence when associated differently with Maya and the 'five sacs' is designated Iswara and Jiva, and when not associated, it is the Supreme Brahma Intelligence.

43. Thus when by the help of the aforesaid considerations about the 'five sacs,' an individual knows the Supreme Brahma, he attains the blissfulness of the Supreme Brahma, and after death is subjected to no more re-births; in other words, for one engaged in contemplating the Brahma, with fixedness of the mind, there are no more births and deaths. He is freed.

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SECTION. IV.

Duality.

THE creatorship of Iswara and contrivance of the individual (*Jiva*) will form the subject of my present consideration. For in such a dual condition, the subjects that will have to be left out by him will be rendered apparent, the more so, that he may henceforth disregard them.

2. The *Shvetashvataro-panishad* mentions, that the force Maya is no other than *Prakriti* (Matter in its undifferentiated cosmic condition, without its three attributes) and Consciousness associated with it is Iswara. Now this Maya-associated Iswara is the creator of all these worlds.

3. Those who study the Rhika Veda, say that the Supreme Self, Iswara, was present in the beginning. He determined to create the world; and no sooner did such determination arise, than the creation of all (*lokas*) abodes followed.

4. Ether, air, fire, water, earth, medicine, food and body in due order, have sprung from him, with his determination.

5. "That with a view of occupying bodies numerous, did He create subjects and all the worlds." *Taitirya Upanishad.*

6. In the *Chhandodogya Upanishad* of the same Veda it is distinctly stated, that prior to the evolution of the world, (Sat) the One Existence alone was present. He declared with a solemn vow, let there be a variety of worlds, and at his will fire, water, and various creatures sprang into existence.

7. In the *Munduka Upanishad* of the Utharva Veda it is said that as sparks from fire do proceed, so from the imperishable Iswara proceeded various creatures sentient, and objects insentient.

8. In the *Vajasaneya Brihadanyka Upanishad* it is mentioned, that in its prior condition the earth was potentially but not perceptibly existent, at present it has assumed divers

name and form both in sentient and insentient visible objects, *viz*:—Virat, Manu, Man, Cow, Ass, Horse, Sheep, Goat, Birds, Ants, etc., both male and female.

9. The purport of the foregoing *Sruti* texts is:—The Supreme Iswara occupies in the shape of individual Intelligence all animal bodies, and for his supporting respiration He is designated *Jiva*.

10. The Universal Intelligence, with the collective aggregate of active and sensous organs, the five vital airs, mind and intellect, constituting the Astral body, together with its indwelling reflex Intelligence (individual)—all these collectively constitute, what is designated *Jiva*.

11. *Jiva* permeated with that Universal Intelligence (Brahma) is yet subject to happiness and misery, for Maya the associate of Iswara (Lord) is alike capable of creating the universe as of fascination; its force infatuates *Jiva* and subjects him to weal and woe during life.

12. From such infatuation, forgetting Self, the *Jiva* is hurled headlong into the concerns of a worldly life, and misery is his portion; thus the creation of the objective world* by Iswara is briefly declared.

13. In the *Saptanna Brahman* mention is made of the creation of various manifest objects by *Jiva*. He has produced seven different kinds of food by knowledge and works.

14. Of the above seven varieties of food, one is intended one for ordinary men inhabiting the earth, two for Devas (Superior beings), one for animals, and lastly, three for (*Atma*) Self.

They are specified as follows:—

15. The first class contains grains; the second consists

* Hence the manifested world is an indication of duality, the author has introduced it simply to show further on, the true aspect of the one Eternal Intelligence; the noumenal and phenomenal represent but two aspects of the One Existence.

of sacrifices done half monthly, and monthly during full moon; animals have milk; and *Atma* has Mind, speech and respiration for his portion.

16. As all of them are included in the world, naturally they come within the category of Iswara's work, and they are known so too, but as by his knowledge and act *Jiva* have admitted them into use as food, they may be looked upon as his production.

17. Now all this world, and the seven varieties of food (above mentioned) indicating it, though identically the same, yet virtually they are known separately as products of Iswara and the admitted food of *Jiva*. Every object has a similar bearing, it has two aspects though naturally it is one, as a woman begat by her father is for the enjoyment of her husband.

18. Iswara's force—a function of Maya—gave birth to the world, and his determination or volition is regarded as the cause of creation. The desire of a *Jiva* for the enjoyment of all enjoyable things—a mental function—is regarded as a means for their acquirement.

19. Though the creative products of Iswara cannot be re-created by *Jiva*, yet jewels and other precious stones, etc., (without subjecting them to any change of form) are differently used in a variety of ways, according to individual taste and intelligence or capacity of enjoying.

20. And as such enjoyment is varied, owing to a difference in the taste, inclination and knowledge of an individual, though the object may be same, yet we find that one is very much delighted with a jewel, another is much vexed in not having it, while a third is perfectly indifferent whether he gets it or not.

21. Thus in its enjoyment, we find *Jiva* creating three different forms in the jewels, (*e.g.*,) pleasure, annoyance and indifference, but as created by Iswara it is always one and knows no distinction.

22. As the same woman stands differently related to several individuals, to one she is wife, to another daughter-in-law, a sister-in-law to a third, mother to a fourth and so on according to the knowledge of her several relations, though as created by Iswara she is one, and has no such distinctions present in her.

23. If you say that in the above instance the difference in the relationship of the female is merely established, and as that does not create a particular difference in her form and features, it is inapplicable.

24. We reply, external objects are of two kinds: externally, they are elementary in composition; and internally, full of mind; so that, if there be no difference in her configuration or flesh, yet the mental function determines her relationship as a wife, daughter-in-law, etc.

25. If you say that in the conditions of error, dream, sovereignty of the mind, and memory there is possibility for the mental function overtaking an external object, but in a state of walking no such mental function appears probable.

26. The answer is:—When an external object is connected with the internal organ by means of sight, hearing and the rest, it assumes the shape of that external object, hence in the waking state for an external object, to become mental, is admissible. This has been particularly declared by the Vashykar, and Vartikkara.

27. (Vashykar's illustration is introduced as a proof.) "As copper melted in a crucible by heat assumes its shape, so the internal organ assumes the modification of an external object which it seeks to discover by taking possession of, by means of the senses."

28. "Or like the sun, whose rays of light discover an object by assuming its shape, the internal organ which is a discoverer of all objects, assumes the shape of what it takes possession, and thus helps the individual to know it."

29. [The corroborating evidence of Vartikkara is now

being cited.] "When an external object comes within the reach of eye-sight, etc., the function of the internal organ originated by the demonstrating intelligence of *Boodhi*, takes possession of it, and becomes converted into its shape, consequently as an object externally is derived from the elements, so internally it is full of mind." This can be admitted.

30. In this manner, the twain character of a pot and all similar objects is established. They are both elementary and mental; in reference to Iswara's creation a pot is externally earthy, but to the individual (*Jiva*) it is created in his internal organ, therefore mental.* The external earthy pot is cognised by sight, while the mental pot is discovered by the witnessing Intelligence of the internal organ.

31. By the methods of *Anvaya* and *Vyetrieka*† we know all mental objects cause worldly enthrallment and lead the

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* We find here two different sorts of creation. External and internal, or elementary and mental. The objective world is elementary, derived from the elements ether and the rest, while as their cognition follows only by the mind assuming their shape, the senses are simply, so to speak, the channel by which the function proceeds from that organ to take possession of them and till they are thus covered, to all intents and purposes they cease to exist. But this is so quick that scarcely have we any notion of the steps involved in the process of a single act of consciousness. Then again some will have it, that it is transient too, for in the ordinary course of our every-day life we are continually forming conceptions of things and objects, which are replaced by others, and they again by others. That is to say a prior conception is re-placed by a second, and that by a third and so on, hence the supporters of the transient theory are called the *Kshanik Vadins*. They look upon the whole thing, as a current of consciousness in which the objects that are perceived follow as a current of water in a river, or as waves follow continually without any break of continuity.

† 'Anvaya' is relation of cause and effect. 'Vyetrieka' is discrimination of separate distinction.

individual to consecutive re-births :—The presence of such mental objects produces pleasure or pain; their absence, neither.

32. For instance, in the dreaming state, all knowledge of external objects is absent, but the mental function still continues busy in covering mental objects and enthralls the individual, while in dreamless slumber, trance, and profound meditation, both external and mental objects are absent and the mental function is at abeyance, hence there is no more attachment.

33. When a father is informed of the demise of an absent son residing in a distant country, by a liar, he is sure to give vent to his grief in tears and crying.

34. Or as in the absence of certain news about the death of his absent son, a father continues to live happily with a gladsome heart, though such son is dead, we therefore find mental function is the chief cause of worldly attachment everywhere in all individuals.

35. [But it may be asked.] What necessity is there for establishing the existence of the objective world when mental function is the cause of an individual's attachment?

36. The necessity lies in this :—Inasmuch as the mental function must assume the shape of the object it seeks to discover, it is essential that objects must be in a state of existence so as to lend their reflection to the internal organ. If it be affirmed that from previous conceptions gathered in former births, the earth can be realised mentally without the external objective world, so that its existence is not a prime necessity, even admitting such to be the case, you cannot do away with its exposition as altogether useless, because that which is dependent on proofs stands in necessity for the proofs of its existence, therefore in the tangible proofs of its existence the phenomenal world is not unreal.

37. If such mental world be the cause of the individual's re-birth, then the practice of abstaining the mind—a certain

form of *Yoga*—will help to stop such conception of duality that is certain enough. But what is the use of studying knowledge of Brahma?

38. Because by refraining the mind in the aforesaid manner, conception of duality is destroyed for the time being, suspended, so to speak—but no *Jiva* can be freed from successive re-incarnations unless he has attained to the knowledge of Brahma, as has been over and over repeated in the Vedanta.

39. According to the ('Avedabadi') non-dualist, simple knowledge of the unreality of the external world, without refraining the mind from it, is enough to lead to a knowledge of the Brahma, but it by no means follows that a want of the external world will produce a similar knowledge of the secondless Brahma;

40. Inasmuch as in (Pralaya) final dissolution of the universe and its contents, duality is wanting to contend against non-duality, the preceptor and *Shastras* are alike destroyed, yet no knowledge of the secondless Brahma is possible in such a condition.

41. [Therefore] Iswara's creation—the external world and the elements which constitute duality—is not antagonistic to, but a means for attaining a knowledge of non-duality, in other words without a preceptor and instruction on the *Shastras*, or a knowledge of the unreality and impermanence of the elements and elementary bodies which go to make up the objective world, non-duality can never be realised, consequently you cannot regard it unnecessary, Under such circumstances why do the other controversialists shew their spite against it?

42. [Now *Jiva's* creation of duality is declared.] The mental creation of duality proceeding from the individual is of two kinds: (*a*) Duality in conformity with the *Shastras*, and (*b*) Duality independent of them. Of them, the last is to be relinquished; and so long as non-duality is not fully realised the first is to be practised.

43. (*a*).—This is to consider upon the non-difference of Self from the Supreme Self by analysis, and argument,—cited in the Vedanta as desires pertaining to the sacred scriptures. It is to be continued so long as knowledge of truth is not acquired, when this first form of Duality is to be abandoned.

44. On this subject the *Sruti* testimony is, "When by continual study of the Vedas and the Vedanta, unreality of dualism has been firmly established, and knowledge of the secondless Reality Parabrahma, is obtained, the sacred writings are to be abandoned, (for they have served their purpose and there is no more any necessity for them) just as a torch is extinguished by one travelling in a dark night when he arrives home or when he has no further need of it.

45. When an intelligent person by studying the Vedanta and other sacred writings has obtained a clear insight into what is real and unreal, and after having ascertained their drift has acquired knowledge of the Supreme Self, he stands in no further need of them, that is to say they are abandoned just as a cultivator, desirous of reaping grains, uses the crusher so long as there are grains, and abandons it after the work is finished.

46. The quiet and tranquil-minded seeker of truth, bent on knowledge of Self, is deeply engaged on the cultivation of that knowledge and abstains from a grandiloquent discussion of the sacred writings, because that is fruitless.

47. To know the secondless Parabrahma by restraining mind and speech and abandoning other words is the advice plainly set forth in the *Sruti*.

48. (*b.*)—'Duality not pertaining to the sacred writings' is also divisible into two varieties, of which the first 'sharp' includes desire and passion ; and the second 'bad' indicates mental sovereignty.

49. Both of them are to be avoided by the seeker of truth, for the *Sruti* insists on mental quietude and meditation as the means for attaining knowledge of Brahma.

50. It is not to be supposed that they are to be avoided only prior to obtaining knowledge, but they must be relinquished even subsequent to it, by one desirous of being freed in life; because passions and desires are indications of ignorance and not of deliverance in life.

51. If it be affirmed, since knowledge of truth cuts of future re-births, that is enough for my purpose, I desire not to be known as one freed in life, and no harm can follow from a continuance of passions and desires. The reply is, if you think in that way, you are sure to be re-born again, after enjoyment of heaven for a brief period. In other words you are no knower of Self, but simply a person engaged in actions sanctioned by religion.

52. If you do not desire enjoyment of heaven because it is temporary, What prevents you from abandoning passions and desires which are faulty and worthless ?

53. If after acquiring knowledge of non-duality, you still persist in keeping up your desires and passions, then you break the very sacred writings which guide you in your actions and become a follower of your own inclinations.

54. If in spite of your knowledge of truth, you act according to the bent of your desires, where is the difference between you and a dog that lives on unclean food ?*

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* Two very extreme views pervail in regard to this subject. Yateshtacharan or acting according to a person's inclination is condemned by Suresvaracharya, an illustrious disciple of Sankararcharya. Our author holds similar views too, and the passage in the text is an appeal to that end. But it is said, the Upanishads contain several passages in which the opposite doctrine is maintained, and a Theosophist is free to act as he likes. Professor Gough in his article in the *Calcutta Review* (1878, p. 34) says " The Theosophist liberated from metempsychosis, but still in the body is untouched by merit and de-merit, absolved from all works good and evil, unsoiled by sinful works. *(Brihadaranyako-panishad*

55. In such a condition you are reduced to something worse than what you were before, inasmuch as prior to such knowledge you had to suffer from the pain of your passions and desires, while now in addition to that, people will speak ill of you. Ah how much glory then, does your knowledge bring unto you!

56. Therefore a knower of truth should not desire to follow the bent of his inclination like the swine and wild boar, but by abandoning passions and desires, he must raise himself to the dignity of a Deva and be an object of worship and reverence everywhere.

57. [Now the means for relinquishing mental defects, passions, etc., are being determined.] To find out impermanence in a desired object is an uncommon help to reduce it and the passion for it, to nihility. This has been repeatedly explained in the Vedanta. Therefore live in happiness by relinquishing desire and passion, and by regarding all things which excite your desire to be non-eternal.

58. It cannot be said, that no such ill consequence can be attributed to the sovereignty of the mind, therefore at its presence is allowable, the more so, as it enables a person to spend his time in happiness. To consider in this wise is objectionable, for though 'mental sovereignty' leads to no evil consequence directly, yet by its influence on passions and desires, it brings forth evil, hence it is to be abandoned. 'Mental sovereignty' is therefore the source of all evil. Bhagaban Sree Krishna speaks also of the injurious effects which it leads to, by its interdependence of, and influence on, desire and passion in the following manner. (*Gita*, Chap. II. V. 69.)

59. "He who contemplates on [the acquisition of] wealth, begets a predilection for it, then follows an intense desire of acquisition, baffled in it he becomes angry and stupid, loses

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4. 4. 23) uninjured by what he has done and by what he has left undone. (*Ibid* 4. 4. 22).

his memory, ultimately to die." Now what can be more hurtful than 'mental sovereignty'?

60. 'Mental sovereignty' is capable of being removed by 'profound unconscious meditation,' which follows as a result of conscious meditation.*

61. And one unable to practice that meditation, but who is devoid of all passions and desires, can keep back 'mental

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* 'Profound meditation' is of two kinds namely :—

1. *Savikalpa*, Conscious, and
2. *Nirvikalpa*, Unconscious.

1. Conscious meditation :—The subject, the perception, and the object constitute the conscious Ego. To realise the *Brahma* without a second by concentrating the mind which has assumed the shape of the Impartite, and by indivisibly resting its function there, with the distinction of knower and knowledge, that is to say, with the retention of the individual Consciousness. Then as in the instance of an earthen toy-elephant, the mind takes cognisance of the animal along with that of its composite clay, so there is the perception of the Universal Consciousness (*Brahma*) co-existent with the Conscious Ego, or non-duality. As it has been said by the subject of such contemplation "I am that Secondless Consciousness, everpresent, pervading everywhere, good, light, without a beginning (unborn), undecaying, unblended, innate, and free."

2. 'Unconscious meditation' is the resting of the Impartite mental function on the Reality *Brahma* without a second, and becoming one with it, by the destruction of the three integral constituents of the Conscious Ego—the subject, the individual perception, and the object.—Then as in a saline solution, the salt having been dissolved assumes the shape of the water, its separate existence is destroyed, but the water alone is left to be perceived, so to discover the Real *Brahma* alone by the mind after it has been moulded into the shape of the Impartite.— *Dhole's Vedantasara, p. 47.*

sovereignty' by pronouncing the mystic syllable 'OM'* with fixed attention for a lengthened period.

62. Thus the sovereignty of the mind having been subdued, it comes to rest tranquilly, having no function to distract it any more. On this subject the sage Bashishtha has given various illustrations to Ramachandra.

63. When the external objective world is shut out of the mind, by due reflection and consideration of the secondless Brahma, and that has been visibly perceived, the way for attaining Nirvana is made easy. Then after study of the Sacred Scriptures on spirituality [The soul and the Supreme soul] with particular attention to their logical inferences, frequent conversation with other persons on the same subject, and refraining the mind from the acquirement of material comforts, nothing is more proper than to commune with Self and stop speech altogether or to become silent.

64. If as a result of 'fructescent works'—actions done in a prior birth but which have commenced to bear fruit—a Theosophist be subjected to mental distraction, it is only temporary in duration, for by repeated practice he has learned how to restore tranquility, and thus he merges into Brahma.

65. And that knower of Brahma whose internal organ is

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* This word is formed of A, u and m. The two first are converted into O according to the rules of Grammar. Each letter has a distinct signification. In the Mandukya Upanishad, 'OM' is said to indicate the Self-luminous Protector of all, (*i.e.*,) Brahma. Hence 'OM' is a predicate and Brahma its subject, and between them there is no distinction whatever. Literally speaking 'OM' can lay no claim to Brahma, but as in worshipping an ammonite (Saligram) a worshipper is to fix the form of Vishnu in his mind, though the stone has no likeness to him, similarly while meditating 'OM' a person is to dwell on Brahma mentally.

never liable to meet with any impediment* from mental distraction is fit to be recognised as Brahma. For it is the unanimous declaration of all devout sages "Such a person is not a knower of Brahma, but is himself a Brahma."

66. In connection with this non-difference of a Theosophist with Brahma, Bashishta says, "He who rests on Brahma with his internal organ entirely merged in It, who has no more any knowledge of what the sacred writings teach, nor that of the objective material world, is himself a Brahma. He cannot properly be styled a knower of Brahma, for it is irrational to say that Brahma knows Itself, or is Its own knower."

67. Thus after the vast desires created by *Jiva* have relinquished their hold from the internal organ, he is delivered in life, and with that purpose in view Duality has been divided into two classes of which the first form, *Jiva's* creation is treated here differently from the second—Iswara's creation.

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* There are eight 'means' for unconscious meditation and four obstacles. The means are (*a*) Forbearance, (*b*) Minor observances, (*c*) Ascetic posture, (*d*) Regulated breathing, (*e*) Restraining the sensory organs, (*f*) Fixed attention, (*g*) Contemplation, and (*h*) Conscious meditation.

Mental inactivity, Mental distraction, Passions and desires, and Tasting of enjoyment are the four obstacles.

SECTION V.

On the consideration of Transcendental Vedic Phrases.

INDIVIDUAL Intelligence centered in *Boodhi* that helps the cognition of all objects by sight, hearing, smell and taste, and enables us to speak, is the literal signification of the word *Prajnana* in the "*Prajnanam Brahma*" cited in the Aiterya Upanishad of the *Rhigveda*. That is to say, with a view of enabling a Theosophist desirous of release to establish his non-difference with Brahma, the four forms of Vedic expressions used as a means to that end, are now being considered. The *Rhik Veda* says "Intelligence is Brahma." This is proved in the following wise:

2. Since Parabrahma is all pervading, It is equally present in Brahmâ, Indra, and other Devas as also in man, cow, horse, and animals. As an internal knower, Its pervasion is universal, consequently it is present in me too. Thus then there being one receptacle for both the Intelligences, *viz.*, *Prajnana* and Parabrahma, they are naturally identical, hence Individual Intelligence is non-different from the Intelligence of Brahma.

3. The phrase (*Aham Brahmasmi*) "I am Brahma" cited in the *Brihadaranyak Upanishad* of *Yajurveda* is thus explained :—That infinite Intelligence, the Supreme Self, residing in the body, composed of the five elements, by the inherent force of Maya, but discovered as a witness by passivity, self-control and other 'means' for attaining Self-knowledge, is the signification of 'I' (*aham.*)

4. 'Brahma' refers to the self-existent, all-pervading, Supreme Self. And 'am establishes the non-difference of the two intelligences expressed by 'I' and 'Brahma.' If, therefore, the identity of the individual and universal Intelligence be established, then the use of 'I am Brahma' by one liberated

in life necessarily implies no contradiction but an established truth.

5. In the *Chhandogya Upanishad* of Sama Veda the phrase (*Tatamasi*) "That art Thou" bears a like signification. Prior to the evolution of all this [visible objective world] there existed a secondless Reality without name or form, but all-pervading and is yet existing in a similar condition; this is indicated by 'That.'

6. The indwelling Intelligence residing in the internal organ of every individual, but quite distinct altogether from the physical body and the organs active and sensuous, is the indication of 'Thou.' And 'art' establishes the non-difference of 'That' and 'Thou.' Hence it is but natural to conceive them as one.*

7. The *Atharva Veda* has likewise a similar phrase with an identical signification. (*Ayam Atma Brahma*) "This self is Brahma." Here the self-luminous visible Individual Intelligence is the literal signification of 'This' and as it

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* It is said 'words' are construed in one of three ways :—(*a*) literal, (*b*) indicated and (*c*) suggestive. The first is that which is at once known with its pronounciation, it is due to its energy, strength, or force. Now this force sometimes fails to convey a signification, and we have then to construe according to what is called in Rhetoric cannons of Indication. There are as many as eighty Indications. But all of them do not concern us so far as construction of the transcendental phrases go. Here we have to do mainly with two varieties of them, *viz.*, Indicative Indication (lakshya lakshan bhava), and Inclusive Indication, (upadana lakshana). Indication of abandoning a part of the expressed signification (bhaga lakshana) is a composite Indication. "That art Thou" cannot be construed literally, but by abandoning the opposing elements of invisibility and visibility from the consciousness or Intelligence expressed by the words 'That' and 'Thou' respectively, the remaining non-conflicting Intelligence is meant in the same manner as "That Devadatta is this."

resides within the bodily fabric, in all its components units from the 'physical body' to 'egoism' it is spoken of as Self. Hence the two words 'This Self' indicate the individual intelligence.

8. The one cause of the phenomenal world and its substratum, *viz.*, the Universal Intelligence is indicated by 'Brahma.' It is Self-luminous too, therefore, the two Intelligences are identical.

SECTION VI.

Illustration by similitude with painting.

Like a price of painting four conditions are present in the Supreme Brahma.

2—3. Now in painting, the four preliminary conditions are :—(*a*) Preparation of the ground, (*b*) stretching, and rubbing the canvas, (*c*) drawing the outline, (*d*) finishing or filling it with color. Similarly in the Supreme Self we find present, (*a*) Intelligence, (*b*) Internal Knower, Thread soul, and Virat. They are explained as follows :—

4. The unassociated Intelligence of the Supreme Brahma is the first, and Iswara's Intelligence associated with Maya, the second condition. The subtle astral body [as subject of one Intellect (*Boodhi*) and called the Thread soul, for it pervades like a thread through all created beings; and as a collective aggregate it is the subjective Intelligence of Hiranyagarbha,] is the third; and Intelligence associated with gross bodies called Virat [for it is present in divers form] is the fourth condition.

5. As in a piece of painting all the figures do not rest in one position, but some are good and others badly placed, so from the Turiene column to all sentient and insentient objects—mountain, river, earth, etc.,and living beings, in short, every thing rests in due order on the Intelligence of the Supreme Brahma.

6. As the different wearing apparel of the several figures in the piece of painting are conceived to be identical with its cloth (canvas),

7. So the different Intelligence (Life soul) of individuals resting on the Universal Intelligence which is the substratum, is alike conceivable to be identical with that of Parabrahma.

Variously do they finish their sojourn here after having assumed bodily form.

8. As the wearing apparel in the painting are taken for the color of the canvas by a dull person, so the ignorant mistake an individual's career in earth for that of Brahma, and consider it so.

9. And as the painted mountains, etc., require no wearing apparel, so are insentient material objects—earth, etc.,—devoid of individual intelligence or Life soul.

10. To consider worldly existence as the supreme object of life and related to Brahma is an error called (Avidya) Ignorance. It is removed by knowledge.

11. For knowledge helps to show if Brahma were at all connected with the world then it would have been likewise eternal, but as it is otherwise, the world is merely an inheritance for the *Jiva*, who is a reflected shadow of the Supreme Self; to determine this is called knowledge, and it can only be acquired by argument and analysis.

12. This knowledge destroys ignorance; hence it is always necessary to determine the nature of the world, individual and Brahma. Because then the impermanence of the two first is clearly established, and their incompatible residue Brahma, (incompatible, because permanent) is discovered as eternal and pure.

13. Thus then to find out the transitory condition of all created objects, to ascertain that incompatible residue [of destruction] the Supreme Brahma, is knowledge, and it leads to emancipation. Now the word 'incompatible' does not refer to knowledge, in that case it will be want of knowledge, and an individual in trance and profound dreamless slumber may as well expect to be 'freed.'

14. When real knowledge of Brahma is firmly established, and the world reduced to impermanence and unreality, that is meant by 'incompatibility.' This is its proper signification,

otherwise to *forget the world* is not meant, as in that case, emancipation in life will be impossible.

15. From such a consideration arises two sorts of knowledge: invisible and visible; the former is to be continually practised till it leads to the latter, when all analysis and arguments are to cease.

16. [The 'invisible,' and 'visible' are now being explained.] Knowledge which establishes Brahma to be Secondless, Intelligence and Cause of all, is called invisible; and when it helps a person to say "I am the eternal, true, and free Brahma," it is called visible.

17. This second sort of knowledge is facilitated by enquiring into Self, hence that is imperatively needed; because by means of it, the individual freed from all fetters, abides in Intelligence (Brahma) and soon enjoys that felicity whose sole essence is joy.*

* 'Liberation' is the acquisition of Brahma, whose essence is joy and the cessation of misery. For we find it said in the Veda "The knower of Brahma becomes Brahma, the knower of self passes beyond all misery." Now, sensuous gratifications or abode in heaven, or any other blissful region is not *Moksha*, for they are derived from works, therefore transitory and non-eternal. The blissfulness of Brahma is not open to a similar objection, it is eternal; we are deluded into an opposite belief simply from Ignorance, hence the destruction of that Ignorance by cultivating self-knowledge. Though the 'means' prescribed for that end helps the cognition of Brahma and removes the envelopment of Ignorance, yet it cannot be said that as knowledge brings in conception of bliss and destruction of misery; prior to it, there was neither perception of felicity nor cessation of sorrow, thus blissfulness of Brahma has a beginning, and what has a beginning is open to destruction, therefore, both bliss and the cessation of misery are non-eternal.

Then again to say, that it is useless to attempt acquiring a thing already got, that is to say, since the felicity of Brahma is naturally present, cultivation of knowledge is no longer necessary.

18. (The nature of Intelligence is to be ascertained before enquiring into Self, with this view it is considered in its four aspects.) They are :—Uniform,* Brahma, Individual and Iswara Intelligences. As the same ether for a difference of its associate receives various appellations, so is one Intelligence severally called.

19. For instance. There is pitcher-ether as follows: that is to say, ether confined within and bounded by a pitcher, to distinguish it from the impartite and all-pervading ether called *Mahakas*.† Aqueous-ether or reflection of the sky with stars and cloud in the water contained in a pitcher.

20—21. Now the clouds present in the great body of (unappropriated) ether represent vapor, which is simply a transformed condition of water (for vapor is a product of evaporation of water by the sun's rays) hence the reflection of ether in cloud is easy to conceive, and as such it has a separate designation, and called cloud-ether.

22. From quintuplication of elements is produced the gross body which is likewise called the foodful sac for its dependence upon food; the three other sacs, Vital, Mental, and Blissful, are not a result of such combination, and they constitute the Astral body. Intelligence pervading it, is termed uniform, because it knows no change.

But that should not be, because we find it so happen, when a man has forgotten about a piece of gold in his hand, he recovers possession of it, as if he had not got it already, when pointed out by another. In the same way, acquisition of bliss already possessed and destruction of misery already destroyed, can only be recovered by means of knowledge, hence cultivation of knowledge is a proper object for an individual to be engaged in.

* *Kutasta chaitanya* is perpetually and universally the same, hence it is uniform.

† *Maha* means great; because it is the source of that, appropriated by a pitcher, etc., in short, it pervades everywhere, in and out.

23. The reflection of 'uniform Intelligence' on *Boodhi,** for its supporting the vital airs,† is called *Jiva*, and he is subject to pleasure and pain.

24. With a view of ascertaining the unassociated and associated nature of the Intelligences, 'uniform' and 'individual,' they are here regarded separate, but from ignornance *Jiva* is incapable of determining the exact nature of the first, hence it can be said that he shuts such knowledge; in the same way as ether of the water contained in a pitcher displaces the pitcher-ether. In the Commentaries of Sariraka treatises it is called (*Anayanyadhyas*) 'Mutual Illusion.'

25. The cause of this mutual illusory attribution or transferring one intelligence to the other is (*Avidya*) Ignorance, or as it is otherwise called Primordial, Ignorance, without a beginning. That prevents *Jiva* from perceiving the nature of uniform Intelligence.

26. Now this Ignorance‡ has two powers.

(*a*) Concealment and (*b*) Projection.

(*a*) Concealment prevents the apprehension of the eternal, self-illuminated, uniform Intelligence, and renders it invisible.

27. Concealment or want of apprehension receives corroboration from the experience of an ignorant person, who if asked about the 'uniform Intelligence' says "I know it not," "I cannot apprehend it," and "There is no such thing as uniform Intelligence."

28. If one is inclined to argue in the following strain: "As shadow and light cannot rest together, so Ignorance cannot exist with uniform Intelligence, whose nature is light, for they are antagonistic to one another, consequently where ignorance is wanting, concealment cannot be expected to be

* Intellect. Mr. Sinnet in his *Esoteric Buddhism* calls it the Spiritual Soul.

† Inspiration, expiration, etc.

‡ Nescience.

present," the experience of ignorant persons as exemplified above will remove his mistake.

29. If one would not trust to his own experience, How can a *Tarkika* determine an entity by argument? It will not help him. Because argument has no end; one person draws his inference in one way, which a man of intellect refutes and determines differently.

30. Though argument alone cannot ascertain truth, yet to help its apprehension, if probable (conformable) arguments are required, you can have recourse to them, in a manner, as will help *Boodhi* to draw natural inferences in conformity to experience, but abstain from close reasoning and ill-matched arguments in the elucidation of truth, for sophistry misleads and is a source of great evil.

31. Now the probable arguments to determine the uniform Intelligence conformable to experience, are being reiterated. While describing the power of envelopment of Ignorance the experience of a person in reference to it has already been mentioned. He says. "I know it not," etc. Therefore use conformable arguments as help the ascertainment of the uniform Intelligence and in no way bear against it.

32. If you regard the discoverer of the power of envelopment or concealment of Ignorance—uniform Intelligence—as opposed to it, How can you otherwise apprehend concealment? (This you cannot). Therefore know the indication of a wise man and look upon (*viveka*) 'discrimination' as an antagonist of (*avidya*) nescience or Ignorance.

33. (*b*) 'Projection' or 'superimposition is now being set forth. It may likewise be termed misapprehension. It is determined by the illustration of silver in nacre. That is to say as silver is mistaken in nacre from illusion, so from the force of creation or superimposition, the uniform Intelligence, enveloped in ignorance is apt to be mistaken for the physical and subtle bodies and individual intelligence. This

is called the mistaken attribution of creation, superimposition or projection.

34. When nacre is mistaken for silver, though the silver is entirely false, yet the [preceeding portion] lying in front and designated by the term, 'This nacre' is not unreal; similarly though the attribution of individual intelligence to the uniform is not real, yet its practical resemblance to Self and Reality is a fact.

35. And as during the occurrence of that mistake, its tri-angular shape and blue color cease to be present in the nacre, so the unassociated felicity, etc., of uniform Intelligence are removed, when it is mistaken for individual intelligence.

36. Thus then as in its illusion, the mistaken perception of nacre is called silver, so the superimposition of false perception on uniform Intelligence is *Jiva*.

37. Then again, as in nacre, illusion of silver occurs only when its preceeding part is visible, so the attribution of *Jiva* to uniform intelligence only follows on the parts represented by Self and Reality.

38. Though as a matter of fact, a mistake is the substitution of one thing for another, yet without a close resemblance of the two, no mistake is apt to occur; now in the case of nacre there is ordinary and particular distinction in its forepart, and a close resemblance* with silver, hence the mistake;

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* Two very extreme views prevail in regard to this subject amongst Hindu metaphysicians. Some hold that between a predicate and subject their does not exist any difference in the meaning. Bhadri supports the view of difference along with non-difference, while our author seeks to maintain the existence of a difference. The arguments on which each rests his opinion are being given here to enable our readers to comprehend both the views.

It is said, there is difference along with resemblance between a material cause and its product, just as there is between a quality and its receptacle, or between caste and person; between

similarly between the literal signification or predicate of the words 'self'—uniform Intelligence—and '*Jiva*' there is both

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an instrumental cause and its resulting action, there does not exist such a relation both of difference and resemblance, but extreme difference only. For example, the instrumental cause of a jar,—a potter with his wheel and turning rod—is extremely different from that jar, which is a product of his manipulation, but between its material cause—a lump of clay—there exists both difference and resemblance, and if they were extremely different from each other, then the cause clay would alike have the property of producing oil, another substance extremely different from it; but since it is otherwise, we may with equal propriety conclude no clay shall produce a jar. Similarly if the material cause of a jar were to bear the strongest affinity, resemblance or similarity with it, no jar would result. Hence there is distinction along with resemblance between them. Now for this difference, the objections of extreme difference and of agreement or the faults of difference, do not apply to this view. Thus then it is an established fact. It likewise derives proofs from our own perception, because externally we find a jar different from clay, but on reflection, we know that every part of the jar is composed of clay, hence the two are identical.

Bhadri thus refutes his rivals who consider the predicate and subject of a word, bear only difference. He says:—If the predicate of the word 'jar' be extremely different from a jar then as it fails to convey the import of a cloth which is extremely different from it, likewise it should fail to signify a pitcher which is also extremely different from it, moreover if you regard the predicate of the word 'jar' to be different from it and admit its signification a 'jar' or a pitcher which is extremely different from it (both in shape and size) then it may with equal propriety imply such another substance as does not bear any resemblance to it; the same consideration is applicable to that other doctrine which does not admit the presence of a force, energy or desire in a term, hence it is faulty too. Because the predicate of 'jar,'—a pitcher,—and a cloth,—which is not so—both of them are equally different from 'jar,' then inasmuch as the word 'jar' has in it the force of

distinction and resemblance, for which the illusory attribution of the former takes place in the latter. Therefore the words

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conveying the signification of a pitcher, and not of another substance, consequently beyond a pitcher the word 'jar' cannot mean any other thing. Hence the strength of a word to convey its proper signification can only render that sense perceptible, and not a different sense. Thus then there is no defect in [admitting the strength of a word] regarding a predicate and subject as always different from one another. It cannot be alleged that along with that difference there is a close resemblance, (*tadatmya sambandha).* Because 'difference' and 'resemblance' or 'non-difference' are naturally opposed to each other ; similarly between a proximate cause and its product there is said to be only difference and not difference along with non-difference (resemblance). According to the view of a Nyayika or supporter of the strength theory [of words], consideration of difference only is not at all faulty, though his opponents attribute faults wherever only difference is maintained. For say they, if there be extreme difference between a cause and its resulting action, then as a lump of clay produces a jar which is extremely different from it, it may as well produduce oil which also is extremely different, and if no oil can be produced from clay, similarly a jar should not be its product. But this fault does not apply to the view held by a Nyayika, for he looks upon (*pragbhava*) 'prior condition' as the efficient cause in the production of all things. That is to say, as for a 'jar' to be produced a potter, revolving wheel, and stick are the instrumental cause, similarly the prior condition of a jar is its cause. In the same way, in reference to the production of all objects, their prior condition is a cause. Now this prior condition of a jar resides in its material cause (clay) and not elsewhere, and that of oil, in the seed bearing it, (seesamum) and not in any thing else, so on we find each and every object residing (potentially) in that prior condition in its respective material cause, and not in any thing else, hence clay produces a jar, etc., and not oil, simlarly oil seeds produce oil and not a jar and so on. Thus then as 'prior condition' is a cause of production, hence to regard an extreme difference between a cause and its product implies neither

'self' and 'I' (expressive of *Jiva*) do not literally bear the same meaning.

39. The difference of the two words 'Self' and 'I' is now being explained. The common acceptance of 'self' and particular indication of 'I' is being illustrated by reference to ordinary usage. In ordinary practice we find 'Self' (*sayam*) used in a variety of expressions always attached to a word, as Devadatta (him) self goes, you (your) self see, I (my) self am incapable. But 'I' cannot be similarly used.

40. Moreover as an expressive antecedent is ordinarily attached almost everywhere as "this silver," "this cloth"

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contradiction not any other defect from the standpoint of a Nyayika. The same holds true with that other view of strength. For instance, moist earth can only produce a jar, because it has that strength only, and as it has not the strength of producing oil, no oil follows, similarly in an oil-seed there is the strength of producing oil and not a jar. Hence to regard a material cause and its product as extremely different from each other is not open to any objection.

But to say that there is difference and resemblance, is objectionable. That is to say, if as Bhadri says that between a material cause and its product there is difference along with non-differece, then the objections pointed out in connection with difference and non-difference will both apply to his view. A gambler and thief are two distinct persons, yet when a person is both a thief and gambler both the defects properly belong to him, similarly in admitting a difference and agreement between property and subject, the usual objections against difference and its reverse must equally apply. But that does not affect the strength theory inasmuch as difference only is admitted. For a substance has the strength to hold qualities in it. Consequently the objection pointed out against difference do not apply. For instance if the form, capacity and its other qualities are different from a jar, so is a cloth different from a jar and it may as well be expected to be present in a jar.

similarly the word 'self' is always applicable by attaching it to another word.

41. If, therefore, 'I' (*aham*) expressive of Individual Intelligence is thus shewn to be different in its signification from (*sayam*) 'Self,' then uniform Intelligence is to be called Self.

42. And according to my view he is the Supreme Self;* because self (*sayam*) excludes the idea of another from its signification, [such exclusion determines the reality of one Supreme Self] and that is my object.

43. Now the words 'Self' and '*Atma*' are synonymous, therefore as the first excludes the idea of another, so it is natural to attribute a similar exclusion with regard to the second.

44. As then the two words last referred are identical in their signification, the use of 'self' in conditions of trance or fainting establish his existence likewise, as, "I myself was unconscious," here Self establishes his presence even in that state.

45. Though for its pervasion, uniform Intelligence must be alike present in all insentient objects, as a pot, a pitcher, etc., yet the distinction of sentiency and insentiency is not due to it, but is the work of intelligence reflected in *Boodhi* and dependent on it. In other words objects with individual Intelligence are called sentient, while those without it are insentient.

46. And as individual Intelligence is mistaken with the uniform, so is insentiency in the case of inanimate objects contrived to be present in uniform Intelligence.

* As in the instances quoted:—"Devadatta himself," "I myself," every where when self is added with a personal pronoun it excludes the idea of another as if by way of emphasis, and points out strongly the person concerned, so in a similar way when Self excludes the idea of other similar selves, my point is gained, and Ican look upon him as the one Supreme Self.

47. If pervasion constitute Supreme Self, since he follows everywere in all objects, in that case all such other objects asfollow everwhere [may equally be called Supreme Self, 'that' and 'this' are equally present everywhere, and used in connection with all objects, which may be said to depend on them, therefore they ought with equal propriety be regarded identically equal to him.

48. [The reply is] though the words 'that' and 'this' like Supreme Self, are plainly perceived to be attached to all objects including even the *Atma*, they are not the Supreme Self, but like other words signifying correct or proper they are merely attached everywhere, even in conditions of extreme contrariety.

49. The signification of 'that' and 'this' 'self' and 'another,' 'thou' and 'I' are antagonistic or opposed to each other.

50. Of them, the signification of 'Self' opposed to that of 'another' is expressive of the uniform intelligence and the signification of 'thou' opposed to that of 'I' can be admitted as *Jiva*.

51. As the distinction between nacre and silver is plainly perceived, so even after the perception of distinction between individual Intelligence indicated by 'I' and uniform Intelligence indicated by 'Self' persons fascinated with the world, attribute the uureal Jiva to the true uniform Intelligence, from illusion.

52. But this illusory attribution of resemblance or identity (*tadatmadhyas*) is a product of ignorance, consequently when that is removed, the false perception of the reality of *Jiva* is also destroyed.

53. Kowledge of self destroys ignorance with its force of envelopment, and its resulting action,—false perception or mistake; but the force of superimposition—evolution, or projection of ignorance [*i.e.*, misapprehension]—and its resulting action of mistaken attribution (*vikshepadhyas*) require for their destruction the exhaustion or consumation of fructescent works. That is to say, without the exhaustion of actions

already commenced to bear fruit, by enjoying them, there can be no removal of 'Self.'

54. Ordinarily speaking, after the destruction of a proximate or material cause, its productive action or result yet continues for a certain time, according to a Tarkika, so that to admit the continuance of illusory attribution, created by superimposition, or misapprehension, even after the destruction of (*Avidya*) Ignorance, its material cause, is possible for a certain time, depending, as it does, upon desire of enjoying fructescent works.

55. If it be urged, according to the view of a Tarkika, after the cause is destroyed its product rests for a little time only, but to admit such duration to a lengthened period, according to the Vedantin, is illogical, the answer is :—If thread, out of which a cloth is produced, be destroyed, to say that the cloth escapes destruction for a short time, be correct, according to a Tarkika,—then when the cause of error which ranges for an indefinite length of time is destroyed, for its product to rest for a lengthened period is not unnatural, because to allow adequate time to a thing according to its space of duration is clearly maintainable.

56. The above illustration is not cited by the Vedantin with the object of establishing a lengthened stay, after that of the Tarkika's momentary duration, but to shew that if he will only cite proofs which are not admissible, but imaginary, then, why are we to abstain from the testimony of *Sruti* which appeals to experience and involves no contradiction ?

57. Hence there needs be no more arguing with the dishonest Tarkika, but it is proper that we should have recourse to reason, for in the aforesaid way the *Sruti* has determined the mistake of the uniform Intelligence indicated by 'self' with individual Intelligence indicated by 'I' and imagined to be one.

58. And though that identity is only being conceived in error, yet simple argument is entirely powerless to clear this

mistake of a Tarkika and others, who pretend to be wise without a due consideration of the purport of *Sruti* on the subject.

59. Some of the opposing sects, unable to study the *Sruti* regularly in a consecutive manner, misapprehend the Supreme Self in an infinite variety of ways, and, incapable of rightly interpreting the *Sruti*, cite at random such texts which they fancy support them, without considering their applicability.

60. The dullest amongst the *Lokayats** says from the

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* *Lokayata* or *Lokayatikas* otherwise called *Sunyavadins* and *Charvakas* were a set of heretics. They condemned all ceremonial rites, including even the *Sradha* or rites performed in connection with death on the occasion of parents by a son, without which no Hindu can be said to be purified from the impurity of death. It would appear, they were materialists and atheists; looking upon the present existence as the best, they were of opinion that wealth and gratification of desire are the highest ends which a man should pursue, and there is no other existence beyond this. Their principal tenets were according to Colebrooke (1) the identity of self with the physical body, (2) rejection of ether as an element, (3) admission of perception alone as a means of proof. They were called Sunyavadins because they expounded the doctrine of 'nothing' preceeding every thing; in short, from nothing has been produced the universe; and *Charvakas* from their teacher Charvaka Muni.

A *Charvaka* calls the physical body, derived from the four elements—fire, water, air, and earth his self, and argues thus:—The subject of the perception of Egoism is self. "I am a man," "I am fat," "I am lean," "I am a Brahman," etc. Here the physical body is perceived as the subject of Egoism, and is accordingly taken for a man, or his qualities of corpulence and of Brahman, etc. Hence the body is self or what is the subject of supreme affection is self. In this way as a wife, son and the rest are conducive to the well-being of the body, and it is the seat of the highest affection, consequently the subject of the indications of that extreme love—the body, is self, and the highest aim of

uniform Intelligence to the physical body, the collective aggregate of all these, is his Self.

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humanity consists in feeding that with good things and clothing it with good dress, jewels, etc., and death is emancipation. Now this requirs no other proof than what actually follows in every individual and is plainly seen ; look for instance at the appearance of a prince with all gold and jewels over, an appearance expressing supreme indications of affection for that body, the care bestowed on its feed and dress, providing all comforts for it, and contrast it with the care-worn and pinched countence of a raggamuffin,—yet even here, you will find him struggling all day long, for the maintenance of the body which regards with affection and care. All these are proofs enough and as they are everywhere visible, there can be no contention against their cogencey.

But this doctrine of *Charvakas* is clearly untenable. For if the subject of perception of Egoism ('I') would constitute self, in that case, the organs of sense and action would be so ; inasmuch as they are also perceived in the same way, as in the expressions "I see," "I hear," "I speak." Thus then the organs are also perceived as the subject of Egoism, then again in regard to an individual's affection for his body, it cannot be a subject of Egoism, consequently it is a misapplication, therefore, the physical body is not self. Moreover, wealth and riches, wife and son, as they shew good deal of affection for that body, evince a similar feeling for the organs too, consequently in the absence of the highest amount of affection, the gross body is not a subject of supreme affection, and, therefore, it is not self. Further, as the body is wanting in sentiency or intelligence, it is not self, and if a *Charvaka* were to say just as a mixture of quicklime with catechu and betel leaf produces the well-known red color, so the body for its being a mixture of the four elements, derives its power of knowledge. But this is clearly impossible, for if a blending of the elements were to produce sentiency, knowledge or intelligence, we may as well expect a 'jar' which is derived from a blending of the same four elements to possess sentiency or knowledge, but that it has not; besides, in conditions of profound sleep, fainting

61. And to support it, cite the *Sruti* text which explains the foodful sac. "This foodful sac is the Supreme Self, etc.," and "I am the Supreme Self."

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and death, the body is as insentient as a jar consequently insentiency is its normal condition and hence it is not self.

If the physical body were identical with self we would never have fixed our belief in the identity of the body of our manhood, with that of our youth, though they are different from each other ; and when a person who had seen us in our boyhood come to see after an absence of several years, when we have attained manhood, he for the sake of recognition recalls to our memory a few leading incidents of the past, and we exclaim, "Indeed that am I." As this is a common incident, therefore, the body is not self. Further, since the body is subject to birth and death, prior to its being born or subsequent to death, it is non-existent, consequently self who is eternal cannot be same with it. Because that will imply the acknowledgment of two defects—of destruction of actions done, and the fruition of actions not done, after death ; both of them are inapplicable. That is to say, if the actions performed in life, were to produce no result, in the absence of self who is no agent and instrument, a person would then cease to practise works enjoined in the Vedas, and we see the contrary to be fact. Then again, for the existing difference of self of boyhood with that of prime, when a person has read the Vedas in his youth and boyhood should enjoy no fruits subsequent to that period either in prime or old age ; similarly all works done in the present life should yield him no results, thus the admission of destruction of works done already and their unproductiveness is injurious, and in a previous birth from an absence of a doer or agent no actions could be done, so that in the present life whatever a person has to enjoy or suffer should be equally the case with all, and there shall be no cause of the prevailing difference as to happiness or woe in its various shades, as we actually find to be the case,—one is happy, a second miserable, a third beset with difficulties,—so that, it is impossible to acknowledge the fruition of actions not done, and along with it, the assumption of the body being self.

62—63. Another *Lokayata* says since with the exit of the (*Jiva-Atma*) or Life-soul the body dies, and since Egoism ('I') is plainly discernible in the organs, sensory and active—and by them words and actions are produced, they, (the organs) represent Self. Thus doing away with the assertion last mentioned of the body being Self.

64. To admit this is nothing inconsistent; though in words and the rest of actions Intelligence is not clearly discernible, yet we cannot take them for insentient objects, consequently (to a certain extent) it is allowable.

[That is to say, Intelligence being the indication or sign of self, the organs as they shew signs of intelligence can justly be regarded as self. This is what another *Charvaka* says, but it is fallacious, because self is that without which the body cannot last; in the case of the organs of sense and action, we find a person may be blind or deaf yet living, he may be paralysed, his hands and feet are deprived of action, and progression, he may be dumb, yet living, consequently self is something distinct from the sensory and active organs. They cite in support, the expression "I hear," "I see," "I am blind," etc. But it is to be remembered the first personal pronoun used in connection with that hearing, sight, etc., establishes the possession of the necessary organs with which the several functions are carried on, consequently when it is said "I hear," etc, it means "I have ears to hear," or "I see

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Now according to *Charvakas* the chief or ulterior aim of humanity consists in eating, dressing, etc., but it is not so, because a desire for a thing constitutes an ulterior aim or supreme purport, and as every one is desirous of acquiring happiness and removing misery, necessarily that desire is the supreme purport of humanity, and the highest of that felicity and extreme destruction of misery is called 'emancipation' in the *Sidhanta*. But enjoyment cannot be ranked with this ulterior aim for it is apt to take an extreme turn, and there is no limit for it; neither can death be taken in the light of emancipation.

with my eyes," and not "I am the eye," "I am the ear." Thus then the perception of (subject of Egoism) 'I' in connection with the organs of sense is quite distinct from them; then again, if their identity be sought to be proved by similar other expressions as "My sight is indifferent," "My hearing is actute," by shewing an attachment of sight, etc., with own self, it is simply a misapplication, for the cogniser is different from cognition, and self being the cogniser is different from sight, hearing, etc. Moreover, in mental abstraction, or absence of mind, a person sees not, neither does he hear, though his sight and hearing are perfect, therefore, we may lay down the insentiency of sensory organs, and what is insentient cannot be similar to self. In connection with it, in a dead body the organs of sense and action are all present, yet they are insentient.

Further, it may be enquired whether one organ is self, or whether their collective totality is so, or they are so many different selves. The first is quite untenable, for if it be said that a single organ is self, a person should die or be insentient when that is wanting; yet the fact is otherwise, similarly if the collective aggregate of organs be regarded in that light, then in the destruction of one single organ, all the rest should equally be destroyed and their should be neither life nor intelligence; moreover, if each of them were so many different selves then like ten elephants tied to one tree breaking it asunder, the body will be similarly affected by desires originating with each of these selves.]

65. A worshipper of *Hiranyagarbha* says as life continues with respiration, though the eyes and the rest of the organs may be destroyed,*

66. And as after all the organs, etc., are engrossed in sleep, respiration (vital airs) alone continue, and as its supe-

* *Hiranyagarbha* is collective aggregate of *Prana*.

riority over the rest, has been mentioned distinctly in several places, it is therefore his Self.

[But *Prana* is not self. Because like the absence of motion in the external air, when there is no respiratien going on, death does not follow, we find plants do not respire* like ourselves yet they continue to grow, and preserve their vitality; in regard to animated beings it cannot be said that respiration goes on during or after death, yet there are instances when it is suspended, and vitality is seen to continue; moreover, in sleep *Prana* is awake, yet if it were intelligence or self, it should show the usual civilities to a new comer related to a person when he arrives at his house while sleeping, that it does not, nor does it prevent a thief when he robs him in sleep; hence it is not self, but insentient and unconscious. It is contended by the supporters of *Prana*, that with its exit, death follows, therefore it is self. But this does not hold true. Because with the departure [cessation of the secretion] of gastric juice, a man loses his appetite, wastes and dies, and we may as well call it self. Moreover, the superiority of *Prana* mentioned in the Veda is only with a view of producing an inclination to one engaged in devotional exercises. If it be said there are *Sruti* texts which clearly denote *Prana* to be self, but inasmuch as similar texts are also found in connection with the mental sac consequently one is contradicted by the other, hence it is not meant so; but it serves to establish the non-difference of the abiding intelligence seated in them with Brahma.]

67. Mind which is more internal than *Prana* is said by its supporters to be self, after the manner of Narad's *Pancharatra*. They say, " Persons given to the exercise of

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* We know too well that trees and plants have inspiration and expiration.

devotion regard mind in that light;" and because, *Prana* is not an agent or instrument, but mind is so.*

68. The *Sruti* texts corroborating the view of mind as self are pointed out to support them:—"Mind is either a

* Mind is not self. Because in conditions of trance and sleep, an absence of Mind is plainly discernible. Now, the *Atma* can never leave a body without causing death to it, but in the absent conditions, when a person recovers consciousness, the Mind is again restored to its original condition. Hence Mind is said to be insentient naturally, and is not self. In proof, we may cite the expression when from some cause or other, a person is under mental abstraction, on recovering from it, he says, "I was wandering in my Mind, and hence did not hear you." Though all the time, he was apparently listening to what was being said to him. Thus then, as Mind is apt to be disturbed, sometimes fixed, at others, unsettled, it is something different from self, who is always fixed. Mind is illumined by the reflection of intelligence from self, not that self imparts something of his own consciousness, of his own will, for that he has none, as he is passive, and actionless; but like a needle attracted by a magnet when placed in apposition, the two—Mind and Self—from their close proximity to one another, are similarly influenced. Hence it is an agent and instrument. Here again there is difference, for as just said, Self is actionless, and, therefore, not an agent (doer) and instrument, whereas Mind is so, and is the cause of bondage and emancipation. But it may be asked how? The reply is, in proportion as you beget a desire for material prosperity, the more are you enticed to search after it, and that subjects you to re-birth; while on the other hand, after having ascertained the unreality of the objective world, when with due deliberation, you cease to have any concern for it, and increase your spirituality by the 'means' of knowledge, your knowledge destroys the 'accumulated' and 'current works' leaving alone the 'fructescent' for your consummation in life, so that when you part with the body, you enter into that blissful state whose sole essence is joy, and which no eyes have seen, nor ears heard, and Mind can form no adequate conception of.

cause of a person's bondage or that of his release." "Situated internal to the vital sheath, self, distinct from it, is full of mind." Therefore Mind is self.

69. Some Buddhists affirm Intellect situated more internally than the mind is self. They say, intellect which is transient in duration is regarded by its supporters to be self, and establish its internal position in this manner:—because the cause of cognition by the mind is due to intellect, and that is evident.

70. If knowledge or cognition, and the predicate of the word 'mind,' namely internal organ, were one, how can there be said to exist between them a relative condition of cause and effect? Hence their difference is being described. The internal organ has two sorts of functions—Egoism and 'This;' of them, Egoism [I am I] is called cognition (*Boodhi*), and 'This,' Mind.

71. Since without the internal perception of 'Egoism' there can be no such knowledge as "This is," therefore, Intellect or cognition is called the internal and cause, while Mind is the external and effect or action.

72. Since that (Intellect) perception of Egoism [I am I] is apt to rise and disappear every moment, it is called transitory, and self-illuminated;*

* A Yogachara says Intellect or spiritual soul is his self:—All objects whether external or internal are moulded after knowledge. Now this knowledge resembles a flash of lightning, it appears and disappears in a moment, hence it is transient. But as it discovers itself and other objects, it is called self-illumined. It has been compared to the light of a lamp and a river current, where wave after wave keeps up the continuity; knowledge of a first object is displaced by a second, and that by a third, and so on; hence the current of intellect or knowledge is of two sorts, of which, one is local, and the other continuous; the perception of Egoism 'I am I' is an instance of the first variety and is only another form of *Boodhi*. 'This is a jar' and similar other percep-

73. And the life soul in the *Veda*; an agent subject to birth and death.

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tions connected with 'this':—'this body,' 'this river,' 'this house,' etc., are all instances of the second; they relate to external objects. The second or continuous flow follows the first or local. Hence the local flow of *Boodhi* produces the continuous which is its action. Therefore that one is self. Now the continuous flow is no other than Mind, therefore 'emancipation' consists in dwelling upon or concentrating the mind on *Boodhi*, and to be one with it, thereby fixing the transient flow of the intellect. But this view is objectionable. For, the action of knowledge in the perception of form, taste, smell, etc., like the sensory organs, eyes and the rest, being the means for ascertaining action, Intellect is not self; but what knows it, which ascertains or cognises all objects to a certainty, is self,—and as he is naturally luminous, he is always self-illuminated. That is to say, like the sun who is the discoverer or illuminator of all objects, which are, therefore, said to be discovered or illuminated by him, we have a similar conditional difference between Self and Intellect (*Boodhi*); Self is illumination and Intellect illuminated by Self. As the light of a lamp, covers or takes possession of a jar or another object and discovers it, the two are mixed, though naturally they are distinct; similarly Self who is consciousness is blended with Intellect so as to become one, and this twin medley is the means of perception from which cognition follows, though naturally they are distinct from each other. And as from a difference in occupation, the same Brahmana may be designated separately a reader and cook, similarly the internal organ which is a product of the good quality of the non-quintuplicated elements, ether and the rest, for its certitude is called Intellect, and for its action of doubt and resolution is designated (*Mana*) Mind; consequently the division of that internal organ into Intellect and Mind for their separate functions of internal and external objects of 'I' and 'this' is not feasible.

In reference to the transient nature of knowledge the arguments adduced by its supporters do not stand a searching scrutiny. For, if Self be liable to destruction every moment, in

74. A Madhyamika Buddhist says this transient cognition is not Self, for it is very short-lived, like a flash of lightning;

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the absence of that Self in a prior period, there can be no acquisition of wealth; or a person advancing money to another with a promise of re-payment a year hence, must naturally forget every thing about it and will cease to demand or receive payment from his debtor. Then again, a person on rising from his dinner table will never express satisfaction the next moment that he has been well satiated, as he does; a dead man may turn into a beast, a can of milk may likewise be turned into poison a moment afterwards; it cannot be aserted with any plausibility, that a second Self is produced after the first one is destroyed retaining all his conceptions, consequently the subsequent Self is capable of retaining the knowledge previously acquired by his predecessor, and this prior knowledge is said to be due to mistake. But since the transient Self is subject to destruction in a subsequent moment, necessarily in the absence of an observer and site, there can be no mistake [as in the instance of a snake in a rope, a spectator and rope are needed to create that illusion.] Moreover, as knowledge is non-particular, its conception cannot be acknowledged. Even admitting conception to be a fact, then it must have a receptacle, vehicle, or asylum; and if it be said, knowledge is the asylum, that will do away with the non-particularity of knowledge.

If Self were short-lived, a person will have not the slightest inclination for doing meritorious deeds, but will lead a life of pleasure and run headlong into sin; for his self is changing every moment, the first one gives place to a second, and that to a third, so that the doer of sin (they regard Self so) will be re-placed by a new self the next moment, and there will be no bad consequences for him, and there will be a total absence of desire of happiness. Further, on appealing to experience, we find a person say, "My intellect is dull;" another says, "My intellect is sharp;" here also the same difference is established between self and intellect; for the intelligence of self knows no fluctuation, it is permanent, and self-illuminated while Intellect is illuminated by self, consequently dependent on him, therefore not self.

but 'Nothing' is self, as without it not another thing can be perceived.

75. And cite in support the *Sruti* text. "Before the evolution of the world there was present nothing;" and knowledge, and its subject, *i. e.*, phenomena, are only illusions created on nothing.*

76. But this assertion is inadmissible. For the asserters of 'nothing' maintain the unreality of the world which they say to be a simple illusion; but illusion must abide on something real, and in the absence of that site in 'Nothing' for an illusion to arise, consequently 'nothing' cannot be admitted to be the source; moreover, 'nothing' also stands in need of Intelligence as a witness, otherwise it cannot possibly have any power or force. [To cite an apt illustration so frequently made use of in Vedantic writings, let us take the instance of 'snake in a rope.' Here the site of the snake

* A Madhyamika Buddhist calls 'Nothing;' his self, because self and things distinct from self, are like nothing, consequently for the resemblance of all objects with 'nothing,' it is the principal entity. In profound slumber, a person loses all consciousness of external objects and he experiences nothing; for, on rising from sleep he says "I knew nothing then." Moreover, to a wise person, the remnant of ignorance in the form of the Blissful sheath, is self—a semblance of nothing. But it may be asked of him whether his nothing is with or without witness? Or whether it is self-illuminated? If the first, then that witness is something different from nothing and no other than self; the second consideration—without a witness—will be a contradiction, and the third view of self-manifestability only establishes Brahma by another name and remove 'nothing' altogether. Then again the *Sruti* text cited by him from the *Chhandogya Upanishad* that "Nothing was present before the world was ushered into existence" does not apply. It does not help his position. It has been purposely introduced to do away with the assertion of 'prior condition' acknowledged by a Naiyayika, and Vaishesika Buddhist, as an efficient cause for the world.

is rope, and when a person imagines, he sees a snake, that illusion requires the presence of the rope; without seeing it there can be no mistake of snake. We have, therefore, a real rope existing on the ground, on which is projected the form of a snake through the enveloping force of ignorance; and that snake is no actual creation, but simply a superimposition, for if it were so, a light helping us to know what the thing lying in front is, dispels it; this will be clearly impossible. Hence it is said, if 'nothing' is the real entity and phenomena are illusions created on nothing, like the snake in rope, that nothing must have something resting on the background; for there can be no illusion on nothing, as there can be no snake without a rope, etc. Then again, who discovers nothing? It cannot discover itself, intelligence is needed for that purpose, hence the real entity is intelligence, and the objective world, an illusion on intelligence.]

Therefore, if Self were to be acknowledged as Intelligence what is different from the cognitional sheath and most intrinsically situtated, and existent too—the Blissful sheath—is self. This is the instruction given in the *Vedas*.

78. Thus having shewn the contention about the nature of Self, his size is now being declared to be equally disputed by the several schools of thought. Some of them say self is atomic in size, some large, and others intermediate, resting their individual assertions on *Sruti* texts and reason.

79. A set of dissenters known by the name of Madhyamikas regard self to be equal in size to an atom, because he pervades in the finest capillaries which are no bigger than a hair divided into a thousand parts.*

* But this statement of the atomic size of self is untenable; for in that case, he will be confined within a small space in one particular part of the body, consequently a person will feel no pain all over his body in the case of illness. Self is a knower, he alone has consciousness, so that to feel pain in the feet as well as in the head at one time, clearly does away with his atomic

80. Because innumerable passages to that effect occur in the *Sruti*. "Self is finer than an atom and subtler than the subtlest."

81. Here is another illustration from the *Sruti* to the purpose. "The forepart of a single hair when divided into

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size. But then its partisans allege, as the sweet scent of a flower or musk is diffused at a distance from the spot where such flower or musk is kept; similarly in spite of his atomic size, self is diffused all over the body, hence either pain or pleasure can be equally felt in the head and feet at one time, though they are distant from each other: but this is a mistake. Because oil seeds placed in a jar will not fill it with oil, and it is in the nature of a quality to remain confined within the body, whose quality it is; hence, external to Self, there cannot be any quality of consciousness. Then again, it cannot be maintained, like a sandal paste applied to the feet producing a pleasurable feeling of coolness all over the body, the consciousness of Self confined in one particular region of the body diffuses itself all over and pervades it everywhere. Because in the case of sandal, the watery particles of the paste are absorbed into the body thus refringerating the blood and producing the sensation of coolness, so that there is no refringerating quality present in sandal, it is only the water with which it is mixed, that has it, necessarily therefore the illustration is not an apt one but extreme. Then again, they say, like the light of a lamp illuminating the interior of a room, consciousness of self illumines by diffusing or pervading all parts of the body, though he may be confined within the narrowest limit in one particular part. Even this is open to objection. For self in that case will be visible and have a form like the lamp, both of which will reduce him to the condition of an unreality, subject to destruction, which he is not. Thus then, self is not atomic in size. The *Sruti* texts cited by the partisans of this theory, have only been misapplied, inasmuch as they were meant to impress dull persons with an idea of difficulty as to the nature of self. As atoms are difficult of comprehension, so is self difficult of perception.

hundred parts, one fractional hundredth only is an individual capable of knowing" so very subtle is self.

82. Another sect called Digambars say, self is intermediate in size, because consciousness is present in every part of the body, from head to foot. And for the *Sruti* text:—"This self occupies even the tips of nails."

83. Though medium in size, yet he is capable of pervading in the capillaries; just as in the instance of the physical body when a person has passed his two hands in the sleeves of a coat, he is said to cover his body with it, so is the pervasion in capillaries attributed to self.

84. But it may be objected, if Self were medium in size he could not enter the body of an ant which is small, and an elephant which is a big animal, from the force of fructescent works; therefore, it is said, the entry of Self in the body of a bigger or smaller animal is due to a smaller or greater particle of self entering that body according to its size, thus establishing his medium size.

85. But the attribution of form in the manner aforesaid to self will reduce him to impermanence llke a jar, etc. [For name and form are indications of creation, and, therefore, non-eternal;] hence the view of a Digambar is faulty, as it implies the destruction of works without enjoying their results (of virtue and sin) and the (accidental) fruition of merit and de-merit without works being performed. Both these defects will apply to self.

86. Thus then as both the views of self in regard to his size—excessively minute like an atom or intermediate—are defective, consequently what is neither small nor medium is great, therefore, like ether he is all-pervading and formless. As the *Vedas* say, "Like ether he is pervasive; he is eternal." "He is formless and actionless."

87. Like his size, the intelligence of Self is equally a subject of contention. Some acknowledge his intelligence, others deny it, while a third say him to be both intelligent and insentient.

88. According to a *Pravakara* and *Naiyayika* self is insentient, but like ether possessing the property of sound, he is a body, with knowledge or intelligence for a quality.

89. They attribute to him other qualities as :—

Desire, spite, endeavour, virtue, vice, happiness and misery and impression.

90. As these qualities are liable to come and go, the circumstances under which they appear and disappear and their cause are now being ascertained. When self is combined with the mind, from the influence of the unseen (*adrishta*,) the qualities intelligence, etc., arise, but in the profound slumbering condition, when the connection of mind with self is cut off, they also are effaced or wiped away.

91. Thus though self is naturally insentient, yet for his quality of intelligence, he can be acknowledged as sentient knowing or intelligent; moreover, the other qualities, desire and the rest, likewise establish it; and as he is an agent,—a doer of virtue and sin—he is, therefore, distinct from Iswara.

92. As happiness and misery are sometimes produced in self from good and bad actions performed [during life], so are desire and the rest derived from similar actions in a previous life.

93. In this manner, though self is all-pervading, yet it is quite possible for him to go away with death, and be re-born in a fresh body, as is amply testified by the *Veda* when it treats of 'Works' (*Karmakanda*.)*

94. A *Prabhakara* and *Tarkika* regard the 'blissful seath' as their self, for it remains even in the profound slum-

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* If it be apprehended, since Self is all-pervading he cannot be subjected to metempsychosis; therefore, it is said, the desires etc., of the present body are a product of works done in a prior state of objective life, and like the stay of Self in the present body, actions performed now will produce a future body, where to experience felicity or misery, in proportion to merit or de-merit, self has to go, to re-habilitate it.

bering condition ; therefore, self is an insentient body with intelligence, desire and the rest, already cited, for his qualities.*

95. Now the followers of Bhatta (Bartikkara of the *Purva Mimansa*) or as they are called Bhat, regard this blissful sheath which is their self to be both insentient and sentient. For a person on rising from his sleep remembers that he was sleeping soundly and knew nothing then, a condition in which ignorance [insentiency] and felicity, both are experienced ; but for this remembrance of felicity, a certain amouut of consciousness must necessarily have been present, hence the *Atma* is said to be both insentient and sentient.

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* But this doctrine of theirs is clearly untenable ; for to say that in profound slumber the absence of consciousness proves self to be instentient, is opposed to individual experience ; for if such were a fact, a person on rising from sleep would never have expressed "I was sleeping happily, I knew nothing then," thus clearly proving a remnant of consciousness, enough to leave an impression in the mind of the sleeper as to his perception of happiness, accompanied with ignorance. Then again, in the *Sruti*, Self is said to be without attributes ; therefore to attribute desire, spite, virtue, etc., which properly belong to the internal organ, is simply a delusion. Moreover, as the said qualities desire and the rest, belong to the internal organ which continues in waking and dreaming slumber—consequently present then ; but in profound slumber, that organ is absent, hence there is an absence of the qualities which mark it—it will thus be found, that the natural inference of what has been mentioned establishes the internal organ, and not self, to be possessed with the qualities, desire, etc. There is yet another consideration which precludes the applicability of the view held by Naiyayikas and Prabhakars : for say they, self is all-pervading and manifold ; in that case it will be difficult to connect a particular self with one body, for all selves are related to all bodies, all works, and all enjoyments and connected with all minds.

96. Thus then, the recollection "I was sleeping insensibly," which arises in the mind of a person on his first waking, can never follow without the perception of actual ignorance or insentiency in such profound slumber, hence for the presence of ignorance and experience or perception, the consciousness of Self is said to be covered with insentiency.

97. And since the *Sruti* mentions "Self is not deprived of his consciousness in that profound slumber," and as memory establishes his insentiency, therefore he is both sentient and insentient and like the fire-fly, luminous and dark.*

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* But this is open to objections, a few of which are here worth mentioning. As light and darkness are naturally opposed to each other, so are sentiency or consciousness, and its reverse. As for instance, it cannot be said, "This man is a jar," so the above conditions cannot exist. For instance, if it be said, that the insentient part is perceivable, and the light of consciousness is not perceivable in self, so that for the same body or substance to be possessed of properties directly opposed to each other is clearly impossible. As from the sight of a stick, it cannot be said, "here is a Dundi," but there must be present an individual carrying the stick, to deserve the appellation of a Dundi; so from the knowledge of one part, insentiency, Self cannot be determined to be both insentient and sentient. Moreover, if the part representing sentiency or consciousness be deemed amenable to perception, then insentiency must fall in the back ground of illusion—a creation of fancy.—Likewise it may be asked of them who follow Bhatta, what is the relation of the two parts, insentiency and sentiency of self? Whether it is due to combination or to an identity? Or is it only a condition of subject and owner. From the first stand-point, self will be reduced to impermanence, for objects derived from a combination of two or more substances are material, hence non-eternal; if the second view be maintained, insentiency will be identical with sentiency, and sentiency with insentiency, which is absurd; the third will reduce self to impermanence, like a jar. We find, therefore, no proofs as to one half

98. After thus exposing the error of the Bhats, the view held in *Sankhya* is now being set forth. A follower of Kapila (author of *Sankhya Philosophy*) says, a body without form cannot have both insentiency and sentiency ; therefore to say self is formless, would be meaningless.

99. But the attribution of a recollection of insentiency to self in spite of his intelligence, does not imply any contradiction. For the perception of insentiency is only due to (*Prakriti*) Matter, which is possessed of the three attributes good, active, and painful or dark, and subject to change, only that self may be an agent or instrument of enjoyment, and be freed from the bondage of re-births. This is its purpose.

100. Though Self and Matter, for the possession of unconditioned bliss and sentiency by the former, and insentiency by the latter are extremely different from each other, yet from an absence of perception of the difference between Matter and Spirit, matter is regarded as the cause which helps self to enjoyment and emancipation ; and for allotting bondage and emancipation to Self, like the aforesaid dissenters Tartika etc., even the followers of the Sankhya School admit a distinct difference in self.*

101. As proofs confirmatory of the insentiency of Matter and the unassociated bliss and intelligence of Self, *Sruti* texts are being cited in reference to the first. " For its being the cause, the indescribable [Ignorance or *Prakriti*] is superior to *Mahat* (*Mahatatwa*)." And in support of the unconditioned or unrelated nature of Self [we find it said] " This self is unassociated or unrelated.

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of Self being insentient and the other half sentient ; for in the *Sruti*, Self is described as a mine of knowledge. It is true the *Smriti* mentions about this insentiency, but that refers only to Ignorance in the condition of profound slumber.

* Kapila regards Matter as the cause of the world, and says, it is likewise the cause of bondage and deliverance of the

102. Thus having exposed the fallacious views held by the aforesaid dissenters in regard to the nature of Self, their opposite doctrines concerning Iswara are now being declared. For this purpose, his nature is first determined. According to the followers of *Yoga*, Iswara is the controller of matter, closely engaged [occupied] in intelligence. He is superior to all individuals.

103. As in the *Sruti* "He is the lord of Matter and Jiva, and qualities." That is to say, Iswara is the Lord of the equilibrised state of matter, when its *Satwa, Raja* and *Tama* are evenly blended, (likewise called *Pradhan* or primary); the individual with his tenement of flesh which is called

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(Purusha) Atma or Spirit; but it is open to objection. For in periods of cyclic destruction, matter is said to be in a state of equipoise, that is to say, its three properties are evenly balanced. Evolution begins only with a disturbance of this equilibrium. The first mentioned condition is spoken of as the natural (*Pradhana*), chief or primary condition, so that with evolution arises the insentient condition; now if insentiency be the primary state, the equilibrised condition will necessarily come to be secondary. Then again, from a want of association with the intelligence (self) there is no relation with the primal condition; and as without a relativity of intelligence, the subsequent evolution cannot proceed from insentiency, consequently the primal cannot create; and that primal condition is Iswara's intelligence endowed with Maya, who is the internal ruler and creator of the world. Kapila advocates the theory of the Spirit being manifold and as many in number, as there are individuals. But to say so is futile, because admission of the oneness of the all-pervading intelligence and the attribution of enjoyment, etc., to the association of the internal organ, are enough to settle the point, and the necessity for such an infinite division of *Atma* is clearly removed; otherwise to regard the eternity of matter and manifold diversity of *Atma* will land us in the region of (*sajatiya, vijatiya*) defects marked by similarity and dissimilarity, or in the language of Western physicists, isomorphism and disomorphism.

ground—for it is the scene of works already bearing fruit—and the three attributes just mentioned—for they are controlled by him. It is not to be imagined that this is the only mention of Iswara in the *Veda*. For the *Brihadaranyakopanishad* have texts explanatory of him, as an internal knower.

104. Resting their opinions on such *Sruti* texts, as they believe support them, and which they construe according to their lights, a marked variety of opinion prevails in regard to Iswara among these controversialists.

105. With a view of ascertaining the view held by a Yogachara, the nature of Iswara after Patanjali is being declared. He is defined as " A particular person unconnected with felicity or misery, merit or de-merit, good or bad action, their impression and composition. Like Jiva, He is unassociated (bliss) and intelligence.*

106. But it may be asked, if Iswara is thus unconditioned

* It remains to be observed that there is a marked similarity between Sankhya and Yoga in regard to Jiva ; for as the former holds him to be unrelated, self-illuminated, uniform, and intelligence, so does the latter ; and he is an enjoyer only, but no agent or instrument. Now such an experience of his enjoyment follows from want of discrimination, for happiness and misery are the attributes of the internal organ whose function is intellection, (*Boodhi*), in connection with which, he is apt to be attributed the power of enjoying, and that *Boodhi* (spiritual soul or intellection) is the agent ; from similar want of discrimination, self is practically regarded as an agent, and so long as the intellect is not cleansed by the practice of the two varieties of meditation called *samprajnata* and *asamprajnata* or better still, the conscious and unconscious varieties of the Vedantin, misery cannot be completely extirpated ; but when these medititations have thoroughly ripened, then Jiva is roused to his sense, he has now got discrimination wherewith to keep misery at bay, and this extreme destruction of misery is called emancipation in Yoga. Sankhya does not admit Iswara, but Yoga does, and that Iswara is like Jiva unrelated or unassociated [uncondioned] Intelligence.

or unassociated intelligence, how can then he be the controller? The reply is, that does not imply any contradiction, it is quite possible for his being a particular person and a controller, otherwise there will be no regulation of bondage and emancipation. [That is to say as a king rewards a person for good and punishes for bad deeds, in the absence of Iswara as such a controller, a bad man be released while a good subjected to re-birth, and thus the inevitable law of *Karma* will be set at nought].

107. And the testimony of the *Sruti* likewise goes to establish his control. As for instance. "From his fear the wind moves and the sun shines." If it be asked how is he unrelated? "This Supreme Self for an absence of pain,* works, etc., the usual atributes or perquisites of a Jiva, is likewise a controller." And there are arguments and (good) reasons for it.

108. Moreover if Jiva be likewise devoid of pain what constitutes the distinction of Iswara? So long as there is a want of discrimination, a person is apt to consider himself as subject to grief; as has already been said. (*Vide ante V. 100.*)

109. With a view of establishing a difference between Iswara and Jiva, a Tarkika (Naiyayika) says, Iswar's three qualities, intelligence, endeavour, and will are eternal, and his unassociated control is unsound and objectionable.

110. And adduce the testimony of the *Sruti* in support:—"His desire is eternal, his determination actuates him always and knows no rest." In this manner, the eternal nature of his qualities are sought to be established.†

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* There are five sorts of pain:—

(*a*). An Identity of sight and seer, (*b*) Ardent desire for happiness and objects tending to it, (*c*) Pain produced from material objects, (*d*) Fear of death, and (*e*) Eagerness for the preservation of the body.

† In such an admission of the eternal intelligence, etc., of Iswara there will be created a discrepancy with the *Sruti* texts

111. The opinion held by the worshippers of Hiranygarbha (Brahma) is now being cited. They say, if Iswara be regarded as eternally intelligent, etc., the work of creation will be continued for all time, hence Hiranyagarbha who is the collective totality of subtle bodies is Iswara.

112. In spite of his having the subtle body, he is not a Jiva, because he is devoid of actions; and because in the *Udgita Brahmana* his glory has been fully declared, [he is therefore Iswara.]

113. As there can be no perception of the subtle without the gross physical body, therefore a worshipper of Vishnu says:—Virat is called Iswara for the conceit that he is the collective aggregate of gross bodies and is always possessed of head, etc., [and of divers forms].

114. And cite in support "That he has thousand feet, thousand hands, and an equal number of heads and eyes." (*Sruti.*)

115. If an immense number of hands and feet were to constitute Iswara, a *centipide* may with equal propriety be called so. Therefore abstain from calling Virat to be Iswara but look upon Brahma as so; and beyond him, there is no other Iswara, for none else has the power of creating subjects.

116. Those who are desirous of issue and large progeny worship Brahma, and regard him as Iswara; for the *Sruti* says "Prajapati (Brahma) creates all subjects."

117. But a worshipper of Vishnu says since Brahma had his origin from a lotus, and that was the navel of Vishnu, consequently the latter pre-existed him, hence he is the father and therefore Iswara, and not Brahma.

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where it is mentioned, "With the creation of the Universe, arose the intelligence of Iswara" as also such other texts which expound the view of non-duality. Hence it is easy to infer, with every show of reason, that the words 'true desire,' etc., cited by a Tarkika, mean a duration extending to cyclic periods of destruction and not to eternity.

118. A Shivite says his own deity is Iswara, because Vishnu could not ascertain where the legs of Shiva were resting.

119. A follower of Ganesa takes cbjection to the recognition of Shiva as Iswara, for he had himself to worship Ganpat for conquering Tripur to avoid disaster; therefore Ganesa is Iswara.

120. In the same way, there are others who show a bais for their own deities whom they call Iswara; by the help of the (*Mantras*) sacred formulæ used in their respective worship, they seek to establish the truth of their assertion, as also by an analysis and argument of their meaning and by a reference to *Kalpa* [a complete cycle of four *Yugas*].

121. From the internal knower to inanimate objects all are equally denominated Iswara, inasmuch as even trees for instance, the *ficus religiosa, aslepias gigantea,* and bamboo are objects of worship with men.

122. In order to ascertain the correctness of the several views held concerning Iswara, by the different sects of worshippers, it is said, with the help of analogy and analysis of the arguments used in the *Shastras*, a wise and tranquil person has no difficulty in differentiating Iswara from the rest and ascertaining him as secondless. This will be shewn in the sequel.

123. The testimony of the *Sruti* on this subject is to the following effect :—" Know then *Prakriti* is *Maya* and Iswara is the particular person endowed with it." " All objects which ramify the universe have sprung from him." [That is to say, Matter is the proximate cause of the universe, and the Internal Knower associated with it is the Supreme Iswara,—the instrumental cause abiding in *Maya*.] And all objects whether sentient or otherwise which fill the universe are said to be derived from Iswara, inasmuch as the same matter which forms a feature in Iswara is equally present in the rest (*Sruti*).

124. And inasmuch as all contradictions are cleared by the *Sruti* text just referred above, the different worshippers of inanimate and animate bodies can have no further cause of disagreement.

125. And as Illusion (matter) is said in the *Nirsimha Tápani* to be full of darkness, (ignorance), and experienced by all beings, such experience is a proof of its existence, as has been over and over mentioned in the *Sruti*.*

126. And its (*Maya* or *Prakriti's*) action is described in the *Sruti* to be insentient and fascinating. It likewise establishes its property of darkness as proved from individual experience, in the following wise. "The action of Maya is both insentient and fascinating." "It is infinite." Now this infinite nature of Matter establishes its universal presence, as we actually find on appealing to the experience of all persons, both young and old, men and women alike.

127. Insentiency refers to want of intelligence. As for instance a jar. Fascination is described as what cannot be grasped by intellect; that is to say, what the intellect fails to comprehend. [It is that spiritual ignorance which leads men to believe in the reality of world and to addict themselves to mundane or sensual enjoyments.]

128. If it be said, for the universal pervasion of *Maya*, and its property of darkness or ignorance being an established fact according to individual experience, it is doubtful whether it is capable of being removed or destroyed by knowledge. For such a purpose the conclusion of the *Sruti*, and an analysis of the arguments used for and against, is cited to lead to the inference of its indescribable nature. Referring to this the *Sruti* says. "It is neither being nor non-being,

* We are all equally ignorant of something or other, and when asked about a thing we know not, we declare our ignorance. Ignorance is universally present, and its existence needs no other proof than our individual experience. This is what is meant.

etc." And what is neither being nor non-being is indescribable.

129. It cannot be termed non-existent, for it is experienced everywhere by all alike; nor existent, as it is capable of being destroyed by knowledge; but as something worthless from the standpoint of knowledge.

130. Thus it can be described in three separate ways:—

(*a*) In the light of knowledge it is something worthless.*

(*b*) From the standard of logical inference, it is indescribable.

(*c*) And according to the standard of ordinary perception it is really existent.

131. And as by spreading a picture, all its figures are rendered plainly visible, so the apparent existence of the world is due to *Maya*; with its destruction by knowledge, phenomena are reduced to the condition of non-reality, just as the figures in the painting disappear when it is rolled up.

132. In the *Sruti*, *Maya* is described as both independent and dependent; but to apply such opposite conditions to one and same substance, may appear contradictory, hence it is explained in the following wise:—Since *Maya* cannot be conceived or realized as a separate entity without intelligence, consequently it is said to be dependent, and inasmuch as it affects the unassociated intelligence it is therefore free:—

133. It has the faculty of rendering the uniform unassociated intelligence of Self insentient and making him appear totally bereft of intelligence; and through the reflex intelligence it seeks to create difference between Jiva and Iswara.

134. It may be asserted, if Self who is ever uniform and knows no change be thus affected by *Maya*, then this trans-

* The word worthless requires to be explained. What does not exist always in all the three conditions of time is called so. The three conditions or divisions of time are waking, dreaming, and profound dreamless slumber.

formation would indicate change. The reply is, *Maya* destroys his unchangeable and uniform nature and discovers the phenomenal world in him—and this is nothing astonishing for it.

135. Like the solvent property of water, heat of fire and hardness of stone, transformation is naturally present in *Maya*.

136. So long as a person is not disenchanted of its spells, he is apt to be filled with wonder concerning it; but when he has come to know of Iswara, the controller of *Maya*, his wonders cease and he regards it as something unreal and false.

137. To a Naiyayika and others like him, who believe in the reality of the objective world, this is applicable; and not to a Vedantin, for he believes in the unreality of *Maya*.

138. And with a view of shewing the uselessness of multiplying questions, the necessity is pointed out of cultivating knowledge wherewith to destroy *Maya*, and this is what an intelligent person should do.

140. Thus then, destruction of *Maya* is proper for all persons, and there is no necessity for ascertaining its nature; but there are men who would dissent to it, and say, it is proper that one should know what *Maya* is; hence it is said, "Ascertain its indication as known to all men."

141. And that indication is what cannot be ascertained exactly, though palpably present and manifested. Like a magical performance every thing that is presented to your sight appears real while the fact is otherwise; and *Maya* is known to all men in that manner—an illusion. How then can you ascertain its nature?

142. And phenomena are said to be a product of *Maya*, for, in spite of our diligent investigations we sadly fail to ascertain the exact nature of any one thing; hence free your self from all bias and say whether it is possible to ascertain the nature of *Maya*.

143. If all the learned men were to join in investigating the nature of a single entity out of the many, which fill this universe, they are sure to declare their ignorance somehow or other, and will fail to ascertain it.

144. For instance, if you ask them how does a drop of semen produce the human body with all its organs? Whence does Intelligence come and why? What will be their reply.

145. If they were to say, it is the very nature of semen to produce a body and its organs, we may pause to enquire, How did they know it? And point out the instance of sterile women who conceive not; consequently semen is not naturally possessed with such a property.

146. So that, ultimately they come to ackowledge their ignorance; for this reason, the wise regard both ignorance and its product, the material world, in the light of a magical performance; they are so to speak a phantasm.

147. What can be more magical than human conception? A drop of semen entering the uterus, vivified by intelligence, develops hands, head, feet, etc., in due order; gradually attains to childhood, youth and old age, is subjected to various diseases, and sees, hears, smells, enjoys and progresses to and fro.

148. Nor is this confined to man alone. For in the case of the *ficus religiosa* and other gigantic trees springing from very minute and insignificant seeds, the same *Maya* is likewise displayed. Look at the tree and the seed which gave it birth, and can you cease to wonder? Therefore by constant practice inure your mind into a belief of the magical property of *Maya*, and look upon it as something equally indescribable.

149. A Naiyayika believes, he alone is capable of satisfactorily explaining phenomena and is proud of it. Let him consult the *Khandana* of Sri Harsha Acharya and he will find his position to be no longer maintainable.

150. For what is inconceivable, cannot be ascertained

by any end of argument, therefore it is improper to connect this inconceivable world with argument even in mind.

151. Consider the source of the world, which is constructed in a manner quite impossible to conceive, and of which no definite idea can be formed, to be *Maya*, which hath for its cause the Secondless, Impartite Intelligence (Brahma) experienced in profound slumber.

152. This world which is nothing else but only a condition of waking and dreaming [a day dream] merges into its source *Maya* which continues in profound slumber; just as a tree abides in its seed. Since therefore *Maya* is the source of the universe, all impressions derived from a knowledge of phenomena are centred in it.

153. Like the ether or space appropriated by cloud, there is a dim perception of reflection of intelligence in all impressions derived from knowledge and this is known inferentially. [But it may be said, it is possible to perceive the presence of water in cloud, for water is nothing else but drops of moisture collected in the cloud, in which again, ether is plainly conceivable, because of the ether present in a jar filled with water, which is identical with the water of the clouds; consequently the presence of the first is easily deducible as an inference from the palpable instance of the second. And it is difficult to see how can the example of cloud-ether apply to reflection of intelligence included in all impressions of phenomena. To clear it out and shew the applicability of the example, it is said that the reflex intelligence—seed of matter—is known inferentially].

154. That reflection of intelligence is subsequently transformed into intellect, hence it is plainly discerned in *Boodhi*. In other words, Ignorance endowed with reflected intelligence modified or transformed into intellect, forms the subject of the reflection of intelligence; under such circumstances, the impression of prior perceptions in the intellect, which is a subject of contention, can be reckoned as a reflection of

intelligence, and for its being a modification, form, or condition of *Boodhi*, may be likened to its function.

155. "*Maya* and reflection of intelligence in it, constitute both Jiva and Iswara"* (*Sruti*). But then it may be remarked, How can their invisibility and visibility be determined if they are thus similar. To establish that difference, it is said :—Like the difference existing between ether present in cloud and water respectively, the knowledge of the Jiva for its being enveloped in ignorance is dimly discernible; while that of Iswara for the associate of Intellect is plainly manifested. Herein consists the practical difference of the two. In other words, the one Impartite Intelligence is through Illusion differentiated into Jiva and Iswara.

156. Similitude of Iswara with cloud-ether is established in the following wise :—*Maya* resembles the cloud, for as in cloud, it is natural to expect subtle particles of rain collected in the form of moisture, so are intellect and knowledge derived from past impressions present in *Maya*; and like the presence of the reflection of ether in that water, there is reflection of intelligence in *Maya*; that is Iswara. Thus then we find, like the space or ether appropriated by cloud and water respectively, both Jiva and Iswara rest on *Maya* and

* Pundit Pitambarjee the author of the well-known Bombay Edition of Mr. Sheriff Mahomed, says in his notes, it is not to be construed that Jiva and Iswara are the active products of *Maya*. That is not meant here, for he says Jiva, Iswara, Intelligence *perse*, Ignorance *(Avidya)* or nescience, and the relation of the two last, together with the subsisting difference of each of the five,—these six substances are naturally uncreate and without an origin; and the statement of the Bartikkar is directly opposed to the *Sidhanta*, and the *Sruti* text "Maya with reflexion makes Jiva and Iswara."

Here the verb to make likewise establishes Maya; for its successful dependence shows or produces Jiva and Iswara. This is what is meant.

reflex Intelligence; because like water present in the cloud, there is present knowledge derived from memory in *Maya*, and like the reflection of ether in that water, Iswara rests in the form of reflex intelligence.*

* It would appear from the text that Vidyaranya Swami means Iswara to be the reflection [of intelligence] in past perception originatlng from or by the intellect, but doubts may be entertained as to the truth of such an assertion, and they are cleared in the following manner. In the first place, it may be enquired whether the associate of Iswara is only Ignorance, or Ignorance with knowledge of prior impressions, or the latter only. If the first point be held, then the resemblance of Iswara with the reflected shadow of intelligence in Ignorance and knowledge of past perceptions of the intellect will create a discord. Similarly the recognition of the second view will require an admission of ignorance only as the associate of Iswara. In that case, he can lay no claim to omniscience; hence it is necessary for preserving his omniscience to consider knowledge and intellect as predicates of ignorance. But to say so is quite contradictory. Because the *satavic* particle of Ignorance can only naturally have the property of all-knowingness, for *Satwa* is light, consequently if knowledge and intellect are viewed in the same light as predicates of intelligence, there will be a perfect absence of omniscience, hence their presence is quite futile and unnecessary. If we pause to enquire into the reason why, we shall find one variety of knowledge cannot possibly take cognisance of, or embrace all objects or things, but on the other hand, for the acquirement of omniscience all knowledges must be admitted as the predicate of ignorance, which again cannot be expected to disappear in any one time save that of *pralaya*, consequently it is not for establishing omniscience.

In the same way, the second view that of intellect and knowledge with ignorance as the associate of Iswara is quite untenable. Then again, those who assert knowledge only is the associate of Iswara, it may be asked of them. Whether Iswara is the reflected shadow in such individual unit of knowledge produced from memory? Or in its collective aggregate? If they maintain

157. "And that reflex intelligence dependent on *Maya* or subservient to it, full of illusion, is the Supreme Iswara, Internal Knower, Omniscient, and the Universal Cause." (*Sruti*.)

158. Beginning with the 'blissful sheath' in the state of profound slumber, the *Sruti* says "That blissful sheath is the Lord of all." Therefore the *Vedas* denote it to be Iswara.

[But objection may be taken to it, for in waking and dreaming, the predicate of the grosser condition of materiality with the reflected shadow—the internal organ—is called the cognitional sheath. The knowing or cognitional Jiva merges into a subtle condition in profound slumber (and that is the blissful) which if regarded as Iswara, then in the absence of that merging of the internal organ in waking and dreaming conditions into the state of blissfulness, there will be a corresponding want of Iswara too. Then again, there must be as many Iswaras as there are men in profound slumber, and as there are five such sheaths or sacs recognised in the human body by all authors, the admission of 'blissful' as Iswara will render the utterances concerning the rest unnecessary and futile; hence it is said, the Blissful sac is not Iswara. This is what a Prabhakar says, but it is cleared

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the first mentioned opinion, then as knowledge originating from the individual's intellect is infinite in variety, Iswara for his being the reflected shadow in each unit of such knowledge must necessarily be infinite in number, and as each knowledge is parviscient, the reflected shadow in it will also necessarily be parviscient. Then again, in regard to the second opinion of Iswara as the reflected shadow in the collective aggregate of all knowledges it is necessary to mention, that save and during the *pralayic* period it can never be and that in proportion to the number of associates there is a similar number of reflected shadows, consequently there cannot be one reflected shadow in all knowledges. Thus then, Ignorance alone is the associate of Iswara.

thus:—If a dull person would receive no benefit from ascertaining the indication of the transcendental phrase, it is better that he should consider and ponder well on the meaning of *Om*, as laid down in the *Mandukya Upanishad*, where likewise the 'Blissful sheath' is mentioned, the Omniscient and Universal Lord. Now as the above *Upanishad* had its object in so saying, to establish non-duality, similarly our author had been actuated to establish the oneness of Jiva and Iswara. He had no desire to make the 'Blissful,' Iswara; for it will be found elsewhere in a subsequent part of the work (Sect. XI) that He terms the 'Blissful' as a particular condition of the individual. Therefore, only with the view of establishing non-duality to persons of dull intellect, that the Blissful sheath is here referred to as Iswara, otherwise there will be a contradiction between what is stated here and in the above Section.]

159. It is not impossible for the 'Blissful sheath' to have omniscience and a paramount control over all, nor is it proper that this should create any dispute or contention; for the utterances of the *Sruti* are beyond cavil and dispute, and they tend that way. Then again, concerning *Maya* it is said, every thing is possible. [That is to say, it is the nature of illusion to create unreal, real; like things shown in a performance of magic.]

160. But as the utterances of the *Sruti* in the absence of supporting arguments to establish their truth may be set at naught like the expression "a boat made of stone" they are now being cited:—Since there is no one capable of undoing the creation of Iswara He is called the Lord Paramount. That is to say, what is created by Iswara, the objective world and the rest, cannot be destroyed in any manner, hence he is the Paramount or Supreme Lord.

161. His omniscience is established in the following wise: The perception [conception] of all beings originating from their intellect rests in ignorance in the condition of profound

slumber, and by that conception makes the whole universe its subject; and for its being the associate of ignorance, the predicate of perception proceeding from intellect (the blissful sheath) is said to be all-knowing.*

162. But then it may be asked, if it is all-knowing what prevents our experiencing it? Therefore it is said:—As intellectual impressions, associate of that blissful (Iswara) are invisible, hence his all-knowingness is not perceived. How is it then known? From their presence in all intellects, conclude omniscience to be present, inasmuch as they are only a product of intellect which is their cause and whose property it is to create perception. In the same way as the property of yarn—the cause of a cloth—is present in its product, the cloth.

163. The blissful "Iswara is the internal knower." *Sruti.* Because resting inside the cognitional and other sacs, and in every other thing besides, he employs them in due order.

164. Regarding Iswara as the internal knower the *Antaryami Brahman* of *Brihadaranyaka Upanishad* says:—"Residing in the intellect, yet he is different from it, nor can he be seen by that intellect, which constitutes his physical body, and of which he is the internal controller." In this manner Iswara is mentioned in the *Vedas.*

165. Now from a fear of its lengthiness I refrain from entering into an explanation of all the indications cited in the *Antaryami Brahman,* but will content myself with "Who resides in all elements" and illustrate it by an example. As yarn constitutes the proximate or formal cause of a cloth and rests in it, so is Iswara the formal cause of all elements and rests in them.

166. But the question is, If Iswara is the formal cause why is He unseen? The reply is, what is most intrinsically

* The reader need not be reminded what the blissful sheath means after what has been said in Verse 158 and note. It refers to Iswara. Therefore, plainly speaking, it is meant here to shew Iswara is omniscient.

situated cannot be seen. As for instance, the threads of a cloth are internal, and their filaments are internal to them; so where that intrinsicality finally rests consider that to be the the Iswara.

167. Thus for His being most intrinsically situated he cannot be seen, because he is formless;—and of concentric intrinsicalities only two or three comparatively external are capable of being determined by the sight, but as he is innermost He is hence unseen, and can only be ascertained by *Sruti* texts and proofs derived from analogy.

168. "The elements form that Iswara's body" is thus explained. As after yarn has been turned into a cloth the body of yarn is the cloth, similarly for Iswara's residing everywhere in all objects, the objective world is His body.

169. "Who resides internally in all objects, controls and employs them." This passage is illustrated by example in the following manner. As by contracting or expanding the threads, [of which a cloth is made] or shaking them, etc., the cloth must of necessity be similarly affected, and there is not the slightest mark by which the cloth can show its distinction;

170. So this internal knower Iswara has been transformed according to the impulse of his desires. That is to say, this objective world, has been produced through his consciousness, and a cow, horse, man, mountain, river, and an infinite variety of objects which fill the universe are changed conditions of Him, and they are necessarily His works.

171. After having explained the *Sruti* text referring to Iswara as an internal knower, the evidence of the *Gita* is now cited. Krishna says to Arjuna "Iswara* is situated in the

* Says the Commentator of the Bombay Edition. The word 'Iswara' is a singular noun of the first declension, hence He is one and not many; consequently as an internal knower He is one and not many as asserted by the followers of Vishnu Swami.

heart of all elementary bodies, and mounted on the mechanism of that organ makes all the elements wander through illusion." [Chap. XVIII, v. 51.]

They assert that as caste is singular number, for it is a collective noun, so Iswara for His being situated inside all hearts, may be taken as a collective noun of the singular number: but this does not hold true; for Iswara is never regarded in that light either in the *Sruti*, *Smriti*, or the *Puranas*; no where is He mentioned except as one; popular experience alike tends that way. Hence it is impossible to construe Him into a collective noun. Then again, if Iswara were so many distinct as there are individuals, there will be created a discord in the harmony of nature, for each Iswara dwelling inside each individual will refuse to be acted upon by the same natural laws which may affect another person and *vice versâ*. To be more explicit, the presence of many Iswaras in one universe will create discord by a difference of desires in them, one may be actuated with a wish to create, another to destroy, and so the two will be acting in the extreme ends, consequently synchcronism, and order will be upset. But it may be alleged, like a king having several servants there needs be no discord; for several Iswaras are all particles of the secondless Supreme Iswara, a form of *Brahma* and controlled by it. It may be asked of those who entertain this view whether that Supreme Iswara is endowed with or without almightiness and omniscience? If the reply be in the affirmative, then the necessity of several Iswaras is clearly done away with; for as an internal knower, one Iswara is quite capable of controlling all beings, and almightiness gives him that power. If on the other hand, the reply be in the negative, then Jiva will be without an Iswara. Thus then Iswara is one and not many. But objection may be taken in quite another form and the authority of Vachaspaty may be cited in support of his multiformness. Now this is clearly a mistake, for Vachaspati with the view of establishing non-duality and explaining it to one desirous of release, brings in the help of illusory attribution and its recession or withdrawal in that way. He has no other object.

172. The phrase "All the elements" in the above extract from the *Gita* is thus explained. It refers to Jiva who is the cognitional sac, and which cognition resides in the lotus of the heart. With the view of explaining the reason why that cognition is to reside in the heart, it is said:—the internal knower [Iswara] is transformed into the shape of the cognitional sac, and resides in the heart; Iswara,—the Blissful sheath—is the proximate cause of Jiva, the cognitional, and in regard to the heart is modified or changed in the form of that cognitional sheath.

[If we pause to enquire in to the drift of the text we shall find, the heart regarded as the centre of life. It is likewise mentioned as an organ. Iswara being most intrinsically situated resides inside the heart where He is transformed into cognition, intelligence or life, from His original state of blissfulness. Western physiology knows nothing or next to nothing about the heart, beyond its capacity of a forcing pump drawing the blood out and distributing it into the arterial channels. Popular literature assigns affection to the heart, and the exploded dogma of an antiquated and unscientific religion looks upon it as conscience, but nowhere is the slightest mention made of its being the tabernacle of Iswara or seat of cognition or knowledge in the abstract.]

173. The words 'mounted' 'mechanism' and 'wander' are thus explained. Mechanism indicates the physical body and the conceit that it is my body is expressed by the word 'mounted'; inclination for 'lawful' or 'prohibited action' is to 'wander.'

174. Jiva when influenced by the inherent force of *Maya*, begets an inclination for works lawful or interdicted, and attributes them to Self thus changing him into an agent and instrument. This is called wandering in [the meshes of] *Maya*.

175. The world 'controller' already mentioned [*ante V.* 164), also bears a similar signification to that of wandering as

mentioned in the *Sruti.* Therefore follow the method laid down in reference to 'controller' and through the help of your intellect apply it also to the world and all its contents. [In short recognise the presence of that internal knower Iswara in the universe and all its contents.]

176. Inclination for lawful actions though they are the means of virtue I have none, nor have I abstained from prohibited works knowing them to cause the production of sin, but moved as I am by the internal knower residing within me and in the way engaged by him, so do I act.

177. But in such a consideration of dependence of inclination on Iswara, there will be a consequent uselessness of the usual incentives [endeavour] to actions good and bad; hence to avoid it, it is said, you are not to conclude that nothing depends upon the individual's endeavour as far as the doing of actions or their reverse are concerned; for Iswara is modified or changed in the shape of what a person is capable of doing, therefore everywhere the individual's endeavour is the chief cause of all works.

178. Though therefore Iswara is modified in the form of the individual's endeavour, yet it does not set aside his control, for when that control is fully realised, the unassociated blissfulness of self is easy to be conceived of, by the Jiva.

179. "That helps and brings about his emancipation" so says the *Sruti, Smriti,* etc. And these Sacred Scriptures have been set down as the commandments of Iswara.

180. Since the *Sruti* mentions, "To break His commands is hurtful and injurious," it is therefore plain enough that apart from His being the internal knower, He is the Supreme Lord. The *Sruti* says the commandments of Iswara are a cause of fear "The wind moves actuated by the fear of the Lord, etc.," hence for a fear of breaking His commands which in its turn is hurtful and produces sin, it is sought here to establish a difference between the internal knower and the Supreme Lord; and that difference is marked by the source

of fear as above mentioned, which is said to constitute the characterising feature of the Supreme Lord.

181. Two examples are cited from the *Sruti* to show the control exercised by Iswara both externally and internally "By His command the sun and moon etc." "The Supreme Self (*Paramatma*) having entered inside [of all beings] controls them."

182. This "Supreme Self is the Cause" of the universe. Another passage quoted from the *Sruti* is now being explained. In regard to the source of objective world the *Shastras* say, "He is the source from which the elements take their origin and is the cause of their destruction;" consequently Iswara for His being the creator and destroyer is the cause of this material world. And this evolution and destruction are admitted to take place in a consecutive order.

183. The subject is further illustrated by reference to an example. As by spreading a picture we bring out the several figures and other objects painted there, and present them to our view, so during the periods of evolutional activity, or say creation, all material objects are produced by Iswara.

184. And as in a rolled up picture all the figures are shut out of sight, so Iswara with the view of consummating the actions of all individuals [virtually extinguishing them from bearing any more fruits] draws the objective word within Him during periods of cyclic destruction [when they continue in a state of rarefied potentiality to be reproduced when the dawn of creation approaches.]*

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* *Pralaya* and *Mahapralaya* are made to signify partial and total destruction respectively. In regard to the latter, opinions are divided. For instance, Sankhyakar, Gautama, the author of *Naya Sutras*, alike deny total destruction which they say to be a myth. The philosophy of Cosmosgony had no where engaged abler intellects than in India. Our ancient *Rishis* had to a great extent solved the mystery more satisfactorily and scientifically than the savants of Europe, and we challenge enquiry. But the

185. Now this being and non-being or appearance and disappearance of creation and destruction of the world is

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views they entertain have not been thoroughly explained, hence interested motives and Missionary zeal had been co-operating to class them amongst the fabulous creations of a mytholic age. Happily the position is quite altered now, and as there is a desire of accepting truth even from an enemy's camp we subjoin the following explanation. *Brahma*, the creator has a lifetime of hundred years. But that period covers an immensity of time which staggers imagination; and on comparative analysis with the evidence forthcoming from a study of the earth's crust and its strata, the facts disclosed by Aryan researches fit nicely into the blank niches left unfinished by geology. For instance, according to the *Surya Siddhanta* we find it laid down that immediately with the advent of *Brahma* on the scene, the work of creation did not commence, the fiat of a personal creator's ordering "Let the waters recede and land appear," and so on after that fashion is never allowed here. The primary period occupied *Brahma* for five millions, six hundred, sixty-six thousand years, before he was in a position to begin his work. All this time, the earth was passing through the several geological epochs, its crust was solidifying or otherwise undergoing the requisite changes to render it fit for life to appear. And if it be remembered that a day of *Brahma* is equal to 14 *Manantwaras* or *Manus*, and a night of equal length, that gives us a period covered by four thousand human *Yugas* or one thousand eighty-four Mahayugas, one of which lasts for 4,320,000. Therefore (4,321,000 × 1084)2 *Brahma's* day and night of 24 hours. This multiplied by 100 will give the period he is to live. He has passed over six Manantwaras and is in the middle of the seventh, so that if 24 Manu constitute the period of his day, he must necessarily be near 12 o'clock noon of the very first day, and after another such period there will follow night, when there will be a *pralaya*, again to disappear with the advent of dawn. This is the rule. After 100 years *Brahma* also is swallowed up in the universal destruction and Iswara and the rest are all gone, leaving the One Life, PARABRAHMA above mentioned. This is a long account of evolution as understood amongst us.

illustrated further by comparing them to night and day, profound slumber and waking, opening and shutting of the eyelids, contentment and distraction of the mind. Like these several conditions the resemblance between destruction and creation is complete.

186. But it may be asked whether Iswara as a creative source of the world is its instrumental or modifying cause? Both these views do not apply to the conclusions which have been here maintained. For Iswara has a requisite force [in the form of *Maya*] wherewith to create and destroy, [and as He is secondless and formless He is neither an instrument nor a modifying cause of the world.] For what is formless cannot be modified into something else of a different shape and form, and what is secondless cannot be regarded as an instrument or beginner.*

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* The word beginner requires an explanation. Its Sanskrit equivalent *'Arambhaka'* or *'Arambhakarta'* can only be satisfactorily accounted for in this manner. When from a combination of several causes, there results a product entirely different in shape and form from them, for a connection of parts with the whole, it is called *Arambhavada*. As for instance by combining either half of a pitcher, is produced a jar which is entirely different in shape from that half. Here the material cause does not leave its own shape, but a thing is produced different from that cause; or as from a combination of one filament with another of thread, a fine thread is produced out of which is produced a cloth; here also the difference between the cause and its product, cotton-thread and cloth is admitted; now such a view of beginning in regard to the origin of the world by Brahma is inapplicable, inasmuch as It is secondless and there is a want of an action or product different from It. Then again, if the theory of beginning were to hold good, subsequent to the production of an action, its cause, which is different from such product, continuing present in the same state must require in regard to one cause the beginning of several products as actions. Hence the view of a Naiyayika [*Arambhavada*] is inconsistent.

187. Now Iswara is secondless, how can then He be the natural cause of both the sentient and insentient? The reply is, His associate of *Maya* is the cause of insentient as the reflection of intelligence is that of sentient creatures.

188. Objection may be taken in regard to Iswara, who is endowed with *Maya*, as the cause of the universe. For Sureswar Acharya (Vartikkar) distinctly attributes to the Supreme Self such causation. In this way, does a dissenter speak in this and the following verse. The Supreme Self associated with *Maya* abounding in darkness or insentiency is the cause of body, while for his preponderance of intelligence, and according to the conception, knowledge and merits or de-merits of individuals which form the instrumental cause of their origin, that Self is the cause of both sentient and insentient objects. In short He is the Universal Cause.

189. In the above manner Vartikkara says, "The Supreme Self and not Iswara is the universal cause of both sentient

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Now between the modifying cause and its resulting product there is said to be no difference. As for instance, clay modified into a jar, internal organ modified in the form of its function, and the modification of Prakriti into Mahatatwa (according to Sankhya). It is a fact well-known that phenomena are regarded only as another form of matter by Kapila and his followers. Then again, there are others who consider it to be only another modification of Brahma; but how can that be? For the world is material and Brahma immaterial; the former is insentient, the latter intelligence; the first is non-eternal and the last eternal. Thus then, if it were a modification of intelligence, that is to say, a changed form of it, intelligence will be destructible, for what is subject to change is always so.

In regard to *Vivarta Karana*, it is alleged, when a cause produces a result without undergoing any change, as for instance, silver in nacre the faults and inconsistencies of the first two methods do not apply, and it is the accepted doctrine of the *Vedanta* for a solution of the Cosmos.

and insentient." With the view of refuting it, our author says. Ye dissenters, hear what a *Siddhanti* has to say against ycur deduction.

190. With a desire of establishing the signification of "That' to include the Uniform Intelligence and things dissimilar, attributed by illusion, like the signification of its complement 'Thou' [of the phrase "That art Thou" the Supreme Self is mentioned as the Universal Cause. This is untenable and rebutted by the *Siddhanti*:—Here like Jiva and Uniform Intelligence (concerning the indication 'That') Iswara endowed with *Maya* and Brahma and their mutual illusory attribution after having been established by Him, Sureswar Acharya expounds the Supreme Self as the Universal Cause.

191. To this effect the *Sruti* mentions, "From the Supreme Brahma which is truth, knowledge and bliss, have been derived ether, air, fire, water, earth, medicine, food-grains, and the physical body."

192. But it may be asked wherein consists the allegation of mutual attribution through illusion in the passage above quoted? It is therefore said, the attribution of casuation of the universe to Brahma having the indications of truth, knowlege and the rest, and the attribution of truth to the universal cause, the reflected intelligence inherent in *Maya* (that is Iswara) is due to a want of proper discrimination arising from the illusory attribution of one to the other.

193. This mutual illusory attribution of one to the other has already been exemplified [*Vide ante* V. 1-3, Chap. VI.], but is here again illustrated by reference to the starching of a piece of cloth:—As in a cloth that has been starched, the starch appears to be one with it, through mistake; similarly the oneness of Iswara and Brahma or their mutual attribution of one another is due to illusion.

194. As a person of dull intellect fails to discriminate the difference between the space appropriated by a cloud and the

unappropriated infinite space [of which it is a part,] so do the ignorant conceive the oneness of Iswara and Brahma.

195. But that difference can only be conceived by ascertaining the purport under the six features. These are:—the beginning and the end, repetition, novelty, result, illustration by praise and by supporting argument.* If the purport of the *Sruti* be determined in the above manner under the six methods cited, it will appear that Brahma is unassociated (unconditioned) while Iswara is the reflected shadow of intelligence in *Maya*. He is the creator of universe.

196. In *Sruti*, the unconditioned nature of Brahma is plainly set forth in the beginning and end: for instance, in the beginning Brahma is described as "Truth, knowledge and infinite;" and in the conclusion, "Whom speech cannot grasp——unspeakable."

197. The nature of Iswara is now declared by referring to *Sruti* text. "*Maya* is the creative source of the universe, it likewise is the cause of the individual's enthralment." [He is subject to bondage.] Hence Iswara endowed with predicate of *Maya* is the creator, while the individual is a subject of metempsychosis.

198. The mode in which creation of Iswara took place is now being declared. [From the standpoint of knowledge.] He desired to be manifold, and thus became the collective totality of subtle bodies—Hiranyagarbha†—just as the profound slumbering condition passes into dreams.

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* Says the *Vedantasara*:—The commencement and the conclusion repetition, novelty, the result, illustration by praise and by supporting arguments are the means for determining the purport; the reader is referred to DHOLE's *Vedantasara*, pp. 44-45.

† The subtle astral body has one or several indications, according to the manner of observing it collectively or individually like the wood and the reservior,or the tree and water considered before; that is to say, either it is the subject of one Intellect (Spiritual Intelligence or *Boodhi*) or of several. In the former condition it is the

199. From the two views expounded in *Sruti*, in regard to creation; of consecutive serial production [as for instance, ether first, then air, fire, water, and earth] or their simultaneous beginning, not telling against one another, both of them are worth knowing; in the same manner as dreams happen in both ways, consecutively and simultaneously.

200. The nature of Hiranyagarbha is defined :—For the conceit that he is the collective aggregate of subtle bodies, and pervading like a thread through all beings (called Thread-Soul) he is the predicate of desire, action, and intelligence of all individuals.

201. As in the morning and evening twilight all objects partially covered by darkness can only be dimly perceived, so the objective world is but faintly apprehended in the Hiranyagarbha condition.

202. As the sketch on a piece of canvas duly prepared with starch can only be plainly perceived when drawn with a crayon, so is the body of Iswara marked by the subtle astral body derived from non-quintuplication of elements.

Thread-Soul or *Sutratma*, for it pervades like a thread through all created beings, and is the subjective Intelligence of *Hiranyagarbha*, thus constituting a collective totality. In the latter or individual condition it is the special or separate intelligence of every living being. Consciousness associated with the collective totality of subtle astral bodies is known by the names of *Sutratma* (Thread-Soul), for it pervades through all such bodies like a thread, and *Hiranyagarbha* or *Prana*, for the conceit of its being the five great elements in a state of simple uncombination, with knowledge, will-force, and active energy for its attributes.—It is the subtle body itself. Iswara associated with [*Maya*] illusion abounding in pure goodness and for the conceit that He is the astral body is called Hiranyagarbha. Prajna associated with Ignorance abounding in impure goodness, for a similar conceit that he is the subtle astral body, is called Taijasa.—*Vide* DHOLE'S *Vedantasara*, p. 23.

203. Like the tender stalks or leaflets of a seed that has germinated, this Hiranyagarbha is the tender seedling out of which is produced the universe.

204. As in the full blaze of the sun all objects are plainly visible; as the figures and trees and plants bearing fruits or sheaths of corn are rendered manifest, in a piece of painting filled with colour, so is this material world plainly manifested in Virat's condition.

205. This Virat is mentioned in the fifth chapter of the *Second Ashtaka* of the *Yajur Veda Sanhita* and *Purush Sukta*. "From Brahma to the Turienne column all this universe is mentioned as constituting the shape and form of Virat.

206. From the unanimous testimony of the different sects of worshippers this can be gleaned concerning the nature of Iswara [mentioned in Verses 202—208]. From the internal knower to a spade every object is fit to be worshipped as Iswara. [This is pointed out in this and the two following Verses.] The internal knower, Thread-Soul, Virat, Brahma, Vishnu, Siva, Fire, Ganesa, the king of difficulties, Vairab, Myral, Marika (goddess), Yaksha, and Rakshas;

207. Brahman, Kshetrya, Vaiswa, Sudra, cow, horse, deer, bird, the *ficus religiosa* and banyan, mangoe, barley, paddy, and grass;

208. Water, stone, earth, wood, an axe and spade, all these are Iswara, and to worship them is meritorious, for they yield good fruits.

209. A person engaged in the worship of such objects derives benefit according to the mode of his worship; and in proportion to the dignity of the object worshipped will be the measure of his reward. That is to say, the worshippers of low reptiles, or inanimate objects derive the least amount of benefit, while the higher divinities worshipped as Iswara bring forth the best results.

210. But there is only one means for cutting off metempsychosis and getting emancipated, that is knowledge of

Brahma; just as to keep away dreams one must necessarily keep himself awake, so by dispelling ignorance one is freed.

211. All the phenomena which at present are discernible to us, from Iswara, Jiva, physical body, to animate and inanimate objects which go to make up the universe, all this is a dream for they are material in the light of knowledge of secondless Brahma. Brahma alone is real and the rest are impermanent, hence in regard to Brahma they are like objects seen in a dream.

212. For Iswara (the blissful sheath) and Jiva (the cognitional sheath) are both contrived in *Maya* and from these two have been produced this universe.

213. Of them which portion of creation is Iswara's and which belongs to Jiva is now being set forth according to the citation of *Sruti*. "From determination to entrance is Iswara's, and from the waking condition, etc., to emancipation is Jiva's." "The Supreme Iswara observed, certainly I have made the several abodes (with their adequate inhabitants food and drink) and have made my entrance in the body of the individual through the cranial aperture in the center."

214. From a want of knowledge of non-duality about the oneness of Brahma and individual self, established in the *Sruti*, persons opposed to that doctrine or unacquainted with it are found engaged in disputing about Jiva and Iswara who are endowed with *Maya*—and in vain.

215. The sight of an emancipated person gives me pleasure, that of a worldly-minded person enquiring after self-knowledge excites my sympathy and makes me feel pity for him, but with those dull* dissenters who are ever entangled in

* There are three grades of dullness, hence such persons are classified as either good, indifferent or bad. Those who have no faith in the teachings of the Shastras though they have a conception of their purport belong to the first class. Those having neither faith in, nor knowledge of, the Shastras and following the

the meshes of error and know not the unassociated intelligence of the PARABRAHMA, I need not engage in any more wrangling about the real nature of Iswara and Jiva.

216. From the worshippers of grass, trees, bricks to Yogachars, all of them are in error concerning the real nature of Iswara; from the followers of Sankhya to those of Charvak (Lokayats) all are in error concerning the nature of Jiva.

217. For so long as there is no adequte knowledge of the Supreme Brahma, they are all entangled in error, and where is their happiness and deliverance?

218. Though according to the dignity of their objects of worship, there is an appreciable difference amongst them, but of what benefit is it? Or as a kingdom obtained in a dream, or wealth acquired by begging in that condition is of not the slightest use when the dream is dispersed and the person awakes; so do their respective devotion bring forth neither bliss nor emancipation from future re-births.

219. Thus then, it is incumbent upon one desirous of release instead of engaging in fruitless disputes about Iswara, to ascertain the nature of Brahma, and to acquire that knowledge (which would procure deliverance to him.)

220. If as a means of acquiring that knowledge [of self] it be necessary to begin with the nethermost rung of the ladder, with Jiva and Iswara, by all means do adopt that method, but beware of being entangled in endless disputes in your preliminary enquiry, and do not allow yourselves to lose sight of that one object, Brahma.

221. If you contend that according to *Sankhya* Jiva is unassociated, pure intelligence, and Iswara is similarly men-

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bent of their wishes are indifferent; while the third class include those who have a faith in the Shastras, but from ignorance act as they choose. With persons of above description, the author writes, all disputes are useless.

tioned in *Yoga*, or that the indication of 'That' and 'Thou' of the transcendental phrase "That art Thou," cited in *Yoga-Shastra* can be clearly ascertained to indicate Jiva and Iswara. The reply is, in spite of the oneness of properties both in Iswara and Jiva, *Yoga Philosophy* maintains an actual existing difference between the two, which is not the conclusion of our *Vedanta*. Do therefore listen :—

222. We (Vedantins) do sometimes avail ourselves of the indication of the two words 'That' and 'Thou' as a step for facilitating the comprehension of non-duality, otherwise they are not for establishing actually a difference in their signification. In other words, when they are spoken of separately as conveying each a separate signification, it is only for the purpose of establishing an identity of indication, which refers to the one and same thing, *viz.*, the Individual Self and the Universal Self are one.

223. One entranced in the meshes of *Maya* which is without a beginning, is apt to conceive of a difference between Jiva and Iswara; and for preventing such an erroneous notion of subsisting difference, the signification of those words are cleared of all inconsistencies and made to indicate non-duality.

224. That can be done in the same way as in the instances already cited before :—Of the space appropriated by a jar, having no difference whatever with the infinite space of which it is a mere unit, or as between the ether of water and that of cloud the difference is nil.

225. As in the instance of the ether of water and cloud a difference in their associates [water and cloud respectively] constitutes the difference of the two, which is far from real; and their receptacles, the ether present in a jar, and that infinite body which fills all space are pure for they are unassociated :

226. So the blissful sac (Iswara) and the cognitional (Jiva) are dependent on the associates of Illusion (*Maya*) and In-

tellect (*Boodhi*) respectively; and their occupation or seat, Brahma and Uniform Intelligence are ever pure [and unrelated.]

227. If it be said, in order to arrive at a proper understanding, in regard to the indication of the words 'That' and 'Thou' no harm can result in the admission of the views of *Sankhya* and *Yoga*, for they help to establish the meaning clearly; the reply is, we may as well take the help of the doctrines of a Charvaka for comprehending the indication of the 'foodful sac' and that [the physical body] is fit to be considered [by the help of this borrowed interpretation] as self.

228. Since between the doctrines of the *Vedanta* and those of *Sankhya* and *Yoga* there is marked difference, it is impossible to expect any agreement. This the author shews in the following manner:—According to *Sankhya* and *Yoga* there is a difference in Self; and the world is real, and Iswara is something distinct from the world and Jiva (*Yoga*). Unless they set aside these doctrines, there can be no agreement between them and a Vedantin.

229. If the question be asked what necessity is there for ascertaining non-duality, since a knowledge of the unrelated condition of *Jivatma* is enough to procure release? The reply is, in that case an individual may fix his belief on the reality of sensuous enjoyment as garland and sandal, and considering them to be ever-lasting, attain his release.

230. That is to say, as it is impossible to regard a garland, sandal, etc., in the light of real and eternal substances, so it is impossible to separate the Jiva from his relationship with Iswara and the universe.

231. Why? Because he is material in constitution; and Matter (*Prakriti*, *Ajnana* or *Maya*) has always the property of creating real, unreal; moreover, Iswara is his controller; how then can he get rid of future re-incarnations when he is thus placed between Matter and Iswara, deluded by the first and controlled by the last?

232. But want of a right discrimination is alone the

source of creating the above named conditions of relation and control; when they are destroyed, by the advent of knowledge, or say, discrimination, the chance of creating the relationship and control is alike destroyed; on this ground an antagonist may take his stand. In that case, he is one with a follower of *Sankhya*. [For indiscrimination is either want of discrimination, or something else; or something opposed to it. Now these are the three forms; of them the first is untenable, for, want implies an absence or nothing, and that cannot act as a productive cause of something, hence want or absence of discrimination cannot account for a cause of relation and and control. Neither the second form holds good; for we do not find that 'something else;' as for instance, a jar, to be such cause; and the third form as it maintains something opposed to discrimination, clearly establishes ignorance which is the same with *Prakriti* of *Sankhya*. Thus then, it upholds *Sankhya*.

233. If for the purpose of attributing bondage and release, Self be declared to be manifold, even that is not possible, for *Maya* is quite capable of doing that.

234. How? Like things created in a magical performance, (as the creation of a tree bearing mangoes or other fruits,) what is difficult of being produced is easily created by (*Maya*) Illusion and for its being naturally endowed with opposite or antagonistic properties [*i. e.*, unreal], creates bondage and release or emancipation. Now it cannot be contended that as the first is an action of ignorance, consequently emancipation must be admitted as a necessity; as that will be against *Sruti*, for nowhere does *Sruti* suffer the actualitity of emancipation, like that of bondage, to prevail.

235. As for instance in reference to his actual condition Jiva is said to be truly "Without destruction, and origin, neither subject to bondage nor emancipation, without the means (hearing and the rest) and any desire of release, and in whom has ceased ignorance.

236. But the milch cow *Maya* has two calves, Jiva and Iswara, who, according to their inclination, drink the milk of duality, but that does not affect non-duality anyhow, nor can cause it any injury.

237. Except a difference in name, there is no difference really present between the Uniform Intelligence and Brahma, just as there is none whatever between the space appropriated by a jar and the great body of it outside, infinite ether (*Mahakas*).

238. That Non-dual Principle or Entity [Secondless Brahma] which was present prior to the creation of the universe, (as is said in the *Sruti*) is even present now, and will so continue in the future *i. e.*, during emancipation; there is no doubt about that, but it is true. Then why are people generally so fond of creating a difference? Ignorance or Illusion alone leads people astray and that is the reason why the generality of mankind are fond of creating a difference between the Individual Self and Brahma.

239. But the question is, if the unreality of the universe and reality of the secondless Entity or Principle, Brahma, which form the subject under consideration, be an established conviction with the wise, why are they found to behave like a man of the world [ignorant]? Where then is the necessity of acquiring knowledge of self. Therefore it is said, from the force of fructescent works, many wise persons are found to have, the same inclination for using material objects as they were accustomed to, prior to the rising of knowledge, but as they are free from illusion they are never ensnared in its meshes as ignorant persons are.

240. To show that the wise are free from error, the opposite condition of the ignorant is being first cited here. The ignorant have a firm belief in their mind as to the reality of enjoyment or suffering, both in the present sphere as well in the next [heaven, etc.,] and there is neither room for the secondless Brahma, nor is It discernible in their mind.

241. The wise have an exactly opposite belief; hence according to their individual perception and conviction, people create either bondage or release.

242. [Arguments for establishing the reality of Brahma and unreality of the universe are now being given.] The manifestibility of the secondless Brahma is derived from the *Shastras* and not from experience. It may be contended, as the secodless Brahma is not visible, hence it is impossible to ascertain It with any definite precision. But this assertion is untenable, inasmuch as Brahma in the form of intelligence is everywhere manifest and is clearly the subject of perception and experience in every individual. Then again, if it be said, this manifestibility of intelligence can be admitted, but as its entireness cannot be perceived, the universe also in its entirety is not perceived, therefore you are constrained to admit an equality between non-dual Brahma and the dual objective world, so far as an absence of complete perception goes; and if in regard to the latter that does not stand in the way of your conception, why is Brahma to remain unmanifested then?

243. Thus then, the manifestibility or perception of both the phenomenal and noumenal in the same province being equal, if that does not prevent you from enquiring into the reality of the former, what objection can there be to hold a similar view with regard to the secondless Brahma?*

244. Now the Vedantin's opponent adopts a different line of argument to do away with non-duality. He says—the

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* As in a pot of boiled rice, by feeling one rice, the whole of its contents are known to have been well cooked, so by the faculty of ascertainment residing inside the physical body, in intelligence, 'felicity, fulness, eternal freedom, unassociation,' etc., which Brahma is endowed with, are easily perceived in every individual self after the destruction of ignorance has ceased to produce any more illusion.

'secondless' is without a duality. Hence non-duality and its reverse, are naturally opposed to each other; and from a perception of the phenomenal, no noumenal can be made out. Adopting a similar course, the Vedantin may as well exclaim, from their natural antagonism, when the secondless Brahma (noumenal) is manifested, the phenomenal must cease. Thus then both of us are equally placed so to speak; but his opponent replies to this:—The perception of intelligence is not opposed to the phenomenal, hence we are not in the same position. In other words from an absence of antagonism between your perception of the non-dual Brahma in intelligence, and our duality, there is no similarity with the question raised by you and me.

245. But inasmuch as the phenomenal is unreal though it is manifested, its reality (apparent) is not opposed to that of the secondless Brahma, and a *Siddhanti* says in reference to it:—If you say so, then listen to me: the phenomenal is in a condition of non-being, impermanence or non-existence (*asat*) but full of illusion; and that Brahma is the only Reality which no *pralaya* can affect, but continues to the end fully manifested.

246. "To the end" is being illustrated:—These unthinkable worlds are full of illusion and created out of it, hence they are unreal. Having thus ascertained them, it is natural to consider Brahma as the only Reality. ['Unthinkable' signifies what is not fit for thinking; these worlds for their being material are unreal, and for the matter of that 'indescribable.' Therefore having found out the unreality of the phenomenal, to regard the secondless Brahma as the only Reality is but natural.]

247. If subsequently, the reality of phenomena reasserts again in your mind after having known them to be unreal, you are again to have recourse to arguments and analysis over and over, till that error ceases to exist, [and for such

repetition there is the authority of Vyas as laid down in the *Sariraka Sutras*, Chap. iv.]

248. But it may be enquired how long is that necessary to be practised? Hence it is said, arguments for discriminating the secondless Reality, or the means 'hearing' and the rest to that end, are not attended with pain and as they are beneficial, inasmuch as they destroy every thing else which is harmful to such knowledge of non-duality, they can be had recourse to *ad libitum*. In this respect, they differ from the supporting arguments of duality, for they are painful, as they cost an effort on the part of the individual seeking to establish it.

249. Moreover, it may be argued that a person even with his knowledge of Brahma, is subject to hunger and thirst, in short,—of the same worldly pursuits as he used to be before, in his state of ignorance; now whether the declaration "I am hungry," "I am thirsty," indicates self? Or the first personal pronoun has reference mainly to the Intelligence which is self? To such a question, a Vedantin admits the first view, so that the principle of egoism or individuality, you may well see, and no one asks you to do otherwise [not to see.] It may as well be mentioned here, that the second view is inapplicable, because self is unrelated and unassociated, and he can have no concern with hunger, thirst and the rest.

250. But this discussion does not stop here: a dissenter is apt to maintain, though hunger and thirst may not properly be the subjects of self, yet through illusion or mistake one is apt so to perceive;—and says a Vedantin, in such a circumstance [of attributing hunger and thirst to self through illusion] the best plan is to destroy that illusion, and to practise discrimination always.

251. For, illusion comes from interminable desire which has no beginnning; and for its removal, the repeated practice of discrimination [from things real and unreal] is very proper.

252. That unreality of the phenomenal world, and its

illusory nature can only be found out by argument, analysis and deduction, and not by experience. But objection may be taken to it, for the experience of the exquisitely beautiful composition of the universe, which is quite unthinkable* and for its being a subject of cognition for the witness, it cannot be maintained that its unreality is alone capable of being determined by arguments and not experience. And that is now being removed as follows:—It is not to be said, that the discrimination of unreality proceeds from argument only, where the witness has an experience of the unthinkable composition [of the phenomenal.]

253. That unthinkable (composition) is an indication or sign of the falsity of an object; but a dissenter seeks to connect it with the pervasion of intelligence of self, and says, intelligence is endowed with it. To this, the reply is, from a want of prior contact or combination, the unthinkable composition, is one indication or sign of non-duality; and the Vedantin admits the unthinkable source of self, because he must be either that or its reverse; in the latter contingency, his origin must be capable of being conceived with ease, which is not a fact, because eternal; hence there is no other alternative but to call him (*Achintyarachana*) unthinkable, etc.

254. How can intelligence said to be eternal? Because nothing can be conceived anteceding it. If any one were to say, intelligence has a prior condition; he is to be asked, What it is? Whether it is conceived by intelligence or by insentiency? Now then of the two prior conditions either of intelligence or insentiency, insentiency cannot be the instrument of discovering intelligence, and hence cannot precede it;

* Literal construction of *achintyarachana* is what has been given here, that would signify either the worthlessness of thinking about the source of the world, for being outside of self and a duality; or what cannot be accurately surmised from thinking—so vast and unknown.

with reference to the first view, the question is whether intelligence is perceived by the same intelligence or by another intelligence to constitute a prior condition; of them, if it be said in reply, that the prior condition of intelligence is quite distinct from the same intelligence, it will then amount to an admission of two intelligences,—a duality—and as non-duality does not recognise another intelligence, and even for argument's sake admitting its existence, there will yet be wanting a co-operation (*pratiyogi*) of that intelligence, without which its knowledge or perception will be clearly impossible. Then again, with that perception by another (prior) intelligence this one (intelligence) will be reduced to the condition of insentiency like that of a jar, etc. Thus then, there remains that other consideration which sets forth intelligence being manifested by the same intelligence. Even that is untenable, for want or absence of a thing cannot be perceived by itself. Moreover, in regard to phenomena, owing to a difference in the demonstrator—the internal organ and the rest,—and for an utter impossibility of perceiving an absence of that duality (the world) by itself, and for an absence of another instrument,—a prior agent of that duality—it may as well be said that like the want of prior condition of intelligence, the phenomenal has also no prior condition, of another substance preceding it. Therefore it is said, the prior condition of duality is conceived by intelligence.

255. The phenomenal with a prior condition [in intelligence] is merely a product just as a jar is, yet its composition is unthinkable, and for the matter of that, false and unreal like phantasmagoria.

256. Thus then, having shewn [*ante* 242-254] the manifestibility of intelligence in the beginning, it is consequently eternal and visibly perceptible; save and beyond it, every other thing is unreal, and that unreality is perceived through the same intelligence. But then objection may be taken as to the tangibility or visibility of the non-dual secondless Reality,

Brahma. Hence the author proceeds to clear it away. Intelligence is visible, and through it unreality of phenomena is conceived, consequently the assertion that the secondless entity Brahma is not visible, would imply contradiction.

257. If it be said, notwithstanding the explanation above given after the *Vedanta*, there are yet many Vedantins who have no faith in it, and why so? The reply is not difficult to find: for in the case of *Charvaks* many of whom are well versed in logic and sound reasoning, yet are they found mistaking self with the physical body, and why is this?

258. If you say from want of a clear intellect they are unable to discriminate properly, then I may as well conclude from a want of proper study or right interpretation of the *Shastras*, those Vedantins shew no faith in the explanation about the visibility of the secondless Reality.

259. When by a proper ascertainment of the secondless Reality, desires seated in the mind and passions are all destroyed, then an individual attains deliverance in life; and in his present life he enjoys supreme felicity. This effect of self-knowledge is mentioned in the *Sruti*, and it is impossible to deny it, for it is a visible result.

260. As for instance—"When knowledge of self arrives maturity, the joints of the heart are all destroyed" *Sruti*. 'Joints' refer to desires and passions.

261. But here 'desires,' refer to the mistaken identity of egoism (*Ahankara*) and intelligence, as instanced in the use of the first personal pronoun I and its deflections, mine, etc.

262. Though the above 'desires' are sources of evil, yet in reference to egoism, if intelligence be kept apart and separate and not mixed up with it, and in that condition of alienation of intelligence kept distinctly in view, millions and tens of millions of desires, will not be prejudicial to knowledge [of self]; for the maturity of knowledge has already destroyed the 'joints' of the heart [as has been mentioned already].

263. As for a preponderance of de-merits in you, the

perception of the secondless Reality brings you no satisfaction and comfort, so even with the destruction of the desires and passions [joints of the heart], if as a result of fructescent works—works which have already began to bear fruit—desires do come afterwards.*

264. They [desires originating with egoism or belonging to it] cannot in any way affect the Supreme Self who is intelligence; just as a disease of the physical body or the growth and decay or destruction of a tree cannot affect self, for he is quite unrelated, similarly after the destruction of illusory attribution of egoism to self, any desire originating in the first is quite incapable of distressing, causing pain or affecting him in any way.

* With reflex intelligence, physical body, and self, egoism is apt to be mistaken by a gradual consecutive difference of which there are three varieties, *viz.*, ordinary, active, and erroneous. The identity or oneness of egoism with the reflex intelligence is ordinary or natural, for it comes and goes with reflection of intelligence; then again, identity of egoism with the physical body is called active [*Karma*] as it is a result of fructescent works, because the conception or experience "I am a man," etc., of all individuals lasts so long as fructescent works continue; with their destruction there is no more any attachment or conceit for the physical body. And the mistaken identity of egoism with the witnessing intelligence which is quite unrelated is called erroneous, as it is conceived in ignorance,—because with the destruction of ignorance a wise person destroys that identity, and he is never found to say "I am an agent," "I am a doer, an eater, happy or miserable." Sankaracharya has in this way, illustrated the mistaken identity of egoism. In regard to the first and the second, they are seldom found to be the subject of perception in the wise: from a destruction of ignorance and error or mistake, the wise are exempt from the third variety, so that the property of egoism in the shape of reflex intelligence and desires, cannot militate against the Witnessing Intelligence, so far as a theosophist is concerned.

265. If you say, prior to the destruction of desires and passions of the heart, there is no possibility of any connection of desires with the unrelated blissfulness of the Supreme Self, hence there will be no more forgetfulness about it, for it means the same thing as destruction of the heart's joints, and that shall constitute your success.

266. If you say ignorant persons know it not, hence it is the name for a heart's joint, for the difference between a wise and ignorant is known by the presence or absence of those joints (desires).*

267. Between the ignorant and wise there is no difference whatever, so far as an attachment or its reverse, for the physical body, organ, and intellect is concerned.

268. As for example, between one who has the sacred thread, and one who has it not—though belonging to the same caste, there is no difference so far as the rules of food are concerned, but their actual difference consists in the qualification of the former for the study of the *Vedas* to which the latter is dis-entitled.

269. Destructions of passions and desires in the heart of the wise is proved by a reference to the *Gita* (Chap. XIV. v. 22) as follows:—"They neither shew an aversion for miseries already befallen, nor evidence a desire for happiness, but like a person quite unaffected by them, allow things to take their usual course," and this is called destruction of the heart's malady.

270. But the text quoted from the *Gita* may be construed as a piece of counsel for the wise; it asks them to be quite unaffected either by pleasure or its reverse, and is therefore

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* The Sanskrit word '*Granthi*' means a joint, but the heart has no joint, it likewise means a knot, which even it has not, therefore it signifies crookedness, a malady, etc.; as there can hardly be any grievous mistake about it, I have allowed it to remain and this explanation is hardly called for.

no proof of destruction of the heart's malady, passions and desires. If a dissenter would argue in this strain, the significance of the word *'like'* in the verse would be rendered futile; and if it be alleged that from want of the requisite strength in the body, the wise are prevented from works, [so that virtually they cannot be said to have destroyed their desires, hence they abstain from actions,] then as a necessary deduction, it would follow that the wise are ill and suffering.

271. If you regard a knower of self, perfectly passive and indifferent to pleasure or pain, as a sick man, how very creditable is that to your intellect, and how clear is your knowledge. What next?

272. If you support your assertion by citing the *Purans* as a testimony, where it is said "Bharat and others were alike supremely indifferent, but they were sick;" What prevents you from taking note of the *Sruti* text which mentions "Even in eating, playing, and sexual intercourse, a theosophist acts like one indifferent."

273. Bharat and others did not live without eating, like wood and stone fixed in one place, but from fear of company they lived supremely indifferent to pleasure and pain.

274. And that avoidance of company owed its origin to the following reason. People who mix much in company are often found addicted to harmful works, and those without it, enjoy felicity; hence for a person desirous of happiness avoidance of company is always essential.

275. Dull and ignorant persons unacquainted with the drift of the Sacred Writings attribute de-merit to a theosophist, who has no inward longing for company, but to all appearances externally, engaged in the practice of playing on a musical instrument, or accompanying it vocally; let them do it, as it can bring forth no evil, for the unassociated condition of self is a natural inference to us [and a matter of fact].

276. Indifference, knowledge, and material abstinence

are helpmates of each other; in many instances they are present together in the same person, and sometimes separately in different.

277. But their cause, nature, and action (result) are different and are never of one and the same shape, hence, for a theosophist, it is proper to discriminate their difference.

278. To pry into the defects of all subjects is the source*

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* If we take a little pain to enquire into the usual phases of an earthly existence we shall find everywhere we are subjected to pain varying in intensity and character. For instance, in intra-uterine life the fœtus is surrounded by and encompassed on all sides with the uterus, it floats in a quantity of fluid, and lives entirely on the mother's blood; from her rough movements, it is indeed protected by the fluid, but yet it has to change position before delivery takes place, and that is attended with pain alike to the mother as to her offspring. Its nurture and growth are attended with the same anxiety and costs a deal of trouble. So on till old age, when the limbs refuse to carry the weight of the body, the spine is doubled up, sight and hearing are almost gone, teeth have left the jaws, allowing an incessant dribbling of the saliva,—a source of nuisance both to the person and with whom he speaks,—he loses control over his excrements, and they escape sometimes quite unnoticed for which his relatives are not charitable enough to overlook. He is reprimanded as an old useless dog, his dissolution is prayed for by the family when he is confined in a bed of sickness, and if it happens to be a chronic malady, many are the curses showered upon his head. He has grown old and useless, none cares for him,—not even his children. Under such circumstances who is there that should not cultivate an aversion to life and its repeated re-incarnation? Hence it is said, a man of indifference should always take things at their natural light or real worth and attribute faults glaringly, in relief as it were, to intensify his aversion for the world.

Now the nature of indifference is to cast away every thing or shew any aversion for it. But as there are several degrees of indifference, it is classified under two varieties with several sub-

or cause of indifference, and to have an aversion for all things is its nature, and not to desire what is already discarded is its result.

279. 'Hearing,' 'consideration,' and 'profound contemplation' are the source, 'discrimination' of self the nature, and to prevent desires and passions from rising in the subjugated mind,—the result of knowledge or perception.*

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divisions. For instance we have (1) *Par*, and (2) *Apar Vyragya*. The first is said to signify an aversion for wealth and prosperity already got, and altogether to discard or abandon it. The second is sub-divided into four varieties named respectively (*a*) struggling (*Yataman*), (*b*) distinguishing (*Vytireka*), (*c*) earnestness (*eka-indriya*), and (*d*) subjugated. They are defined in the following wise :—The 'Struggling' is an indifferent variety and consists in regarding the defective naturc of things. 'Distinguishing' consists in improving the good qualities of a person, deriving satisfaction therefrom. 'Earnestness' is to abstain the external organs of sense from internal desires ; and when they have been so far subdued that they no more trouble the mind, it is called subjugated.

Of this last we have three more sub-divisions to speak of, they are called dull, sharp, and very sharp. When with the demise of a wife, child, or loss of property one feels disgusted with the world, and desires to abandon it, that is called dull. Then again, when a person incessantly prays not to have a wife, wealth, or son in his present life, with a tranquil intellect, that is called sharp indifference ; and in regard] to a future state when he wishes not even for the blissful abode of Brahma, it is an instance of the last variety.

* Yajnavalka addressing his wife Maitreyi says, "Self is sure worthy of being seen, he is fit to be heard [from the precepts of the wise] considered and meditated upon." Thus then in regard to the perception of self visibly by the mind the above are the several means, and as such they are sources of knowledge. Moreover, 'discrimination of self,' has reference to the ascertainment of the existing difference between the uniform intelligence and

280. 'Forbearance' and the rest* are the cause—earnest attention, the nature—and the slackening of the usual practices of people,—the result of mental abstinence.

281. Of them—'Indifference,' 'knowledge,' and 'actual abstinence,'—knowledge is the principal for its bringing in emancipation, while indifference and abstinence are merely the means of knowledge and helpful to it.

282. For all three to continue in equal force, in the same individual, can only happen to a person as a result of his superior devotion; but from some obstacles or other, it often happens for one or two of them to get reduced.

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egoism, but this need not necessarily excite any misgiving as telling prejudicially against the doctrine of non-duality. For the uniform intelligence is something other than the physical body; organs sensory and active, vital airs, etc., etc., and to look upon it as Self or Brahma is the height of knowledge and the acme of discrimination; but then to connect desire with egoism as 'my house,' 'my son,' 'my money, mine eyes,' are conceived in error, hence the ascertainment of difference is insisted upon; but for one, who has no mistake of self as an agent or instrument, his egoism has already merged into the Absolute, the Infinite, Supreme Self, and his discrimination is matured. Similarly the concluding portion has reference to keep the mind free from being disturbed with other illusions in regard to self after it has been thoroughly subjugated and restrained from the disturbing influence of the senses.

* They include:

(1) Forbearance *(yama)*

(2) Canons to be observed *(niyama)*,

(3) Posture *(asana)*,

(4) Regulating the vital air *(pranayama)*,

(5) Restraining the organs of sense *(pratyahara)*,

(6) Fixed attention *(dharana)*,

(7) Contemplation *(dhyana)*,

(8) Conscious meditation *(savikalpa samadhi)*.

283. One whose knowledge is diminished by an increase of 'indifference' and 'mental abstinence' never attains emancipation at once, but is entitled to enjoy the felicity of the liberated in life, as a result of his pious devotions.

284. On the other hand, one who has a preponderance of knowledge with less of 'indifference' and 'abstinence' is sure to enjoy the supreme felicity of *Nirvan*, and not that destruction of visible misery which forms the happiness of the liberated in life.

285. It is the nature of indifference to regard everything as worthless, hence even the several abodes from Bhur to Brahma are looked upon as no better than straw, that is its highest limit; but knowledge has its finality in producing a steady or firm foothold of affection for all creatures, equally with one's own self.

286. As in the state of profound (dreamless) slumber all external objects are forgotten, so is forgetfulness of enjoyment [of sensuous objects] in the state of wakefulness said to be the final point of abstinence (*Upariti*).* In this mannner, the shades of difference present in indifference and the two others, are fit to be ascertained, [so that one may know which is superior or the best, and which less so—and may follow accordingly.

287. Though for a presence or continuance of fructescent works of various kinds, even a theosophist is at times infested with desires, yet that need not stand as a plea for construing the *Shastras* in a contrary light.

288. From a force of fructescent works, whatever condition a theosophist may be circumstanced to fill, it can create

* 'Abstinence' is continually to keep the external senses aloof from sensuous objects, after they have been turned away from them, thereby to keep the mind engaged in hearing the precepts on the *Brahma*; otherwise to abandon all acts enjoined in the Shastras, in the prescribed order [by turning a *Sannayasi*].

no difference, his knowledge suffers not the least, consequently his emancipation is certain.*

289. To sum up then :—As in a piece of painting several figures are duly represented, so is this exquisite objective world,—a duality—through the force of illusion attributed to the intelligence of the Supreme Self; and it is essentially requisite for that illusion to be shaken off and intelligence alone particularized (as the secondless, non-dual Reality.)

290. The fruit of reading the present treatise is enjoined in the following words:—Those of clear intellect who incessantly study it to find out its profound signification, shall cease to be enchanted with the sight of this unreal world like the ignorant, or as they used to be, in a prior stage (when wanting in knowledge).

END OF VOL. I.

* For with the destruction of ignorance the material of which the future body is to be built is destroyed and he is freed.

MUSJID BARI STREET,
Calcutta, 1st January, 1990.

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*** THIS work establishes the Non-Duality of the Soul and the *Brahma*, and is the Master-Key for attaining *Nirvana* by the destruction of *Ajnana* (A-knowledge).

The *Arya* of Lahore thus speaks of the work :—

The work before us is a tri-lingual translation, together with the Original Sanskrit of the work of the above name. * * * * The merits of these several translations are undoubtedly great. The Bengali rendering is that of Pundit Kalibur Vedantabagish, the Hindi has been done by the well-known Sanskrit Scholar, Lady Rama Bai, while the English is the work of the Editor [N. D.] himself. The book contains also a Preface and an introductory Essay on Matter and Spirit. The work is a proof of the indefatiguable zeal and industry of Babu Heeralal Dhole, whose English rendering alone is such as is sure to command a very wide circulation for the book."

The *Philosophic Inquirer* of Madras remarks thus :—

"It is a bi-lingual [tri-lingual] translation of the *Vedantasara* or the Essence of the Vedanta Philosophy of *Paramhansa Sadananda Jogindra.* The English rendering of it is from the erudite and scholarly pen of our friend Dr. Nandalal Dhole, late Surgeon to the Courts of Khetree and Marwar. * * We may make bold to assert that the translation appears to us to be one which throws much credit on the translator, because of its simplicity and perspicacity of style. In cases where the Text is obscured by the technicalities peculiar to the subject, the

translator has given ample annotations at foot of each page explaining the terms and contexts, so as to enable the student of Vedantism to understand the subject without any external aid, and also in view to make the translation itself lucid and unmistakable. The translator appears to us to have acquitted himself well, and from the way in which he has done his work, there can be no doubt that he has mastered the subject he has undertaken to handle, in a way profitable to others also."

Indian Nation in speaking of the work says :—

"It gives the Sanskrit Text, and Translations in Hindi, Bengali and English. The Sanskrit Text is largely annotated. There is also a very learned, philosophical dissertation on the doctrines of the *Vedantasara* and corresponding European systems. The book is well got up ; and a better edition would hardly be desired."

The *Theosophist* in reviewing the work remarks :—

"The views,—at any rate in its first English part,—being avowedly those expressed in the columns of our magazine, very little has to be said of this portion, except that the author has made uncommon good use of it, and elaborated very cleverly the whole. One point, however, may be noticed, as it is found to be constantly contradicted and picked holes into, by the theists as well as by all the supporters of independent creation—*viz.*, the definition of Matter.

"'Kapila defines Matter to be eternal and co-existent with Spirit. It was never in a state of non-being, but always in a state of constant change, it is subtle and sentient, etc., etc., (p. 2).

"This is what the Editor of this Journal has all along maintained and can hardly repeat too often. The article : 'What is Matter and What is Force ?' in the *Theosophist* for September 1882, is sufficiently lucid in reference, to this question. It is at the same time pleasant to find that our learned friend and brother, Mr. T. Subba Rao Garu, the great Adwaitee scholar shares entirely with all of us these views, which every intutional scholar who comprehends the true spirit of the *Sankhya* Philosophy, will ever maintain. This may be proved by the perusal of a recent work on '*Yoga* Philosophy' by the learned Sanskritist, Dr. Rajendra Lala Mitra, the *Introduction* to which has just appeared, showing clearly how every genuine scholar comprehends the *Sankhya* in the same spirit as we do. The ONE-LIFE of the Buddhists, or the PARABRAHMA of the Vedatins, is omnipresent and eternal. Spirit and Matter are but its manifestations. As the energising force—*Purush* of Kapila—it is Spirit—as undifferentiated cosmic matter it is *Mulaprakriti*. As differentiated cosmic matter, the basis of phenomenal evolution, it is *Prakriti*. In its aspect of being the field of cosmic ideation it is *Chidakasam* ; as the germ of cosmic ideation it is *Chinmatra* ; while in its characteristic of perception it is *Prajna*. Whoever presumes to deny these points denies the main basis of Hindu

Philosophy and clings but to its exoteric, weather-beaten, fast-fading out-*shell*. The main point of the work under review seems to be to indicate how in this basic doctrine, upon which the whole structure of philosophy rests, both in the Aryan and Arhat tenets meet and are identical, in all, except in forms of expression, and how again Kapila's *Sankhya* supports it. The author has in this respect admirably succeeded in condensing the whole spirit of the philosophy in a few short pages. And a close study of the same is sufficient to bring the intelligent reader to the same sense of perception. For a superficial reader, Dr. N. Dhole, the English translator, seems to hold that Spirit is something quite apart and distinct from Matter, and quite a different substance or no-substance, if you please. But such readers can only be referred to the following extract :—

" '.........And since the recognition of this *First Principle*, call it *Prakriti*, *Purusha*, *Parabrahma*, or Matter, Spirit, the Absolute, or the Unknowable, clashes not with the cherished ideas of the most inveterate Freethinker................................,

"The above passages clearly prove that like all true *Adwaitees* the learned Doctor holds Spirit and Matter to be but different phases and aspects of the ONE-LIEE which is every thing or no *nothing*, if you prefer. It would be a pertinent question to ask, how it is then that the author expresses himself a Dualist! The simple explanation will be found in the consideration that so far as the *phenomenal*, or the *manifested* world is concerned, the idea of Duality is launched into the discussion to indicate the two aspects of the one eternal whole, which together set the machinery of evolution into working order. But once turn from the manifested into the *noumenal*, the unmanifested Life and the erudite author will most probably cease to call himself a dualist, as is made very clear from the above quoted extract from his work.

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"It is needless to say again that every student of Adwaitism ought to possess himself of a copy of the work under review."

The *Purusharthapahtaini* of Masulipatam reviews the work as follows :—

"We have to acknowledge with thanks 'the Vedantasara.' It is a Manual of Advaita Philosophy of Paramahansa Sadananda Jogindra with an Introductory Memoir on Matter and Spirit. It is very ably prefaced by the Editor, Mr. Heeralal Dhole, whose learned and patriotic spirit longs to see the revival of the once glorious spiritual or religious advancement of our Aryan nation. The Memoir and the English Translation of the Original Sanskrit Text by Dr. Nandalal Dhole, late Surgeon to the Courts of Khetree and Marwar, with copious annotations, do justice to his ripe erudition. Kapila Maha Muni, the first Prince of Yoga Philosophy, has his masterly views expounded in the Memoir. The book is a Treasure of the Aryan Spiritual Philosophy and is to be in the possession of every enlightened gentleman."

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The *Indian Selector* in acknowledging the work writes :—

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The *Arya* says :—

" Mr. Nandalal Dhole, L.M.S., translator of the *Vedantasara* and the Publisher of his works,—Mr. Heeralal Dhole, are doubtless engaged in the laudable work of supplying the world with English Translations of the Aryan Philosophic and Spiritual literature. *A Hand-Book of Hindu Pantheism*, the *Panchadasi* with copious annotations * * * * * was received in our office during the last month. In it we find many valuable things deserving of a careful study by the votaries of Occult science, and * * * we recommend the work to the public for patronage."

The *Theosophist* writes as follows :—

"The work purposes to discuss 'fully and elaborately' 'whatever the Aryan Philosophy' says 'concerning the *Atma* (Soul) and *Parabrahma* (Absolute),' with 'critical notices of the other contending systems.' If we may judge from the contents of the [work] under notice, the authors evidently are for the Adwaita doctrine of Srimat Sankaracharya. The arguments against the opponents of that system are undoubtedly strong.

"The publication of the book under review is likely to do good, and we would recommend it to all who may be interested in a study of the *Aryan Philosophy*."

The *Philosophic Inquirer* remarks :—

"If there is a country in which the highest truths of philosophy were taught to the earliest man, it was our own country—India, the cradle of philosophy, which many a great intellect of our land delighted in, it was the Pantheistic phase of our Vedantic philosophy; if there is a philosophy, which while being most highly intellectual and sentimental, can at best satisfy the human instincts, it is, we venture to say, without fear of contradiction, Pantheism proper sprung in India. Any interpretation of such a philosophy faithful in its entirety must be welcome to all thinking minds; the undertaking therefore of our eminent contributor N. D. to translate the *Panchadasi* with annotations is laudable in every respect indeed; and on perusal of the * above translation to hand, we have been able to find therein a clear and systematic exposition of Vedantism to the extent executed. We cordially invite the attention of all our friends and readers to this very useful publication of the translator of the *Vedantasara*, and hope that it will meet with a large support from the educated section of our countrymen, the kind of support which it deserves."

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"What his views are in respect to this great problem, the attempt to slove which has been only fruitful in splitting the holders of different and conflicting theories into bitter and uncompromising sectarians and bigots of dogmatic proclivities, may best be gathered from the following most telling passage :—

"And now that Pantheism is attracting increased attention from the highest intellects of the West, after sleeping a sleep of death in this cradle land of humanity where it first saw the light of day; and since the recognition of this *First Principle*, call it *Prakriti*, *Purusha*, *Parabrahma*, or Matter, Spirit, the Absolute, or the Uuknowable, clashes not with the cherished ideas of the most inveterate Freethinker, the hard materialist, the staunch Atheist, the inexorable Physicist, or the follower of the so-called

isms who stand on the legs of logic and reason ; it may justly be termed as the centre round which the satellities of Religion revolve. Our adepts have been proclaiming from their high pedestal this solemn truth for centuries ; it has been repeated quite recently that the Deist's God exists nowhere. Yet, even yet, the world is slow to profit by such instruction, and so it must continue to the end of the chapter.'

"After stating in brief the aim of the work..................a work which will, as he [the author] himself thinks 'tend to stimulate a study of those precious records of thoughts which our progenitors left a legacy for us to inherit, far richer than the priceless *Kohinoor* or the collective totality of the world's gold and which now are monopolized by the cobwebs of the spider ; and if it be so fortuuate as to secure one ardent and earnest enquirer patiently taking up the work and finding the lost key, our end and aim will be gained'."

V. Yoga Shastra—Shiva Sanhita in Sanskrit with a Preliminary Discourse on Yoga Philosophy by Madavacharya (Vidyaranya Swami), the reputed author of *Sarva Darshan Sangraha*, *Panchadasi*, etc. Cloth Bound Re. 1-8.

The *National Guardian* introducing this book to its readers writes :—

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